Tiffany Hovis, as dependent administrator of and on behalf of the Estate of Matthew Ray Maxwell, and Matthew Ray Maxwell’s heir(s)-at-law and wrongful death beneficiaries; and Donna Diaz, individually v. Wichita County, Texas; and Corrhealth PLLC A/K/A Corrhealth

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

TIFFANY HOVIS, as dependent § administrator of and on behalf of the § ESTATE OF MATTHEW RAY § MAXWELL, and MATTHEW RAY § MAXWELL’s heir(s)-at-law and § wrongful death beneficiaries; and § DONNA DIAZ, individually, § § Plaintiffs, § § v. § Civil Action No. 3:23-CV-2220-L § WICHITA COUNTY, TEXAS; and § CORRHEALTH PLLC A/K/A § CORRHEALTH, § § Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) (“Motion”), filed November 17, 2025 (Doc. 87). After careful consideration of the Motion, response, reply, pleadings, and applicable law, the court denies the Motion. I. Background This civil action arises from the death of Matthew Ray Maxwell (“Mr. Maxwell”) on or about April 1, 2022, while he was incarcerated at the Wichita County Jail in Wichita Falls, Texas. See generally Pls.’ First Am. Compl. (Doc. 19). Tiffany Hovis (“Ms. Hovis”), as dependent administrator of the Estate of Mr. Matthew and as estate representative, as well as Donna Diaz, Mr. Matthew’s mother, in her individual capacity, raise civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 71.001-71.012 (Texas Wrongful Death Statute) and the Texas Civil Practice § 71.021 (Texas Survival Statute). See id. Ms. Hovis seeks to bring claims as the estate representative on behalf of Mr. Maxwell’s two minor biological children— who are identified as a daughter, N.J.M., and a son, C.L.M—both of whom were adopted prior to Mr. Maxwell’s death (the “Adopted Children”). Defendants provide evidence that C.L.M. was adopted in 2016 or 2017, and that N.J.M. was adopted in 2020 or 2021.

See Defs.’ App. (Doc. 89 at 11-15). Defendants move to dismiss any claims brought by Ms. Hovis on behalf of the Adopted Children, arguing she lacks statutory authority to assert these claims because the order terminating Mr. Maxwell’s parental rights also terminated the Adopted Children’s status as statutory beneficiaries and, in turn, Ms. Hovis’s standing to assert claims on their behalf under the Texas Wrongful Death Act or Texas Survival Statute. Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 87 at 3-4). Ms. Hovis and Ms. Davis oppose the Motion. Pls.’ Resp. Br. (Doc. 122). II. Applicable Law and Analysis A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) attacks the court’s jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A defect in the court’s Article III or constitutional standing implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, is properly raised by a party via Rule 12(b)(1).

See Cadle Co. v. Neubauer, 562 F.3d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245, 248 n.2 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Dismissals for lack of Constitutional standing are granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).”). To have standing under § 1983 for claims based on the death of another, a plaintiff must have standing under the state wrongful death and survival statutes. Pluet v. Frasier, 355 F.3d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 2004). Rule 12(b)(1) motions, however, only deal with issues of constitutional standing. Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 795 n.2 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Blanchard 1986, Ltd. v. Park Plantation, LLC, 553 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2008)). “In Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc., the Fifth Circuit explained that issues regarding Article III standing or constitutional standing are properly addressed under Rule 12(b)(1), whereas prudential or statutory standing issues are addressed under Rule 12(b)(6).” Encompass Off. Sols., Inc. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2013 WL 1194392, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2013) (Lindsay, J.) (citing Harold H. Huggins Realty, 634 F.3d at 795 n.2). The type of standing challenged in this matter is statutory standing because it is not a general test of injury and redressability but instead an issue requiring traditional tools of statutory interpretation to determine whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses the Adopted Children’s claims and, concomitantly, Ms. Hovis’s standing to assert these claims on their behalf. In this matter, both parties rely on evidence outside of the pleadings in their arguments related to Ms. Hovis’s statutory standing. Because the Motion was originally brought under Rule 12(b)(1), the court declines to convert it (even through Rule 12(b)(6)) into a motion for summary judgment. Instead, the Motion must be denied, without prejudice to any party’s right to seek dismissal on this basis pursuant to the appropriate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or other applicable authority. HI. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the Motion (Doc. 87), without prejudice to any party’s right to seek dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 or other applicable authority. It is so ordered this 17th day of August, 2026.

United States District Judge

Memorandum Opinion and Order — Page 3