MEMORANDUM DECISION Sep 29 2015, 9:02 am Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Joel M. Schumm Gregory F. Zoeller Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Michael Gene Worden Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tiffany Smith, September 29, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1503-CR-144 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court. The Honorable Judge David State of Indiana, Hooper, Judge Pro Tempore. Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 49F18-1308-FD-53633
Friedlander, Senior Judge
1 [1] Tiffany Smith appeals her conviction of theft, a Class D felony. We affirm.
1 The version of the governing statute, i.e., Ind. Code Ann. § 35-43-4-2 (West, Westlaw 2013) in effect at the time this offense was committed classified it as a class D felony. This statute has since been revised and in its current form reclassifies this as a Class A misdemeanor. See I.C. § 35-43-4-2 (West, Westlaw current with all
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-144 | September 29, 2015 Page 1 of 6 [2] On August 14, 2013, Officer Paul Humphrey of the Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department was investigating a report of shoplifting at a Walmart store
in Marion County. While he was there, Marcus Shields, a Walmart asset
prevention associate, saw Smith, Adrianna Johnson, Eurronia Young, and
Shaquel Parchman enter the store together. Subsequent review of surveillance
recordings for the parking lot revealed the four women had arrived at the store
in one car.
[3] Officer Humphrey and Shields watched the four women via surveillance
cameras as they moved through the store. They split into two groups of two,
each with their own carts. Smith went with Young, and they placed similar
items in their carts. Johnson went with Parchman, and they each put similar
items, specifically twin bed sheet sets, clothes hampers, and vacuums in their
respective carts as they shopped together.
[4] Next, the four shoppers went to the front of the store. Smith and Johnson
checked out. Smith paid with cash, while Johnson paid cash for most items
and paid for a comforter with her debit card. They went to the parking lot and
placed their items in their car while Young and Parchman remained in the store
without checking out. Johnson returned inside, gave Young and Parchman the
receipts she and Smith had received, and went back to the car.
2015 First Regular Session of the 119th General Assembly legislation effective through June 28, 2015). The new classification, however, applies only to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2014. See id. Because this offense was committed prior to that date, it retains the former classification.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-144 | September 29, 2015 Page 2 of 6 [5] Young and Parchman went to a customer service desk. They presented the
receipts Johnson had given them and requested refunds for the items in their
baskets, for which they had not paid. Parchman requested refunds for two twin
bed sheet sets, a clothes hamper, and a vacuum cleaner. Walmart provides cash
refunds for items that were originally purchased with cash. A Walmart
employee gave cash refunds to Young and Parchman. Officer Humphrey and
Walmart personnel detained them as they tried to leave the store. Another
officer went outside and detained Smith and Johnson.
[6] The State charged Smith and Young with theft, Class D felonies. The State
tried them jointly, and a jury determined that they were both guilty. The trial
court sentenced Smith, who now appeals.
[7] Smith raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the evidence is sufficient
to support her conviction. She claims she was in the car when the theft
occurred and is not responsible for Young and Parchman’s theft of Walmart’s
money through fraudulent returns.
[8] In considering challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh
the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Caruthers v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1016
(Ind. 2010). Instead, we consider only the evidence supporting the judgment
and any reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. Tin Thang v. State, 10
N.E.3d 1256 (Ind. 2014). We affirm a conviction unless no reasonable trier of
fact could find every element proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Blount v. State,
22 N.E.3d 559 (Ind. 2014).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-144 | September 29, 2015 Page 3 of 6 [9] In order to convict Smith of theft as a Class D felony, the State was required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith (1) knowingly or intentionally (2)
exerted unauthorized control (3) over property of another person (4) with intent
to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-
43-4-2 (West, Westlaw 2013).
[10] In addition, the State alleged at trial that Smith was guilty of theft under a
theory of accomplice liability. In Indiana, a defendant may be charged as a
principal yet convicted on proof that he or she aided another in commission of
a crime. Kendall v. State, 790 N.E.2d 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. “A
person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person
to commit an offense commits that offense.” Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-2-4
(West, Westlaw current with all 2015 legislation). In determining whether
there was sufficient evidence to establish accomplice liability, we consider such
factors as: (1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with
another at the scene of the crime; (3) failure to oppose commission of the crime;
and (4) course of conduct before, during, and after occurrence of the crime.
Tuggle v. State, 9 N.E.3d 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Mere presence
at the crime scene, or lack of opposition to a crime, is insufficient to establish
accomplice liability. Id.
[11] In this case, Smith was not just present at the store, but she actively assisted her
companions in carrying out the theft. She arrived with Johnson, Young, and
Parchman in one car. They entered the store at the same time and paired off.
Smith and Young moved through the store together and put similar items in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-144 | September 29, 2015 Page 4 of 6 their baskets. Walmart asset protection employee Marcus Shields noted that
Smith and Young did not look at the items’ prices before they put them in their
baskets, which in his experience is a sign that the person may not intend to pay
for them.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
MEMORANDUM DECISION Sep 29 2015, 9:02 am Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Joel M. Schumm Gregory F. Zoeller Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Michael Gene Worden Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tiffany Smith, September 29, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1503-CR-144 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court. The Honorable Judge David State of Indiana, Hooper, Judge Pro Tempore. Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 49F18-1308-FD-53633
Friedlander, Senior Judge
1 [1] Tiffany Smith appeals her conviction of theft, a Class D felony. We affirm.
