Tiffany H. v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: June 25, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-05882
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 TIFFANY H., CASE NO. 3:25-CV-5882-DWC 11 Plaintiff, v. ORDER REVERSING AND 12 REMANDING DEFENDANT’S COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS 13 SECURITY, 14 Defendant.

15 Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of Defendant’s 16 denial of her application for supplemental security income benefits (“SSI”).1 After considering 17 the record, the Court concludes the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in his evaluation of 18 certain medical opinion evidence. Had the ALJ properly considered this evidence, Plaintiff’s 19 residual functional capacity (“RFC”) may have included additional limitations or the ultimate 20 determination of disability may have changed. The ALJ’s error is, therefore, not harmless, and 21 this matter is reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to the 22 23 1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and Local Rule MJR 13, the parties have 24 consented to have this matter heard by the undersigned Magistrate Judge. See Dkt. 2. 1 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) for further proceedings consistent with this 2 order. 3 I. Factual and Procedural History 4 Plaintiff unsuccessfully applied for disability benefits in 2007, 2010, and 2014.2 See Dkt.

5 7, Administrative Record (“AR”) 83–158. Plaintiff protectively filed a new application for SSI 6 on October 15, 2018, alleging disability beginning on January 1, 1999. AR 365–76. Through 7 counsel, she later amended the alleged date of disability onset to the protective filing date. AR 8 51. Her application was denied at the initial level and on reconsideration. AR 159–72, 189–98. 9 She requested a hearing before an ALJ, which took place on June 14, 2022. AR 43–70, 199–202. 10 A second hearing was held on January 10, 2023. AR 71–82. Plaintiff was represented by counsel 11 at the hearings. See AR 43, 71. On February 8, 2023, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision 12 denying benefits. AR 15–42. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. AR 1–7. 13 Plaintiff appealed to this Court, which remanded the case for further proceedings. AR 835–40. 14 Another hearing took place on May 8, 2025. AR 775–99. On June 17, 2025, the ALJ issued

15 another unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff had not been under a disability since October 15, 16 2018. AR 739–74. Plaintiff again appealed to this Court. See Dkts. 1, 5. 17 In the final decision dated June 17, 2025, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the severe 18 impairments of affective disorder, anxiety disorder, and personality disorder. AR 746. Despite 19 these impairments, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a full range of work at all 20 exertional levels with specific nonexertional limitations: “she can understand, remember, and 21 22 23 2 In the most recent decision, the ALJ found the presumption of continuing non-disability had been rebutted. AR 24 743. 1 carry out simple and detailed instructions that can be learned in 30 days or less. She can have 2 occasional contact with the general public and coworkers and supervisors.” AR 750. 3 II. Standard of Review 4 When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court

5 may set aside the denial of social security benefits if the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error 6 or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 7 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)). Substantial 8 evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 9 conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 10 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “We review only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability 11 determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Garrison v. 12 Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014). 13 “[H]armless error principles apply in the Social Security Act context.” Molina v. Astrue, 14 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a).

15 Generally, an error is harmless if it is not prejudicial to the claimant and is “inconsequential to 16 the ultimate nondisability determination.” Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 17 1055 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. 18 III. Discussion 19 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in evaluating certain medical opinion evidence and 20 Plaintiff’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms. Dkt. 15 at 1. She contends the proper 21 remedy for these errors is remand for an award of benefits. Id. 22 23

24 1 A. Medical Opinion Evidence 2 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in evaluating medical opinion evidence from K.M. 3 Mansfield-Blair, Ph.D.; Wendy Hartinger, Psy.D.; and LMHC Pat Beck. Dkt. 15 at 1. When 4 evaluating medical opinion evidence, ALJs “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary

5 weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical 6 finding(s). . . .” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a).3 Instead, ALJs must consider every 7 medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding in the record and evaluate the 8 persuasiveness of each one using specific factors. Id. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). 9 The two most important factors affecting an ALJ’s determination of persuasiveness are 10 the “supportability” and “consistency” of each opinion. Id. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). 11 “Supportability means the extent to which a medical source supports the medical opinion by 12 explaining the ‘relevant . . . objective medical evidence.’” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791– 13 92 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1). 14 An opinion is more “supportable,” and thus more persuasive, when the source provides more

