Judgment rendered July 6, 2022. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.
No. 54,605-CA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
TIFFANY WINES Plaintiff-Appellant
versus
JAMILA HOLLINGSQUEST AND Defendants GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY
Appealed from the Third Judicial District Court for the Parish of Union, Louisiana Trial Court No. 49,696
Honorable Thomas Wynn Rogers, Judge
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS B. WAHLDER Counsel for Appellant By: Thomas Benjamin Wahlder Laurie Simms Wahlder Stephen Hecker
DAVENPORT, FILES & KELLY, L.L.P. Counsel for Appellee, By: Martin Shane Craighead Shelter Mutual Insurance Company
Before STONE, STEPHENS, and MARCOTTE, JJ. STEPHENS, J.
This appeal is from the trial court’s judgment granting summary
judgment in favor of defendant, Shelter Mutual Insurance Company
(“Shelter”), and dismissed all claims of plaintiff, Tiffany Wines (“Tiffany”),
against Shelter, with prejudice, at her cost. For the reasons set forth below,
we affirm.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 9, 2020, Tiffany was a guest passenger riding in a vehicle
owned and being operated by Markeia Hicks (“Ms. Hicks”) when it was
struck by a vehicle being negligently operated by defendant, Jamila
Hollingsquest (“Ms. Hollingsquest”). Tiffany filed suit against Ms.
Hollingsquest and her auto liability insurer, GEICO Casualty Company
(“GEICO”), and Ms. Hicks’s uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”)
insurer, Shelter.
In its answer, Shelter denied that its policy provided any UM coverage
to Tiffany and moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the UM
claims asserted by Tiffany. Specifically, Shelter alleged that because
Tiffany is not a named insured or an “additional listed insured” under the
policy, is not a “relative” of the named insured, and was not “using” the
vehicle as defined in the policy, she has no claim for UM coverage under the
Shelter policy. According to Shelter, Tiffany was simply a guest passenger
in Ms. Hicks’s vehicle.
Tiffany filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment,
contending that she was an “individual using the described auto with
permission,” and therefore is an “insured” under the Shelter policy for
purposes of UM coverage. Going further, Tiffany suggested that the Shelter policy’s definition of “use” is unenforceable because it “impermissibly
contravenes” the mandates of La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(a)(i) and (ii), inter alia.
A hearing on the motion was held on August 16, 2021, and a written
ruling was issued by the court on August 20, 2021. The trial court found
that Nielson v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 2014-0614 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/7/14),
167 So. 3d 697, writ denied, 2014-2564 (La. 3/13/15), 160 So. 3d 964, cited
by Shelter in its memorandum in support of summary judgment, was directly
on point and granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment. A written
judgment in accordance therewith was signed by the trial court on
September 1, 2021, granting Shelter’s motion for summary judgment and
dismissing with prejudice, at plaintiff’s cost, her claims against the insurer.
It is from this judgment1 that plaintiff, Tiffany Wines, has appealed.
DISCUSSION
Tiffany’s sole assignment of error is that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Shelter, the defendant insurer, and
dismissing her claims. Tiffany urges that this ruling is an error of law based
upon a misstatement of law set forth in Nielson, supra, wherein the appellate
court upheld and enforced an identical policy definition of “use” to exclude
and dismiss the UM claims of an injured guest passenger without observing
the statutory mandates of Louisiana’s UM law.
In response, Shelter denies that its policy provides UM coverage for
Tiffany Wines under the facts of this case. In Nielson, supra, the First
Circuit found that Shelter’s auto policy does not extend UM coverage to a
1 On August 25, 2021, a revised ruling was issued by the trial court; this revision was identical to the original ruling, the exception being the assessment of costs associated with the motion to plaintiff, Tiffany Wines. 2 guest passenger who does not qualify as an “insured” under the policy.
Nielson dealt with the same factual scenario and the same Shelter policy
language, and interpreted the policy language as precluding UM coverage
for these reasons:
• While there is strong public policy in favor of UM insurance coverage in Louisiana, an insured is free to reject or limit UM coverage in order to reduce premiums;
• The Shelter policy clearly limits who is covered for UM purposes; and
• The policy should be enforced as written, as such limitations are permissible under Louisiana’s UM law.
