Tiffany Kowalski v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJuly 8, 2022
DocketCH-315H-18-0016-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Tiffany Kowalski v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Tiffany Kowalski v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tiffany Kowalski v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

TIFFANY L. KOWALSKI, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-315H-18-0016-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: July 8, 2022 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Edward L. D’Felio, Wyoming, Michigan, for the appellant.

Stephen T. Ball, Detroit, Michigan, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final deci sion. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). However, we FORWARD the appellant’s Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335) claim to the regional office for docketing as a new appeal.

BACKGROUND ¶2 Effective April 30, 2017, the agency appointed the appellant to an excepted-service position as a Pharmacy Technician. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8 at 48. Her appointment was subject to the successful completion of a 1-year probationary period. Id. The agency terminated her effective June 30, 2017, for failure to qualify during her probationary period due to lack of candor on an Optional Form 306. Id. at 26, 28-29. ¶3 The appellant appealed her termination to the Board, arguing that the agency violated 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.805-.806 and discriminated against her on the basis of her service-connected disabilities. IAF, Tab 1. Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision finding that the appellant was a preference-eligible employee in the excepted service with less than 1 year of current continuous service and therefore did not 3

meet the statutory definition of an “employee” with adverse action appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. § 7511. IAF, Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID) at 4-5. He further found that the appellant’s reliance on 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.805-.806 was misplaced because those regulations only apply to individuals in the competitive service. ID at 5. The administrative judge lastly found that he could not address the appellant’s allegation of discrimination absent an othe rwise appealable action. ID at 6. Thus, he dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ID at 6. ¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, and the agency has responded in opposition. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The administrative judge correctly found that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s termination appeal. ¶5 To be considered an “employee” for the purposes of Board jurisdiction, a preference-eligible individual in the excepted service must have completed 1 year of current continuous service in the same or similar positions. 2 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B); see Maibaum v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 116 M.S.P.R. 234, ¶ 9 (2011). Here, it is undisputed that the appellant completed only 2 months of her excepted-service appointment, and she has not alleged that there was any other service that could be counted toward completion of 1 year of current continuous service in a similar position. IAF, Tabs 1, 6 -7; PFR File, Tab 1. Therefore, as the administrative judge correctly found, the appellant did

2 An appellant must receive explicit information on what is required to establish an appealable jurisdictional issue. Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Although the appellant was an excepted-service appointee, the administrative judge notified her of the requirements for proving jurisdiction over an appeal by an individual in the competitive service. IAF, Tab 3. We find, however, that the administrative judge cured the defective notice by properly setting forth the applicable law in the initial decision, thereby affording the appellant an opportunity to meet her jurisdictional burden on review. ID at 4; see Easterling v. U.S. Postal Service, 110 M.S.P.R. 41, ¶ 11 (2008). 4

not meet the definition of an employee with a statutory right to appeal her termination to the Board. ID at 5. ¶6 On review, the appellant reiterates her contention that the agency failed to provide her notice of the proposed termination and an opportunity to resp ond pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 315.805. PFR File, Tab 1. Because the appellant was an excepted-service appointee, however, she was not entitled to the procedural protections of 5 C.F.R. § 315.805 or to appeal her termination for preappointment reasons under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806. See Barrand v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 112 M.S.P.R. 210, ¶ 13 (2009) (explaining that 5 C.F.R. § 315.806 applies only to individuals in the competitive service) . Thus, the administrative judge correctly found that the appellant could not rely on these regulations for purposes of establishing Board jurisdiction. ID at 5.

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Bridgett L. Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board
758 F.2d 641 (Federal Circuit, 1985)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Tiffany Kowalski v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tiffany-kowalski-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2022.