Tiffany R. v. New York City Housing Authority

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Tiffany R. v. New York City Housing Authority

35 A.D.3d 327, 825 N.Y.S.2d 363

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 28, 2006

StatusPublished

This text of 35 A.D.3d 327 (Tiffany R. v. New York City Housing Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Tiffany R. v. New York City Housing Authority, 35 A.D.3d 327, 825 N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2006).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Edmead, J.), entered on or about November 22, 2005, which, upon the grant of plaintiffs motion to reargue, denied defendant’s previously granted motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The motion court properly exercised its discretion in granting reargument.

While plaintiff will be required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that any failure on the part of defendant to take required security precautions proximately caused her injuries (see Burgos v Aqueduct Realty Corp., 92 NY2d 544, 550 [1998] ), it cannot be concluded at this juncture, as a matter of law, that the alleged security deficiencies, occurring in the context of a housing complex with a high incidence of crime, would not constitute breaches of defendant’s proprietary duty, or that any such breach was not a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff’s harm. Concur—Friedman, J.E, Nardelli, Gonzalez, Catterson and Kavanagh, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Edmead, J.), entered on or about November 22, 2005, which, upon the grant of plaintiffs motion to reargue, denied defendant’s previously granted motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The motion court properly exercised its discretion in granting reargument.

While plaintiff will be required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that any failure on the part of defendant to take required security precautions proximately caused her injuries (see Burgos v Aqueduct Realty Corp., 92 NY2d 544, 550 [1998] ), it cannot be concluded at this juncture, as a matter of law, that the alleged security deficiencies, occurring in the context of a housing complex with a high incidence of crime, would not constitute breaches of defendant’s proprietary duty, or that any such breach was not a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff’s harm. Concur—Friedman, J.E, Nardelli, Gonzalez, Catterson and Kavanagh, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

35 A.D.3d 327, 825 N.Y.S.2d 363, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tiffany-r-v-new-york-city-housing-authority-nyappdiv-2006.

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