Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 474 Digitally signed by Elizabeth ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS Perry Date: 2022.08.04 11:20:03 DIVISION IV -05'00' No. CV-19-529 Adobe Acrobat version: 2022.001.20169 Opinion Delivered October 23, 2019 TIJUANNA CRAWFORD APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE MILLER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 46JV-16-178]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE CARLTON D. JONES, HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE CHILDREN APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge
This appeal arises from the circuit court’s March 29, 2019 order terminating the
parental rights of Tijuanna Crawford to her four children, KC, JM, DC, and DC1. No
putative or legal father participated in these proceedings. 1 The children were removed from
their mother’s legal custody in September 2016 by the Arkansas Department of Human
Services (DHS). Crawford was incarcerated at that time, and the children were taken from
their maternal grandmother, who was deemed an unfit caregiver. The circuit court found
that, after approximately two and a half years during which reunification services had been
provided, the mother failed to demonstrate that she could provide a safe and stable home
for her children. The circuit court found that DHS proved four statutory grounds on which
1 The putative father of DC and DC1 did not establish significant contacts with those children in order for parental rights to attach. The putative father of KC and JM is deceased. to terminate her rights, and it also found that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate
her parental rights. Crawford appeals and argues that the lack of express written findings of
fact in the order requires reversal and remand to the circuit court to issue explicit findings
of fact underpinning its legal conclusions. We affirm.
In this case, DHS alleged, and the circuit court found that it proved, four statutory
grounds provided in Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(Supp. 2017)
against Crawford: (1) one year out of custody and failure to remedy; (2) willful failure to
provide significant support or to maintain meaningful contact with the children; (3)
subsequent other factors preventing reunification; and (4) aggravated circumstances with
little likelihood of reunification. In its order, the circuit court stated that it considered “the
testimony, exhibits, statements of the parties and counsel, the record herein, and other things
and matters presented,” and it set out each of the statutory grounds with particularity. The
order did not elaborate on the evidence that supported each statutory ground. Crawford’s
appellate argument is a procedural one, not substantive. Crawford’s argument is
unconvincing.
Crawford did not request specific findings of fact from the circuit court, nor can she
cite any authority for the proposition that the court in this termination proceeding is
otherwise obligated to expressly make specific findings of fact to support each of its findings
on statutory grounds and best interest absent a request to do so. See Chaffin v. Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 522, 471 S.W.3d 251. The failure of a party to request special
findings of fact amounts to a waiver of that right. Smith v. Quality Ford, Inc., 324 Ark. 272,
276, 920 S.W.2d 497, 499 (1996). In the absence of a statute or rule requiring specific
2 findings of fact or a timely request for specific findings under Arkansas Rule of Civil
Procedure 52, the appellate court will ordinarily presume that the trial court made the
findings necessary to support its judgment. See Curry v. Pope Cty. Equalization Bd., 2011
Ark. 408, 385 S.W.3d 130; Marshall v. Rubright, 2017 Ark. App. 548; Chaffin, supra; Am.
States Ins. Co. v. Williams, 2010 Ark. App. 840. “[W]hen the trial court fails to make certain
findings of fact, the appellate court, under its de novo review, may nonetheless conclude
that the evidence supported the decision.” Chastain v. Chastain, 2012 Ark. App. 73, at 12,
388 S.W.3d 495, 502 (citing Hamilton v. Barrett, 337 Ark. 460, 989 S.W.2d 520 (1999)). In
determining whether the circuit judge clearly erred in a finding, the appellate court may
look to the whole record to reach that decision. Stehle v. Zimmerebner, 375 Ark. 446, 455,
291 S.W.3d 573, 580 (2009). Indeed, de novo review of the evidence makes it incumbent
on the appellate court to review the entire record of the evidence presented to the circuit
court. See ConAgra, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 Ark. 672, 678, 30 S.W.3d 725, 729 (2000).
Termination of parental rights is a two-step process requiring a determination that
the parent is unfit and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Houseman v. Ark.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 227, 491 S.W.3d 153. We review termination-of-
parental-rights cases de novo. Id. The grounds for termination of parental rights must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is the degree of proof that will produce in
the fact-finder a firm conviction regarding the allegation sought to be established. Id.
To the extent that Crawford contends there is insufficient evidence on which to
terminate her parental rights, we disagree. In our de novo review of this record, if any one
of the four alleged statutory grounds has been adequately supported, then we will not reverse
3 the circuit court’s order as to grounds. McDaniel v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark.
App. 335, 579 S.W.3d 184. For purposes of appeal, we focus on the subsequent-other-
factors ground, and this record supports the circuit court’s order.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a) sets forth the subsequent-
other-factors ground for termination: that other factors or issues arose subsequent to the
filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect that demonstrate that placement of the
children in the custody of the parent is contrary to their health, safety, or welfare and that,
despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or
indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parent’s
circumstances that prevent the placement of the children in the custody of the parent. See
also Arnold v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 300, 578 S.W.3d 329. In ruling
from the bench, the circuit court stated that it did not know whether the problem was
Crawford’s incapacity or her lack of motivation to fix the situation that was preventing the
return of the children to her custody. The circuit court stated that, since her children’s
removal, Crawford had been rearrested and had tested positive for drugs, and she initially
testified at the termination hearing that she would not test positive for drugs but ultimately
admitted that she had taken an illegal drug the previous day.