15 relevant “objective medical evidence and supporting explanations” for their opinion. 20 C.F.R. 16 §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). “Consistency means the extent to which a medical opinion 17 is ‘consistent . . . with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the 18 claim.’” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 19 416.920c(c)(2). ALJs must articulate “how [they] considered the supportability and consistency 20 factors for a medical source’s medical opinions” when making their decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 21 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). “Even under the new regulations, an ALJ cannot reject an 22 3 The regulations regarding the evaluation of medical opinion evidence have been amended for claims filed on or 23 after March 27, 2017. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5867–68, 5878–79 (Jan. 18, 2017). Because Plaintiff’s application was filed after that date, the new regulations 24 apply. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c. 1 examining or treating doctor's opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without providing an 2 explanation supported by substantial evidence.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792. 3 Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to articulate legally sufficient reasons for not adopting all 4 of Dr. K.M. Mansfield-Blair’s opined limitations. Dkt. 15 at 4–11. On August 17, 2022, Dr.

5 Mansfield-Blair performed a psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff based on a clinical interview and 6 a review of mental health records from May to November 2019. AR 610–15. Dr. Mansfield-Blair 7 noted diagnoses of major depressive disorder, recurrent, moderate; post-traumatic stress disorder, 8 chronic; and (rule-out) borderline intellectual functioning. AR 614. Dr. Mansfield-Blair opined 9 Plaintiff’s mental health prognosis was “guarded” and she would likely benefit from mental 10 health therapy and psychotropic medication. Id. 11 Dr. Mansfield-Blair opined Plaintiff “would not have difficulty” dealing with the usual 12 stress encountered in the workplace; “would have a low to moderate level of difficulty” 13 performing simple and repetitive tasks and performing work activities on a daily basis without 14 special or added instruction; and “would have a moderate to high level of difficulty” performing

15 detailed and complex tasks. AR 614–15. Further, Dr. Mansfield-Blair wrote Plaintiff “would 16 have difficulty” accepting instruction from supervisors, interacting with coworkers, and 17 “maintaining regular attendance and completing a normal workday/work week without 18 interruptions from a psychiatric condition, given she reportedly receives no mental health 19 treatment.” Id. Dr. Mansfield-Blair opined Plaintiff would not be able to manage funds in her 20 own interest. AR 614. 21 The ALJ found Dr. Mansfield-Blair’s opinion “somewhat persuasive,” writing it was 22 “only partially consistent with the record and supported by the evidence.” AR 756. The ALJ 23 accepted the “largely moderate cognitive and social functioning limitations assessed by Dr.

24 1 Mansfield-Blair,” finding these were “generally consistent with those found by both state agency 2 evaluators, Drs. Comrie and Flanagan, and well-supported by the evidence in the record[.]” AR 3 757. 4 The only one of Dr. Mansfield-Blair’s findings that the ALJ specifically discussed was

5 the opinion that Plaintiff “would have difficulty maintaining regular attendance and completing a 6 normal workday/work week without interruptions from a psychiatric condition, given she 7 reportedly receives no mental health treatment.” AR 615, 757. The ALJ took issue with the fact 8 that Dr. Mansfield-Blair “fail[ed] to define interruption,” did not specify the nature, frequency, 9 or duration of the interruptions, did not explain the degree of difficulty Plaintiff would have, and 10 “did not link the interruptions to a specific mental health impairment or symptom.” AR 757. 11 But the ALJ did not explain whether or why he rejected any other opined limitations, 12 except the above-referenced statement that the “largely moderate cognitive and social 13 functioning limitations” were supported by and consistent with the record. It is not clear whether 14 the ALJ similarly rejected the other two areas with which Dr. Mansfield-Blair opined Plaintiff

15 “would have difficulty”—accepting instruction from supervisors and interacting with 16 coworkers—for the same failure to explain the degree of difficulty or if the ALJ intended to 17 account for this “difficulty” by limiting Plaintiff to occasional contact with coworkers and 18 supervisors. See AR 750. As noted above, the Court cannot affirm an ALJ’s decision by 19 supplying a rationale that was not provided in the opinion. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010; see 20 also Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225–26 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Long- 21 standing principles of administrative law require us to review the ALJ’s decision based on the 22 reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to 23

24 1 intuit what the adjudicator may have been thinking.”) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 2 194, 196 (1947)). 3 Further, the ALJ did not specify why he rejected Dr. Mansfield-Blair’s opinion that 4 Plaintiff would have a “moderate to high level of difficulty performing detailed and complex