1 The version of the governing statute, i.e., Ind. Code Ann. § 35-43-4-2 (West, Westlaw 2013) in effect at the time this offense was committed classified it as a class D felony. This statute has since been revised and in its current form reclassifies this as a Class A misdemeanor. See I.C. § 35-43-4-2 (West, Westlaw current with all
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-144 | September 29, 2015 Page 1 of 6 [2] On August 14, 2013, Officer Paul Humphrey of the Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department was investigating a report of shoplifting at a Walmart store
in Marion County. While he was there, Marcus Shields, a Walmart asset
prevention associate, saw Smith, Adrianna Johnson, Eurronia Young, and
Shaquel Parchman enter the store together. Subsequent review of surveillance
recordings for the parking lot revealed the four women had arrived at the store
in one car.
[3] Officer Humphrey and Shields watched the four women via surveillance
cameras as they moved through the store. They split into two groups of two,
each with their own carts. Smith went with Young, and they placed similar
items in their carts. Johnson went with Parchman, and they each put similar
items, specifically twin bed sheet sets, clothes hampers, and vacuums in their
respective carts as they shopped together.
[4] Next, the four shoppers went to the front of the store. Smith and Johnson
checked out. Smith paid with cash, while Johnson paid cash for most items
and paid for a comforter with her debit card. They went to the parking lot and
placed their items in their car while Young and Parchman remained in the store
without checking out. Johnson returned inside, gave Young and Parchman the
receipts she and Smith had received, and went back to the car.
2015 First Regular Session of the 119th General Assembly legislation effective through June 28, 2015). The new classification, however, applies only to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2014. See id. Because this offense was committed prior to that date, it retains the former classification.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-144 | September 29, 2015 Page 2 of 6 [5] Young and Parchman went to a customer service desk. They presented the
receipts Johnson had given them and requested refunds for the items in their
baskets, for which they had not paid. Parchman requested refunds for two twin
bed sheet sets, a clothes hamper, and a vacuum cleaner. Walmart provides cash
refunds for items that were originally purchased with cash. A Walmart
employee gave cash refunds to Young and Parchman. Officer Humphrey and
Walmart personnel detained them as they tried to leave the store. Another
officer went outside and detained Smith and Johnson.
[6] The State charged Smith and Young with theft, Class D felonies. The State
tried them jointly, and a jury determined that they were both guilty. The trial
court sentenced Smith, who now appeals.
[7] Smith raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the evidence is sufficient
to support her conviction. She claims she was in the car when the theft
occurred and is not responsible for Young and Parchman’s theft of Walmart’s
money through fraudulent returns.
[8] In considering challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh
the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Caruthers v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1016
(Ind. 2010). Instead, we consider only the evidence supporting the judgment
and any reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. Tin Thang v. State, 10
N.E.3d 1256 (Ind. 2014). We affirm a conviction unless no reasonable trier of
fact could find every element proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Blount v. State,
22 N.E.3d 559 (Ind. 2014).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-144 | September 29, 2015 Page 3 of 6 [9] In order to convict Smith of theft as a Class D felony, the State was required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith (1) knowingly or intentionally (2)
exerted unauthorized control (3) over property of another person (4) with intent
to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-
43-4-2 (West, Westlaw 2013).
[10] In addition, the State alleged at trial that Smith was guilty of theft under a
theory of accomplice liability. In Indiana, a defendant may be charged as a
principal yet convicted on proof that he or she aided another in commission of
a crime. Kendall v. State, 790 N.E.2d 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. “A
person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person
to commit an offense commits that offense.” Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-2-4
(West, Westlaw current with all 2015 legislation). In determining whether
there was sufficient evidence to establish accomplice liability, we consider such
factors as: (1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with
another at the scene of the crime; (3) failure to oppose commission of the crime;
and (4) course of conduct before, during, and after occurrence of the crime.
Tuggle v. State, 9 N.E.3d 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Mere presence
at the crime scene, or lack of opposition to a crime, is insufficient to establish
accomplice liability. Id.
[11] In this case, Smith was not just present at the store, but she actively assisted her
companions in carrying out the theft. She arrived with Johnson, Young, and
Parchman in one car. They entered the store at the same time and paired off.
Smith and Young moved through the store together and put similar items in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-144 | September 29, 2015 Page 4 of 6 their baskets. Walmart asset protection employee Marcus Shields noted that
Smith and Young did not look at the items’ prices before they put them in their
baskets, which in his experience is a sign that the person may not intend to pay
for them.
[12] Next, all four women went to the front of the store. Young and Parchman
waited as Smith and Johnson purchased the items in their carts and left
together. Johnson briefly returned to the store to give her receipt and Smith’s
receipt to Young and Parchman. A reasonable finder of fact may infer that
Smith gave her receipt to Johnson. The transfer of the receipts was essential to
the crime because Walmart would not provide cash refunds without them.
[13] The State presented sufficient evidence that Smith acted in concert with her
three companions to carry out their purpose of committing theft of money from
Walmart. Her argument that she had returned to the car with her properly-
purchased items when the theft occurred is merely a request to reweigh the
evidence, which our standard of review forbids. See Kendall, 790 N.E.2d 122
(evidence sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated battery as an accomplice
even though defendant was in the car while his companions battered the
victim).
[14] Smith cites to Smith v. State, 167 Ind. App. 428, 339 N.E.2d 118 (Ind. Ct. App.
1975), but that case is distinguishable. There, a panel of this Court deemed the
evidence insufficient to convict a defendant of theft where the evidence
indicated that she helped a co-defendant remove two large boxes from a store in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-144 | September 29, 2015 Page 5 of 6 the middle of the night, and she was present when the co-defendant returned
two air conditioners to the store and confessed his guilt. In the current case,
Smith worked with Young to ensure that they placed similar items in their
baskets, checked out with Johnson while Young and Parchman waited inside,
and then gave her receipt to Johnson to give to Young and Parchman, an
essential step in the fraudulent return. The evidence here is stronger than in
Smith.
[15] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[16] Judgment affirmed.
Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-144 | September 29, 2015 Page 6 of 6