Tice v. Shangle

182 Iowa 601
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedSeptember 29, 1917
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 182 Iowa 601 (Tice v. Shangle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tice v. Shangle, 182 Iowa 601 (iowa 1917).

Opinion

Gaynor, J.

The plaintiff’s and the defendant’s lands adjoin. The plaintiff is the owner of the East Half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 19, and the defendant is the owner of the Northeast Quarter of the same section. It is apparent, therefore, that the true government line dividing the plaintiff’s land from the defendant’s should pass north and south through the center of the section. The plaintiff’s claim, however, is that, many years ago, a fence was erected, running north and south, dividing plain[602]*602tiff’s land from the defendant’s; that this fence has been acquiesced in as the line dividing their respective lands, for more than the statutory period; that each has cultivated up to this line as the dividing line, and has acquiesced in it as such; that the defendant is attempting to change the line by erecting a fence to the west of this established line, and on plaintiff’s land. The plaintiff, therefore, brings this action in equity to compel the defendant to remove this fence, so attempted to be erected, so far as erected, and to restrain him from erecting or maintaining any fence west of this original fence so claimed to have been acquiesced in as the true line. The theory of the plaintiff is that he is the owner of the land west of this original fence; that the defendant is erecting, or attempting to erect, or has erected, a fence at a point west of the true dividing line between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s land, and therefore on the plaintiff’s land. The plaintiff bases his right to maintain this action on adverse possession, and also on the theory of acquiescence in the original line, as indicated by the original fence; that the original fence has become the dividing line between their lands; and that each owner is, therefore, entitled to hold up to the fence on his side of that line.

The disposition of this controversy involves the application of the law of acquiescence. Plaintiff does not allege, nor does he attempt to prove, where the original government line was. He bases his claim to this land on the theories above stated, and so brings this action to restrain the defendant from passing west of this original fence line so acquiesced in, and from erecting, or attempting to erect, any fence as a division fence at any point west. In fact, neither party in this controversy has shown or attempted to show the existence of any original government corners; nor does the record disclose any surveys made, with reference [603]*603to government corners or lines, for the purpose of ascertaining or determining where the original government corners and lines were. We are not, therefore, in a position to say from this record where the government established any of the corners along or on this Section 19. The plaintiff bases his contention solely on the ground that, a great man}'' }rears ago, the owners of the tracts now in controversy established a line dividing these lands, or that a line was established dividing these lands; and that this line, so established, has been acquiesced in by adjoining owners for the statutory period of time; and that, therefore, without regard to government lines, the line so established and acquiesced in became and is the true dividing line between these parcels of land; that the line so established, so far as the original owners and their grantees are concerned, is the true dividing line. It is claimed that the original owners and their grantees have acquiesced in this line, and given evidence of their acquiescence by cultivating up to it on either side.

It is evident that the plaintiff must stand or fall upon this contention. If, as a matter of fact, there was an original line established and acquiesced in by the parties as a division line between these tracts of land for more than ten years, neither party can now disturb it; and in any controversy between the parties touching the division line, this line, so acquiesced in, must be treated as the true line between them; and each is entitled to the land on his side of the line, with a right to occupy and cultivate up to the line so acquiesced in.

The law that governs a case of this character has been so frequently considered by this court that it would seem unnecessary to restate it for the purposes of this case. Originally, the government fixed the lines by establishing corners. These corners and lines divided the land into government subdivisions, for the purposes of convenience [604]*604in sale and to identify a portion of land conveyed by the government. Ordinarily, people buy with reference to the original government corners and lines. The lands are usually described by governmental subdivisions. When so described, the location and territorial extent are determined by reference to the original government corners, as established, indicated in the original government survey; and those who so purchased are entitled; ordinarily, to claim by government description, and to have the lines dividing their land recognized accordingly. This does not, however, prevent adjoining owners from fixing their own lines, or agreeing upon lines which separate their land. It is on this theory that the rule of acquiescence has been adopted. Where adjoining lands have been divided by monuments marking a visible dividing line, and this line has been acquiesced in by the respective owners possessing and cultivating up to such line for the statutory period, they will not be heard to say afterwards that the line is not the one to be recognized as the dividing line between the land. This may be shown by express agreement, or by the conduct of the parties which clearly indicates an intent to recognize and hold the line so created as the true dividing line. This doctrine has repeatedly found recognition in this court. In Miller v. Mills County, 111 Iowa 654, it was said:

“It may be remarked that there is nothing about the government surveys entitling them to reverence. The original purpose was to enable the government to dispose of the public domain in parcels accurately defined. * * * But if the coterminous owners have adopted another line as their division line, and have occupied up to it and recognized it as such for a period of ten years, there appears to be no reason for not regarding it as the true boundary line, nob withstanding it is not that fixed by the government survey. * * * The authorities are abundant to the point that, when owners of adjoining lands have acquiesced for a con[605]*605siderable time in the location oí a division line between their lands, although it may not be the true line according to the calls of the deeds, they are thereafter precluded from saying it is not the true line. * * The great current of authority sustains our conclusion that, in the absence of other controlling circumstances, the inference is conclusive that the division line between adjoining tracts, definitely marked by the erection and maintenance of a fence or other monuments, recognized by the owners as such, and up to which they have occupied and cultivated the land on either side more than ten years, * * * is the true boundary between them.”

Recognizing and following this rule are the following cases: Dwight v. City of Des Moines, 171 Iowa 178; McGovern v. Heery, 159 Iowa 507; Griffin v. Brown, 167 Iowa 599.

About forty years ago or more, one Caleb Spain was the owner of land now claimed by the defendant. One Sexton owned the land claimed by the plaintiff. At the time Spain purchased this land, it was unenclosed, and was used by Sexton for pasturing his cattle, in • connection with certain lands to the north, unenclosed.

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Bluebook (online)
182 Iowa 601, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tice-v-shangle-iowa-1917.