Our de novo review of this record amply supports the finding in the termination
order that DHS proved the subsequent-other-factors ground. The children had been
removed in September 2016 from their grandmother’s custody, given that Crawford was
incarcerated.
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Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 474 Digitally signed by Elizabeth ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS Perry Date: 2022.08.04 11:20:03 DIVISION IV -05'00' No. CV-19-529 Adobe Acrobat version: 2022.001.20169 Opinion Delivered October 23, 2019 TIJUANNA CRAWFORD APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE MILLER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 46JV-16-178]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE CARLTON D. JONES, HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE CHILDREN APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge
This appeal arises from the circuit court’s March 29, 2019 order terminating the
parental rights of Tijuanna Crawford to her four children, KC, JM, DC, and DC1. No
putative or legal father participated in these proceedings. 1 The children were removed from
their mother’s legal custody in September 2016 by the Arkansas Department of Human
Services (DHS). Crawford was incarcerated at that time, and the children were taken from
their maternal grandmother, who was deemed an unfit caregiver. The circuit court found
that, after approximately two and a half years during which reunification services had been
provided, the mother failed to demonstrate that she could provide a safe and stable home
for her children. The circuit court found that DHS proved four statutory grounds on which
1 The putative father of DC and DC1 did not establish significant contacts with those children in order for parental rights to attach. The putative father of KC and JM is deceased. to terminate her rights, and it also found that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate
her parental rights. Crawford appeals and argues that the lack of express written findings of
fact in the order requires reversal and remand to the circuit court to issue explicit findings
of fact underpinning its legal conclusions. We affirm.
In this case, DHS alleged, and the circuit court found that it proved, four statutory
grounds provided in Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(Supp. 2017)
against Crawford: (1) one year out of custody and failure to remedy; (2) willful failure to
provide significant support or to maintain meaningful contact with the children; (3)
subsequent other factors preventing reunification; and (4) aggravated circumstances with
little likelihood of reunification. In its order, the circuit court stated that it considered “the
testimony, exhibits, statements of the parties and counsel, the record herein, and other things
and matters presented,” and it set out each of the statutory grounds with particularity. The
order did not elaborate on the evidence that supported each statutory ground. Crawford’s
appellate argument is a procedural one, not substantive. Crawford’s argument is
unconvincing.
Crawford did not request specific findings of fact from the circuit court, nor can she
cite any authority for the proposition that the court in this termination proceeding is
otherwise obligated to expressly make specific findings of fact to support each of its findings
on statutory grounds and best interest absent a request to do so. See Chaffin v. Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 522, 471 S.W.3d 251. The failure of a party to request special
findings of fact amounts to a waiver of that right. Smith v. Quality Ford, Inc., 324 Ark. 272,
276, 920 S.W.2d 497, 499 (1996). In the absence of a statute or rule requiring specific
2 findings of fact or a timely request for specific findings under Arkansas Rule of Civil
Procedure 52, the appellate court will ordinarily presume that the trial court made the
findings necessary to support its judgment. See Curry v. Pope Cty. Equalization Bd., 2011
Ark. 408, 385 S.W.3d 130; Marshall v. Rubright, 2017 Ark. App. 548; Chaffin, supra; Am.
States Ins. Co. v. Williams, 2010 Ark. App. 840. “[W]hen the trial court fails to make certain
findings of fact, the appellate court, under its de novo review, may nonetheless conclude
that the evidence supported the decision.” Chastain v. Chastain, 2012 Ark. App. 73, at 12,
388 S.W.3d 495, 502 (citing Hamilton v. Barrett, 337 Ark. 460, 989 S.W.2d 520 (1999)). In
determining whether the circuit judge clearly erred in a finding, the appellate court may
look to the whole record to reach that decision. Stehle v. Zimmerebner, 375 Ark. 446, 455,
291 S.W.3d 573, 580 (2009). Indeed, de novo review of the evidence makes it incumbent
on the appellate court to review the entire record of the evidence presented to the circuit
court. See ConAgra, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 Ark. 672, 678, 30 S.W.3d 725, 729 (2000).
Termination of parental rights is a two-step process requiring a determination that
the parent is unfit and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Houseman v. Ark.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 227, 491 S.W.3d 153. We review termination-of-
parental-rights cases de novo. Id. The grounds for termination of parental rights must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is the degree of proof that will produce in
the fact-finder a firm conviction regarding the allegation sought to be established. Id.