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same
criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary
judgment is appropriate. Leisure Recreation & Entertainment, Inc. v. First
Guaranty Bank, 2021-00838 (La. 3/25/22), ___ So. 3d ___, 2022 WL
883911; Elliott v. Continental Cas. Co., 2006-1505 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So. 2d
1247; Reynolds v. Select Properties, Ltd., 1993-1480 (La. 4/11/94), 634 So.
2d 1180; Davis v. Whitaker, 53,850 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/28/21), 315 So. 3d
979. A motion for summary judgment will be granted if the motion,
memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue
as to material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).
Where the facts are undisputed and the matter presents a purely legal
question, summary judgment is appropriate. Higgins v. v. Louisiana Farm
Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 2020-01094 (La. 3/24/21), 315 So. 3d 838.
Interpretation of an insurance policy ordinarily involves a legal question that
can be properly resolved by a motion for summary judgment. Bernard v.
Ellis, 2011-2377 (La. 7/2/12) 111 So. 3d 995, 1002.
3 An insurance policy is a contract that constitutes the law between the
insurer and the insured. La. C.C. art. 1983; Doucet v. Darwin Select Ins.
Co., 2016-1989 (La. 2/3/17), 210 So. 3d 794; Peterson v. Schimek, 1998-
1712 (La. 3/2/99), 729 So. 2d 1024. The judiciary’s role in interpreting
insurance contracts is to ascertain the common intent of the parties to the
contract. C.C. art. 2045; Cadwallader v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2002-1637 (La.
6/27/03), 848 So. 2d 577.
Absent a conflict with statutory provisions or public policy, insurers
are entitled to limit their liability and to impose reasonable conditions upon
the obligations they contractually assume. Landry v. Progressive Security
Ins. Co., 2021-00621 (La. 1/28/22), ___ So. 3d ___, 2022 WL 263003. The
purpose of liability insurance is to afford the insured protection from damage
claims. Peterson, supra; Ledbetter v. Concord General Corp., 1995-0809
(La.1/6/96), 665 So. 2d 1166.
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Judgment rendered July 6, 2022. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.
No. 54,605-CA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
TIFFANY WINES Plaintiff-Appellant
versus
JAMILA HOLLINGSQUEST AND Defendants GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY
Appealed from the Third Judicial District Court for the Parish of Union, Louisiana Trial Court No. 49,696
Honorable Thomas Wynn Rogers, Judge
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS B. WAHLDER Counsel for Appellant By: Thomas Benjamin Wahlder Laurie Simms Wahlder Stephen Hecker
DAVENPORT, FILES & KELLY, L.L.P. Counsel for Appellee, By: Martin Shane Craighead Shelter Mutual Insurance Company
Before STONE, STEPHENS, and MARCOTTE, JJ. STEPHENS, J.
This appeal is from the trial court’s judgment granting summary
judgment in favor of defendant, Shelter Mutual Insurance Company
(“Shelter”), and dismissed all claims of plaintiff, Tiffany Wines (“Tiffany”),
against Shelter, with prejudice, at her cost. For the reasons set forth below,
we affirm.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 9, 2020, Tiffany was a guest passenger riding in a vehicle
owned and being operated by Markeia Hicks (“Ms. Hicks”) when it was
struck by a vehicle being negligently operated by defendant, Jamila
Hollingsquest (“Ms. Hollingsquest”). Tiffany filed suit against Ms.
Hollingsquest and her auto liability insurer, GEICO Casualty Company
(“GEICO”), and Ms. Hicks’s uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”)
insurer, Shelter.
In its answer, Shelter denied that its policy provided any UM coverage
to Tiffany and moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the UM
claims asserted by Tiffany. Specifically, Shelter alleged that because
Tiffany is not a named insured or an “additional listed insured” under the
policy, is not a “relative” of the named insured, and was not “using” the
vehicle as defined in the policy, she has no claim for UM coverage under the
Shelter policy. According to Shelter, Tiffany was simply a guest passenger
in Ms. Hicks’s vehicle.
