Tiffany Isaac v. Department of State

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedFebruary 9, 2023
DocketAT-0752-17-0730-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Tiffany Isaac v. Department of State (Tiffany Isaac v. Department of State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tiffany Isaac v. Department of State, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

TIFFANY ISAAC, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-0752-17-0730-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DATE: February 9, 2023 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Tiffany Isaac, Bishopville, South Carolina, pro se.

Marianne Perciaccante, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

Elizabeth R. Amory, Charleston, South Carolina, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affe cted the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND ¶2 On November 29, 2015, the agency appointed the appellant, a nonpreference eligible, to an excepted-service GS-04 Student Trainee (Passport Specialist) position under the Pathways Internship Experience Program (IEP), pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 213.3402(a), Schedule D. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4 at 94, 97-98. The appointment was intended to continue through the completion of the appellant’s education and work requirements, and the agency had the option to noncompetitively convert her to a term or permanent competitive service position within 120 days after she successfully completed all program requirements. Id. at 97; 5 C.F.R. § 362.204(b) (setting forth the circumstances under which an agency may noncompetitively convert an intern to a term or permanent appointment in the competitive service). Eligibility requirements for the IEP include maintaining a cumulative grade point average (GPA) of at least 2.0, IAF, Tab 4 at 95, and the duration of the appointment is considered a trial 3

period, id. at 97. Effective July 21, 2017, the agency terminated the appellant for failing to maintain a cumulative GPA of 2.0. Id. at 129. ¶3 The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging her termination and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. The agency filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 5. The administrative judge issued a show cause order in which she set forth the elements of proof required to establish that the appellant was an “employee” with Board appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a) and ordered the appellant to file evidence and argu ment on the jurisdictional issue. IAF, Tab 7. In response, the appellant stated that agency officials had discriminated against her 2 and had made “slanderous” statements about her; however, she did not address the jurisdictional issue. IAF, Tab 8. ¶4 Without holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision that dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the appellant was serving in a probationary period at the time of her termination and that there was nothing to suggest that she otherwise qualified as an employee within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a). IAF, Tab 9, Initial Decision (ID) at 3. The appellant has filed a petition for review, the agency has filed a response to the petition, and the appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3-4.

ANALYSIS The administrative judge correctly dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ¶5 The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). An appellant bears the burden of proving by preponderant evidence that her appeal is wi thin the Board’s jurisdiction. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i). A nonpreference eligible in the excepted service has a statutory right to appeal a termination if she qualifies as an

2 The appellant did not identify the basis of the alleged discrimination. IAF, Tab 8 . 4

“employee” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C). Subsection (C) defines an employee as an individual who: (1) is not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service; or (2) has completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same or similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a temporary appointment limited to 2 years or less. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)(i)-(ii); see Van Wersch v. Department of Health and Human Services, 197 F.3d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that subsections (C)(i) and (C)(ii) of 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) are alternative means of establishing jurisdiction). ¶6 It is undisputed that the appellant was appointed to the excepted service , is not preference eligible, and did not meet the requirements of either 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) or (ii). Therefore, the administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege facts that, if proven, would establish that she qualified as an “employee” with adverse action appeal rights under 5 U.S.C.

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Celia A. Wren v. Merit Systems Protection Board
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Van Wersch v. Department of Health & Human Services
197 F.3d 1144 (Federal Circuit, 1999)

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Tiffany Isaac v. Department of State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tiffany-isaac-v-department-of-state-mspb-2023.