To the extent that Crawford contends there is insufficient evidence on which to
terminate her parental rights, we disagree. In our de novo review of this record, if any one
of the four alleged statutory grounds has been adequately supported, then we will not reverse
3 the circuit court’s order as to grounds. McDaniel v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark.
App. 335, 579 S.W.3d 184. For purposes of appeal, we focus on the subsequent-other-
factors ground, and this record supports the circuit court’s order.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a) sets forth the subsequent-
other-factors ground for termination: that other factors or issues arose subsequent to the
filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect that demonstrate that placement of the
children in the custody of the parent is contrary to their health, safety, or welfare and that,
despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or
indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parent’s
circumstances that prevent the placement of the children in the custody of the parent. See
also Arnold v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 300, 578 S.W.3d 329. In ruling
from the bench, the circuit court stated that it did not know whether the problem was
Crawford’s incapacity or her lack of motivation to fix the situation that was preventing the
return of the children to her custody. The circuit court stated that, since her children’s
removal, Crawford had been rearrested and had tested positive for drugs, and she initially
testified at the termination hearing that she would not test positive for drugs but ultimately
admitted that she had taken an illegal drug the previous day.
Our de novo review of this record amply supports the finding in the termination
order that DHS proved the subsequent-other-factors ground. The children had been
removed in September 2016 from their grandmother’s custody, given that Crawford was
incarcerated. A psychological examination revealed that Crawford has an extremely low
IQ; that her drug of choice was marijuana, but she also used cocaine; that she had never had
4 drug treatment; that she has emotional issues including bipolar disorder, for which she
should attend counseling and be medicated; and that her visitation should be supervised.
Over the next two years, services were provided to Crawford, and she intermittently
attempted to work the case plan, but she was in and out of prison, she left her mental-health
issues and drug-abuse issues untreated, she failed to maintain employment, and she visited
her children at times but not consistently.
The termination hearing was conducted in March 2019 at which time the children
ranged in age from thirteen to three, and they had been out of Crawford’s custody
approximately two and a half years. Over the course of this DHS case, Crawford tested
positive several times for amphetamines and methamphetamine and once for THC. Since
the case had been open, Crawford has been incarcerated for approximately 280 days in three
different states, she had moved residences at least ten times, DHS had no information on
Crawford’s current residence, and she had not maintained a steady job. Crawford had long-
standing substance-abuse issues, and she had significant emotional problems for which she
needed counseling that she did not attend. Crawford had not visited her children at all since
October 2018. Crawford had another baby, but he was presently living with a relative.
Crawford stated that she was moving again soon to another apartment.
In short, DHS’s evidence showed that after all this time, Crawford lacked the stability
that the children needed. Crawford was unwilling or unable to face her mental-health and
substance-abuse issues, to stay out of criminal trouble, or to be the parent that her children
need. The circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the subsequent-other-factors
statutory ground was proved.
5 To the extent Crawford argues that the circuit court’s best-interest finding is flawed,
we disagree. The circuit court found that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate
parental rights, having taken into consideration (1) the likelihood that the children would
be adopted and (2) the potential harm to them if returned to their mother’s custody.
The testimony showed that the oldest child, KC, was living in a therapeutic foster
home, and she had some behavioral issues that were being addressed with counseling, but
she was otherwise doing well. The CASA supervisor did not think that KC was presently
adoptable due to her emotional problems, but with continued treatment, she would be. JM
was serving ninety days in a juvenile facility for committing a terroristic act, and he had
some aggression issues, but DHS was working on getting him into a long-term residential
placement. The DHS supervisor and the CASA supervisor both believed that finding JM
an adoptive home would be difficult, but that with proper treatment, he could be adopted.
DC had been in the same foster home the entire time and was in play therapy for behavioral
issues. DC1 had been in the same foster home the entire time, although not with DC, and
he was doing well. The adoption specialist opined that all the children were adoptable,
especially the young ones, DC and DC1, who were physically healthy and had no issues
preventing adoption. The adoption specialist acknowledged that KC and JM both had
behavioral issues, JM more so than KC, but believed that their issues could be modified and
stabilized given that they were both getting treatment and they were both young and
physically healthy. The adoption specialist’s goal was to have the children adopted as a
sibling group. As already described, Crawford was in no position to take her children after
more than two years of services, so there was evidence of potential harm in returning them
6 to her. Our de novo review of the evidence in this case supports the circuit court’s best-
interest finding, so we cannot say that it is clearly erroneous.
In summary, we reject Crawford’s argument on appeal that the circuit court was
required to “make express findings of fact in its written order” to support the statutory
grounds and best interest of the children, particularly in the absence of a request by Crawford
of the circuit court to do so. Furthermore, our de novo review of the evidence leads us to
conclude that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that statutory grounds had been
proved and that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate Crawford’s parental rights.
Affirmed.
HARRISON and SWITZER, JJ., agree.
Leah Lanford, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.
Ellen K. Howard, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Chrestman Group, PLLC, by: Keith L. Chrestman, attorney ad litem for minor
children.