Tiffany filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment,
contending that she was an “individual using the described auto with
permission,” and therefore is an “insured” under the Shelter policy for
purposes of UM coverage. Going further, Tiffany suggested that the Shelter policy’s definition of “use” is unenforceable because it “impermissibly
contravenes” the mandates of La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(a)(i) and (ii), inter alia.
A hearing on the motion was held on August 16, 2021, and a written
ruling was issued by the court on August 20, 2021. The trial court found
that Nielson v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 2014-0614 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/7/14),
167 So. 3d 697, writ denied, 2014-2564 (La. 3/13/15), 160 So. 3d 964, cited
by Shelter in its memorandum in support of summary judgment, was directly
on point and granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment. A written
judgment in accordance therewith was signed by the trial court on
September 1, 2021, granting Shelter’s motion for summary judgment and
dismissing with prejudice, at plaintiff’s cost, her claims against the insurer.
It is from this judgment1 that plaintiff, Tiffany Wines, has appealed.
DISCUSSION
Tiffany’s sole assignment of error is that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Shelter, the defendant insurer, and
dismissing her claims. Tiffany urges that this ruling is an error of law based
upon a misstatement of law set forth in Nielson, supra, wherein the appellate
court upheld and enforced an identical policy definition of “use” to exclude
and dismiss the UM claims of an injured guest passenger without observing
the statutory mandates of Louisiana’s UM law.
In response, Shelter denies that its policy provides UM coverage for
Tiffany Wines under the facts of this case. In Nielson, supra, the First
Circuit found that Shelter’s auto policy does not extend UM coverage to a
1 On August 25, 2021, a revised ruling was issued by the trial court; this revision was identical to the original ruling, the exception being the assessment of costs associated with the motion to plaintiff, Tiffany Wines. 2 guest passenger who does not qualify as an “insured” under the policy.
Nielson dealt with the same factual scenario and the same Shelter policy
language, and interpreted the policy language as precluding UM coverage
for these reasons:
• While there is strong public policy in favor of UM insurance coverage in Louisiana, an insured is free to reject or limit UM coverage in order to reduce premiums;
• The Shelter policy clearly limits who is covered for UM purposes; and
• The policy should be enforced as written, as such limitations are permissible under Louisiana’s UM law.
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same
criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary
judgment is appropriate. Leisure Recreation & Entertainment, Inc. v. First
Guaranty Bank, 2021-00838 (La. 3/25/22), ___ So. 3d ___, 2022 WL
883911; Elliott v. Continental Cas. Co., 2006-1505 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So. 2d
1247; Reynolds v. Select Properties, Ltd., 1993-1480 (La. 4/11/94), 634 So.
2d 1180; Davis v. Whitaker, 53,850 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/28/21), 315 So. 3d
979. A motion for summary judgment will be granted if the motion,
memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue
as to material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).
Where the facts are undisputed and the matter presents a purely legal
question, summary judgment is appropriate. Higgins v. v. Louisiana Farm
Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 2020-01094 (La. 3/24/21), 315 So. 3d 838.
Interpretation of an insurance policy ordinarily involves a legal question that
can be properly resolved by a motion for summary judgment. Bernard v.
Ellis, 2011-2377 (La. 7/2/12) 111 So. 3d 995, 1002.
3 An insurance policy is a contract that constitutes the law between the
insurer and the insured. La. C.C. art. 1983; Doucet v. Darwin Select Ins.
Co., 2016-1989 (La. 2/3/17), 210 So. 3d 794; Peterson v. Schimek, 1998-
1712 (La. 3/2/99), 729 So. 2d 1024. The judiciary’s role in interpreting
insurance contracts is to ascertain the common intent of the parties to the
contract. C.C. art. 2045; Cadwallader v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2002-1637 (La.
6/27/03), 848 So. 2d 577.