5 tasks[.]” AR 614. The RFC provides that Plaintiff “can understand, remember, and carry out 6 simple and detailed instructions that can be learned in 30 days or less.” AR 750. Although this 7 provision limits Plaintiff to simple instructions, it allows for detailed instructions, with which Dr. 8 Mansfield-Blair indicated Plaintiff would have up to a “high” level of difficulty. The ALJ 9 provided only the general statement that Dr. Mansfield-Blair’s examination findings “[do] not 10 support greater limitations than provided for in the residual functional capacity.” AR 756–57. 11 Without an explanation for why the ALJ discounted this finding, the Court cannot determine 12 whether the ALJ properly considered all portions of Dr. Mansfield-Blair’s opinion. See Blakes v. 13 Barnhart, 331 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We require the ALJ to build an accurate and 14 logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusions so that we may afford the claimant

15 meaningful review of the SSA’s ultimate findings.”). Accordingly, the ALJ erred. 16 Had the ALJ properly considered this evidence, the RFC may have included additional 17 limitations or the ultimate determination of disability may have changed. Therefore, the ALJ’s 18 error is not harmless and requires reversal.4 19 B. Remedy 20 Plaintiff argues the proper remedy for the ALJ’s errors is remand for an immediate award 21 of benefits. Dkt. 15 at 1, 18; Dkt. 18 at 5. 22

23 4 Because the Court finds the ALJ harmfully erred in assessing Dr. Mansfield-Blair’s opinion evidence, the Court declines to address Plaintiff’s additional challenges to the ALJ’s evaluation of medical opinion evidence from 24 Wendy Hartinger, Psy.D., and LMHC Pat Beck. 1 The Court may remand a case “either for additional evidence and findings or to award 2 benefits.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996). Generally, when the Court 3 reverses an ALJ’s decision, “the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the 4 agency for additional investigation or explanation.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th

5 Cir. 2004) (quoting INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002)). However, the Ninth Circuit created 6 a “test for determining when evidence should be credited and an immediate award of benefits 7 directed[.]” Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). Under this “credit-as-true” 8 test, benefits should be awarded where: 9 (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting [the claimant’s] evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved 10 before a determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence 11 credited.

12 Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292; see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. 13 An ALJ’s errors are relevant only to the extent they impact the underlying question of the 14 Plaintiff’s disability. Strauss v. Comm’r of the Social Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 15 2011). “A claimant is not entitled to benefits under the statute unless the claimant is, in fact, 16 disabled, no matter how egregious the ALJ’s errors may be.” Id. Therefore, even if the “credit- 17 as-true” conditions are satisfied, a court should nonetheless remand the case if “an evaluation of 18 the record as a whole creates serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Garrison, 759 19 F.3d at 1021. 20 The Court concludes Plaintiff has not shown that the record is free from important and 21 relevant conflicts or that no issues remain that must be resolved. Because there are outstanding 22 issues that must be resolved concerning Plaintiff’s functional capabilities and her ability to 23 24 1 perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, remand for further 2 administrative proceedings is appropriate. 3 C. Remaining Issues 4 Plaintiff further contends the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s testimony about

5 the severity of her symptoms. Dkt. 15 at 1. As noted above, the Court concludes the ALJ 6 committed harmful error in assessing certain medical opinion evidence and remand for further 7 proceedings is appropriate. Because Plaintiff may be able to present new evidence and new 8 testimony on remand, the ALJ must reconsider all the medical evidence in the record. 9 Accordingly, on remand, the ALJ is instructed to re-evaluate the entire sequential evaluation 10 process. See Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (1996) (an RFC “must always 11 consider and address medical source opinions”); Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 12 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009) (“an RFC that fails to take into account a claimant’s limitations is 13 defective”); Watson v. Astrue, No. ED CV 09-1447-PLA, 2010 WL 4269545, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 14 Oct. 22, 2010) (finding the RFC and hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert

15 defective when the ALJ did not properly consider two physicians’ findings). 16 IV. Conclusion 17 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby finds the ALJ improperly concluded 18 Plaintiff was not disabled beginning October 15, 2018. Accordingly, Defendant’s decision to 19 deny benefits is reversed and this matter is remanded for further administrative proceedings in 20 accordance with the findings contained herein. 21 Dated this 25th day of June, 2026. 22 A 23 David W. Christel United States Magistrate Judge 24