Tilley v. Overton

1911 OK 284, 116 P. 945, 29 Okla. 292, 1911 Okla. LEXIS 288
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedJuly 11, 1911
Docket905
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 1911 OK 284 (Tilley v. Overton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tilley v. Overton, 1911 OK 284, 116 P. 945, 29 Okla. 292, 1911 Okla. LEXIS 288 (Okla. 1911).

Opinion

HAYES, J.

This is an appeal from an order vacating and setting aside a temporary injunction. When a demurrer to plaintiff in error’s petition and motion to vacate and dissolve the temporary injunction was filed in the court below by defendant in error, defendant below, plaintiff obtained leave and filed an amended petition. The facts upon which he bases his right to an injunction are as follows: He is a freeholder, property owner and taxpayer in school district No. 13 in Greer county, and defendant is the qualified and acting treasurer of said county. At the regular annual meeting, held in said school district No. 13 in the year 1908, less than one-fourth of the legal voters of said district attended and participated in the acts of said meeting. At that time there were more than 40 legal voters resident in the district entitled to vote at the annual -elections therein, if such voters had been present and offered to participate. At the annual meeting in said year the voters present voted to levy a lump sum of 15 mills as the tax levy for the support of the common schools for said district for the current school year of 1908, and *294 no other or different levy for that purpose for said year’ was •made either before or since the annual election. No levy of five mills was made by the board of the district, and no notice prior to said annual meeting was given of any purpose to increase the levy for that year above five mills; and none of the voters qf the district prior to said meeting had notice that it was the purpose 'or intention on the part of the district board in said district, or of any one, to levy at said meeting a school tax in excess of five mills. The 12 mills levied by a majority of those voting at the meeting was regularly and duly recorded and returned to the proper authorities of the county and placed on the tax roll and delivered to the defendant for collection, and the defendant is now demanding from the plaintiff and other taxpayers of the district that they shall pay the full amount of said levy of 12 mills upon the assessed valuation of all their property in said district for the support of the schools of that district; and plaintiff prays that he be granted an injunction, enjoining defendant in error as treasurer of the county from the collection of any part of said tax levy, which has been, he alleges, illegally and excessively levied, and to restrain defendant from paying out to the school district board any portion of the moneys paid into and received by him as county treasurer as the proceeds of said illegal and excessive levy.

The propositions of Saw presented by this proceeding for our consideration can best be approached by stating plaintiff’s contentions. He contends: First. That no part of the tax in excess of five mills authorized to be levied by section 9, art. 10, of the Constitution, can be levied by the people of a school district until there has been levied by the board of the school district a direct levy for five mills. Second. That the first five mills which said section authorizes to be levied by a district for the support of its common schools must be levied by the board, and not by a vote of the people. Third. That there cannot be levied by the board and by the people in excess of 10 mills for any one year. Fourth. That any levy above five mills must receive not only a majority of the voters voting at an -election *295 thereon, but a majority of all the voters resident in such district. Fifth. That before any levy can be voted in excess of five mills, notice that an election for that purpose will be held at the annual meeting must be given to the voters of the district before the vote thereon can be taken. Since some of these contentions are related and dependent upon each other, it will not be necessary to consider them all separately.

At the outset, it is necessary to determine the effect of the provisions of section 9, art. 10, of the Constitution, authorizing the levy annually of a school district tax for the support of the common schools. Said section in full reads as follows:

“Except as herein otherwise provided, the total taxes, on an ad valorem basis, for all purposes, state, county, township, city or town, and school district taxes shall not exceed in any 'one year thirty-one and one-half mills on the dollar, to be levied as follows: State levy, not more than three and one-half mills; county levy, not more than eight mills: Provided, that any county may levy not exceeding two mills additional for county high school and aid to the common schools of the county, not over one mill of which shall be for such high school, and the aid to said common schools shall be apportioned as provided by law; township levy, not more than five mills; city or town levy, not more than ten mills; school district levy, not more than five mills on the dollar for school district purposes for support o'f common school: Provided, that the aforesaid annual rate for school purposes may be increased by any school district by an amount not to exceed ten mills on the dollar valuation, on condition that a majority of the voters thereof voting at an election, vote for said increase.”

It will be observed that that portion of the section providing for a school district levy for the support of common schools may be separated in two parts, the first of which authorizes a levy for a district of not more than five mills on the dollar each year. The section is silent as to how this tax may or shall -be levied. No attempt is made to define the procedure for its levy, by whom it shall be levied, or when it shall be levied. It authorizes unqualifiedly, without restrictions or limitation so far as the Constitution attempts to regulate it, a levy for school district purposes not more than five mills on the dollar. The second part *296 of the section following the word “provided" authorizes an additional amount to be levied. That additional amount shall not exceed ten mills on the dollar valuation. The language of this clause is not that the original five mills may be increased by any school district “in an amount not to exceed ten mills,” but “may be increased by any school district by an amount not to exceed ten mills on the dollar valuation.” This language, we think, is not susceptible of the construction contended for by plaintiff in error, that it was intended to provide that the maximum amount that may be levied shall not exceed ten mills: The legislative intent was to authorize first a levy of a tax not to exceed five mills, leaving it to the Legislature to prescribe the manner, time, and by what authority this levy shall be made; but when a levy is to exceed five mills, which is authorized by the second part of the section, then there is placed upon the authority to levy such additional amount the constitutional restraint that it shall not be levied except with the approval of a majority of the voters of the district voting at an election thereon. The additional amount that may be levied under the limitation and restrictions of the second part of the section is ten mills, instead of five mills; and the limitation as to the manner of such levy, which does not occur as to the five mills authorized' by the preceding clause, is that it must receive the sanction of a majority of the voters of the district voting at the election, whereas the first five mills may be levied with or without such sanction of the voters as the Legislature may provide.

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Bluebook (online)
1911 OK 284, 116 P. 945, 29 Okla. 292, 1911 Okla. LEXIS 288, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tilley-v-overton-okla-1911.