Absent a conflict with statutory provisions or public policy, insurers
are entitled to limit their liability and to impose reasonable conditions upon
the obligations they contractually assume. Landry v. Progressive Security
Ins. Co., 2021-00621 (La. 1/28/22), ___ So. 3d ___, 2022 WL 263003. The
purpose of liability insurance is to afford the insured protection from damage
claims. Peterson, supra; Ledbetter v. Concord General Corp., 1995-0809
(La.1/6/96), 665 So. 2d 1166.
The extent of coverage is determined from the intent of the parties as
reflected by the words of the insurance policy. Ledbetter, supra. Exclusions
in an insurance policy that conflict with statutes or public policy will not be
enforced. Landry, supra; Marcus v. Hanover Ins. Co., 1998-2040 (La.
6/4/99), 740 So. 2d 603. The Court’s search for public policy governing
automobile insurance policies must begin with the statutes enacted by the
Legislature. Landry, supra; Sensebe v. Canal Indem. Co., 2010-0703 (La.
1/28/11), 58 So. 3d 441.
When the existence of UM coverage under a policy of insurance is at
issue, a two-step analysis is required. First, the automobile insurance policy
is examined to determine whether UM coverage is contractually provided
under the express provisions of the policy. Next, if no UM coverage is 4 found under the policy provisions, then the UM statute is applied to
determine whether statutory coverage is mandated. Higgins, 315 So. 3d at
441-42; Green ex rel. Peterson v. Johnson, 2014- 0292 (La. 10/15/14), 149
So. 3d 766, 773-74; Filipski v. Imperial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 2009-1013
(La. 12/1/09), 25 So. 3d 742; Cadwallader, supra; Succession of Fannaly v.
Lafayette Ins. Co., 2001-1355 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 1134; Magnon v.
Collins, 1998-2822 (La. 7/7/99), 739 So. 2d 191; Davis, supra.
We therefore look first at the UM coverage expressly provided in
Markeia Hicks’s Shelter policy to determine whether contractual UM
coverage existed for Tiffany’s injuries in the present case. See, Green ex rel.
Peterson, 149 So. 3d at 774.
• The insurance policy issued by Shelter to Ms. Hicks provided auto liability and UM coverages in the amount of $50,000 each person/$100,000 each accident.
• UM coverage in an amount equal to the bodily injury liability limits was provided for in the Shelter policy.
• The Shelter policy specifically described as a “covered vehicle” the 2020 Kia Forte FR 4DR operated by Ms. Hicks and occupied by Tiffany as a passenger at the time of the accident.
• In addition to the named insured, Markeia Hicks, the Shelter policy also provided liability and UM coverage to individuals using the covered vehicle with permission.
• The Shelter policy has an omnibus insured clause providing liability coverage to permissive users. The omnibus clause provides: o Individuals who have permission or general consent to use the described auto are insureds for claims resulting from that use.
• The Shelter policy also provided UM coverage to any individual permissively using the described vehicle. o Part IV-Coverage E-Uninsured Motor Vehicle Liability Coverage contains “Additional Definitions Used in Coverage E,” which include: o (1) Damages means money owed to an insured for bodily injuries, sickness or disease, sustained by that insured and caused by an accident arising out of the ownership or use of a motor vehicle. 5 o (2) Insured means: ▪ (a) You; ▪ (b) Relatives; ▪ (c) Individuals listed in the Declarations as an “additional listed insured” who do not own a motor vehicle, and whose spouse does not own a motor vehicle; and ▪ (d) Any individual using the described auto with permission. (Emphasis added.)
