Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States

339 F.2d 633, 168 Ct. Cl. 457, 14 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6043
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedDecember 11, 1964
DocketNo. 30-61
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 339 F.2d 633 (Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 339 F.2d 633, 168 Ct. Cl. 457, 14 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6043 (cc 1964).

Opinion

Laramore, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit for refund of Federal income taxes for the year 1952 in which the ultimate question presented is whether the amounts paid by taxpayer to transferors of “oil allow-ables” constitute royalties so that, under section 114(b) (3)1 of the Internal Kevenue Code of 1939, such payments must be excluded from gross income before computing taxpayer’s depletion allowance. The answer to this question depends on whether the assignors of the allowables had a depletable “economic interest” in the oil in place with respect to the oil produced under these allowables. Taxpayer asserts it is the only one entitled to claim depletion. The government urges that the transferors of the allowables have the requisite “economic interest” to entitle them to share in the depletion [460]*460deduction allowed by section 23 (m)2 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. It is not disputed that either the taxpayer or the transferors (but not both) is entitled to claim depletion with respect to the amounts paid to the transferors for these allowables.

During the year 1952, Tidewater was the owner and operator of various oil and gas leases located in the East Texas Oil Field. That Field is under the control and supervision of the Texas Railroad Commission, which exercises authority over oil and gas drilling and production operations in the State of Texas. The Railroad Commission makes monthly determinations of the number of barrels of oil which can be produced from each well. Each well in the Field is assigned an allowable in barrels per producing day by the Railroad Commission. In addition to the proration of the number of allowable barrels to be produced per well, the Railroad Commission also establishes the number of days each month during which each well can produce. The amount so fixed is referred to as the “allowable” for each well.

The record discloses that the East Texas Oil Field is about 42 miles long (north to south) and 4 to 8 miles wide (east to west) .3 The Field has been described as a large pool or reservoir of oil, having a natural water drive from west to east produced by encroaching subterraneal water which bounds the field on the west. Bottom-hole pressure, which forces oil to the surface through the wells drilled in the field, is created and maintained by this natural water movement. The extent and ease of production of oil are determined in the main by the water-oil contact. As oil is withdrawn, water moves [461]*461from the west to replace it and sweeps the oil along in the process.

As early as 1938, it was realized that withdrawal of salt water from the field must be curtailed both to prevent a drop in bottom-hole pressure (which would reduce total recoverable oil reserves and increase production costs) and to prevent pollution of fresh water supplies. Two methods of achieving this result were developed. The first was to encourage reinjection of salt water into the field; 4 the second was to encourage owners and operators to close wells producing excessive amounts of salt water and transfer production to other wells in the field which were not producing salt water.5 These transferable rights to produce are referred to as “saltwater shut-in allowables.”

It is the second method which gives rise to the problem involved in this case. By order dated July 10, 1947, the Railroad Commission permitted the operator of any well in the field producing 100 or more barrels of water a day, to shut in that well and transfer its “allowable” to another well or wells producing less than 25 percent water. The transferred allowable would be added to the transferee’s existing allowable to increase production from the transferee’s well or wells to the extent of the allowable transferred. After the transferred allowable ceased, the transferor operator could reopen the shut-in well and resume production under the applicable Railroad Commission Order if it chose to do so.

Taxpayer acquired from other unrelated operators a number of such salt water shut-in allowables, and during the year 1952 a portion of taxpayer’s production of oil from its leases in the East Texas Oil Field was under these acquired allowables. Under the typical assignment of a shut-in allowable,6 the assignor sold all of its rights to its allowable on specific wells and agreed that all of the oil produced by the assignee under the allowable should be property of said [462]*462assignee. The assignee (taxpayer) agreed to pay assignor a stated price per barrel, which, varied with the posted sales price “for each and every barrel of such transferred allowable which assignee produces * *

In its tax return for 1952, taxpayer did not claim depletion on the amounts paid to assignors; this amount was excluded from gross income in determining the base for depletion. Taxpayer later filed a timely claim for refund, asserting it was entitled to claim depletion on this amount. That claim was denied, and this suit followed.

As stated earlier, the decision in the case at bar turns on the question whether the transferors of the allowables have the requisite “economic interest” to entitle them to share in the depletion deduction allowed by section 23 (m) of the 1939 Code. The “economic interest” concept, which is used in defining the intended beneficiaries of percentage depletion, was originally formulated by the Supreme Court in Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933). The Court, aware of the necessity of creating a uniform law of taxation independent of the complexities of local law, freed the right to depletion allowance from “any special form of legal interest in the oil well” and reasoned that

[t]he language of the statute is broad enough to provide, at least, for every case in which the taxpayer has acquired, by investment, any interest in the oil in place, and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from the extraction of the oil, to which he must look for a return of his capital. [287 U.S. at 557]

As pointed out recently in Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956), the two requisites of an economic interest established by Palmer v. Bender, supra, are (1) that the taxpayer must have acquired by investment an interest in the mineral in place, and (2) that he look to the extraction and sale of the mineral for the return of this investment. Since Palmer v. Bender, quite naturally the battles in this area of tax law have been fought over whether there was an interest in the oil in place of the proper sort and whether the source of the return of the taxpayer’s capital was the extraction and sale of mineral.

[463]*463The major factor seriously in dispute between the parties, in the case at bar, involves the first criterion — an interest in the oil in place.7 The government espouses two theories— either one, it contends, provides the transferors of the allow-ables the requisite interest in the oil in place so as to entitle them to claim depletion on the amounts received from taxpayer for each barrel of oil produced pursuant to the transferred allowables.

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339 F.2d 633, 168 Ct. Cl. 457, 14 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6043, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tidewater-oil-co-v-united-states-cc-1964.