• The Shelter policy contains the following definitions: o (30) Operator means an individual who is using a vehicle. o (33) Passenger means an individual who is occupying one of the seats of a vehicle with permission but does not include the operator of a vehicle. o (42) Relative means an individual related to you by blood, marriage, or adoption who is a resident of your household. It includes your child who is away at school, if that child is both unmarried and unemancipated. Relative also includes any foster children in your legal custody for more than 90 consecutive days immediately before the occurrence. An individual who owns a motor vehicle or whose husband or wife owns a motor vehicle, is excluded from the definition of relative. o (52)(2)(b)(iii) Uninsured motor vehicle means a motor vehicle being used by a person liable for damages because of that use; if that owner or operator is covered by a policy of liability insurance applicable to the accident but the monetary limits of that policy are less than the full amount owed by its owner or operator for the insured’s damages. o (54) Use means physically controlling, or attempting to physically control, the movements of a vehicle. It includes any emergency repairs performed in the course of a trip, if those repairs are necessary to the continued use of the vehicle.
As set forth in Shelter’s insurance policy, damages means “money
owed to an insured…” As noted by the First Circuit in Nielson, supra at
701-02, per its policy’s plain language, Shelter owes underinsured/uninsured
motorist damages only to individuals who are an “insured” for purposes of
UM coverage. The policy clearly defines an insured for UM coverage as:
(1) “you” (defined as the named insured); (2) relatives (as defined in the
policy); (3) persons listed in the declarations as an “additional listed insured”
6 who do not own a motor vehicle and whose spouse does not own a motor
vehicle; and (4) an individual “using” the described auto with permission.
Tiffany is not the named insured—Markeia Hicks is the sole named
insured. Next, there is no evidence that Tiffany is an individual related to
Ms. Hicks by blood, marriage, or adoption and a resident of her household;
therefore, Tiffany is not a “relative” of the named insured, Markeia Hicks.
Third, Tiffany is not listed as an additional insured on the Shelter policy.
Finally, Tiffany was not “using” the described auto with permission; as a
guest passenger, Tiffany, while in the vehicle with permission, was merely
an occupant, not a user, as defined by the clear language of the Shelter
policy. As noted above, to be considered “using” the described auto,
Tiffany would have to have been a permitted operator, not a passenger, and
would have been, at the time of the accident, “physically controlling, or
attempting to physically control, the movements” of the described vehicle.
Since Tiffany does not qualify for UM coverage under the contractual
provisions of the Shelter policy, we turn to the second step of the analysis set
forth in Green ex rel. Peterson, supra, which is application of the UM
statute, La. R.S. 22:1295, to determine whether statutory coverage is
mandated.
Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1295 provides in part:
The following provisions shall govern the issuance of uninsured motorist coverage in this state: (1)(a)(i) No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle designed for use on public highways and required to be registered in this state or as provided in this Section unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than the limits of bodily injury liability provided by the policy, under provisions filed with and approved by the commissioner of insurance, for the protection 7 of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover nonpunitive damages from owners or operators of uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death resulting therefrom… (Emphasis added.)
By its express language, La. R.S. 22:1295 does not require UM coverage for
passengers; what it does require is that automobile liability policies shall
include UM coverage “for the protection of persons insured thereunder.”
“Although Louisiana’s public policy strongly favors UM coverage and a
liberal construction of the UM statute, it is well settled that a person who
does not qualify as a liability insured under a policy of insurance is not
entitled to UM coverage under the policy.” Magnon, 739 So. 2d at 196;
Taylor v. Rowell, 1998-2865 (La. 5/18/99), 736 So. 2d 812; Howell v.
Balboa Ins. Co., 564 So. 2d 298 (La. 1990); Seaton v. Kelly, 339 So. 2d 731
(La. 1976). Therefore, if a person is not an insured under a liability policy,
then there is no requirement that UM coverage be provided to them,
regardless of whether they are a passenger. Magnon, supra.
Regarding the liability portion of Shelter’s insurance policy issued to
Markeia Hicks:
• As to liability coverage for bodily injury and property damage coverage, Shelter agrees to pay damages on behalf of an insured….
• In Coverage A (Bodily Injury) and Coverage B (Property Damage):
o (1) Damages means money, including pre-judgment interest, an insured is legally obligated to pay another person because of bodily injury, property damage, or consequential loss, arising out of an accident caused by that insured’s ownership, maintenance, or use of the described auto or a non-owned auto.
o (2) Insured means a person included in one of the following categories, but only to the extent stated for that category. ▪ Category 1: You are an insured for claims resulting from your ownership, maintenance, or use of the described auto; and your use of non-owned autos.
8 ▪ Category 2: • (a) Relatives; and • (b) Individuals listed in the Declarations as an “additional listed insured” who do not own a motor vehicle, and whose spouse does not own a motor vehicle; are insureds for claims resulting from their use of the described auto and their use of non- owned autos.
▪ Category 3: • (a) Individuals who would meet the definition of relative except for the fact that they own a motor vehicle, or their spouse owns a motor vehicle; and • (b) Individuals listed in the Declarations as an “additional listed insured” who own a motor vehicle, or whose spouse owns a motor vehicle; are insureds for claims resulting from their use of the described auto.
▪ Category 4: ▪ Individuals who have permission or general consent to use the described auto are insureds for claims resulting from that use.
To determine whether UM coverage is mandated by La. R.S. 22:1295 in this
case, as the UM statute has been interpreted by our supreme court, the
question to be answered is whether Tiffany qualifies as an insured under one
of the above four categories of insureds.
Tiffany is not a named insured, and there is no evidence that she was
related to Ms. Hicks by blood, marriage, or adoption, or that she “resided” in
Ms. Hicks’s household to be within the policy’s definition of relative.
Likewise, Tiffany is not included as an “additional listed insured” under the
terms of the Shelter policy. Finally, Tiffany’s claims do not result from her
“use” of the described auto as defined by the policy. Therefore, Tiffany
Wines is not within the four specific categories of insureds for liability
coverage under the Shelter auto policy issued to Ms. Hicks. Because
Tiffany is not a liability insured under the Shelter policy, La. R.S. 22:1295
does not require UM coverage for her. 9 In finding that the identical Shelter policy language was neither
contrary to public policy nor in conflict with statutory provisions mandating
UM coverage in Louisiana, the First Circuit in Nielson wrote the following:
Nielson relies on the recent Louisiana Supreme Court case, Bernard v. Ellis, 2011-2377 (La. 7/2/12), 111 So. 3d 995, 1003. In Bernard, the Supreme Court evaluated whether there was UM coverage for a guest policy under a policy issued by Imperial Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, specifically recognizing that Imperial’s policy did not define the term “use,” which necessitated the Court to look to jurisprudence and interpret the ambiguous term broadly to include riding as a passenger. It is important to note the factual distinction between Bernard and the case before us, since we are dealing with an insurance policy that specifically defines the term “use” to not include a passenger. We further note that the Supreme Court did not hold that Louisiana law prohibits an insurance company from excluding a guest passenger from UM coverage. Rather, it simply held that under the ambiguously undefined policy language at issue in Bernard, a passenger would be included as an insured for UM purposes. Id. at 1005. Shelter’s policy, on the other hand, very clearly defines “use” in such a way that a guest passenger is not an insured for purposes of liability or UM coverage. Thus, we find that Bernard is not controlling of the facts in this case.
While there is strong public policy in favor of UM insurance coverage in Louisiana, an insured is free to reject or limit UM coverage in order to reduce premiums. The Shelter policy clearly limits who is covered for UM purposes, and the policy should be enforced as written. (footnote omitted).
Nielson, 167 So. 3d at 701-02. We agree with the First Circuit, and find no
reason to decide otherwise in the case before us.
While Tiffany has also made statutory and public policy arguments in
support of her claim that the Shelter insurance policy provides UM coverage
for her as a passenger, we summarily reject them as unfounded. Until and
unless the Louisiana Legislature sees fit to amend the UM statute, we will
not usurp its function by doing so as a court. Landry, supra, 2021-00621 at
**11-12. As stated by the supreme court in Taylor, 736 So. 2d at 818, citing
Hearty v. Harris, 574 So. 2d 1234, 1242 (La. 1991), “while ‘automobile 10 liability policies’ are issued primarily for the protection of the public rather
than the insured, it is not the public policy of this state to protect and provide
compensation to injured persons at all times.”
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed. Costs are assessed against plaintiff, Tiffany Wines.
AFFIRMED.