Tibbatts v. Tibbatts

23 F. Cas. 1193, 6 McLean 80
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Ohio
DecidedApril 15, 1854
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 23 F. Cas. 1193 (Tibbatts v. Tibbatts) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tibbatts v. Tibbatts, 23 F. Cas. 1193, 6 McLean 80 (circtdoh 1854).

Opinion

OPINION OF

THE COURT.

This is -a bill in chancery praying, for the reasons stated, that a certain lease or contract in relation to the occupancy and management of a certain farm, by the defendant, should be set aside, and the possession of the same decreed to the complainant. The contract was entered into between John W. Tib-batts. and Ann Tibbatts, his wife, on the 2d day of August, 1851, with Leo Tibbatts, the defendant. They leased unto Leo Tib-batts until the first day of March,' 1862, a certain tract of land or stock farm, situated and lying in the county of Union, and state of - Ohio, containing between eleven and twelve hundred acres; and in consideration of the covenants hereinafter made and expressed on the part of the said Leo, covenant and bind themselves, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, that the said Leo shall hold, use and occupy, the said farm and tract of land, for and during the term aforesaid without let or hindrance, under the following covenant and condition, viz: — “the said Leo is to pay no rents during the term of this lease. Second, he is to manage and conduct the business and operations of said farm, in accordance with his own judgment, without being subject to the dictation or direction of any one else. Third, the stock, implements of husbandry, and other utensils appertaining to farming purposes, now on said farm, are to be fairly valued by disinterested persons, chosen mutually by the parties interested in this agreement, and at the end or termination of this lease, are to be accounted back in equal value. Fourth, Leo is to have one third, and John W. Tibbatts and Ann Tibbatts, two thirds of the net profits that may be made or accrue by the same. Fifth, the current expenses of the farm and the cattle too, are to be paid out of the general stock [1194]*1194funds of the concern. But the real estate tax of the farm is to be paid by John W. Tibbatts. Sixth, on any advances made by either of the parties to this lease, the concern is to allow an interest at the rate of six per cent, per annum. Seventh, the said Leo is to keep correct and regular book accounts of all the transactions of the farm; accounts of the receipts and expenditures of the same, which are at any time, whenever desired to be subject to the inspection of John W. Tibbatts, and Ann, his wife. Eighth, in case of the death of Leo Tib-batts, during the term of this lease, John W. Tibbatts and Ann, his wife, are to have peaceable possession of the premises.”

The character of the above paper is a controverted point, by the counsel in the case. On the part of the plaintiff’s counsel, it is argued, that the agreement is an article of copartnership, while on the other side, it is insisted that it is a lease. It is a matter of some nicety to draw the line between the agency and a copartnership. A stipulated sum to be paid out of the profits of the partnership, would not constitute, technically, an individual a partner, although his agreement would bring him substantially within some of the leading principles which constitute a partnership. It is not necessary to constitute a partnership, that each individual should contribute to the capital equally, or indeed that a partner should advance any portion of the capital. He may agree to contribute his labor in the management of the concern, which is sufficient to make him a partner, if he be a sharer in the profits and loss. “Partnership,” says Fourier, “is formed by a contract, by which one person or partnership agrees to furnish another person or partnership, to whom it is furnished, in his or their own name or firm, on condition of receiving a share in the profits, in proportion determined by the contract, and of being liable to losses and expenses, to the amount furnished, and no more.” This definition cover’s the contract before us. Tibbatts and wife furnished the farm, the stock and farming utensils, and Leo Tibbatts is to manage the farm and pay to Tibbatts and wife two thirds of the profits. And books are to be kept of the farming transactions, which are to be open to the inspection of the other party. The stock is to be valued,, and on rhe termination of the contract, it is to be recounted for in value, and peaceable possession of the land is to be given up. Here che distribution is to be made of the profits, which subject all the parties to loss, as chere can be no distribution, if there be no profits. If advances be made by either rarty, he is to receive from the concern, ;ix per cent, on such advances. The cur-ent expense of the farm was to be paid by jeo, and the tax on the cattle. The tax m the land. Tibbatts and his wife were to iay. Leo was to manage the farm according to his own judgment, and not under the dictation of Tibbatts and wife. This would be a singular provision in a lease for eleven years; but if a partnership was intended, it would be a very proper and necessary stipulation in behalf of Leo, whose labor and skill were secured, for the management of the farm.

An agreement to lease improved ground, for a certain part of the product is common, and in such a case the lessor receives only his proportion of the profits. But under such a contract the lessee would be bound to use reasonable diligence in planting or sowing his crop; but there would be no such liability under the above contract; as Leo Tibbatts was to exercise his own judgment, and not act under the dictation of Tibbatts and wife. Here was a trust and confidence reposed in Leo, which he could not transfer to any other person. And this is not affected by the fact that Leo might be less competent than any one he might substitute in his place. But this contract did not relate to the management of the farm only, but included a large amount of live stock of various descriptions. These constituted a part of the capital furnished, and from which a profit was expected, as well as from the culture of the land. Indeed, it may be supposed, that the products of the fields, whether of pasturage or grains, would be used in feeding the stock and preparing it for market. This whole operation is different from an ordinary lease of ground, whether the rent be paid by a part of the product or in money. It is stipulated in the contract, that no rent should be paid. John W. Tibbatts was a lawyer, and could not but have known the significance of this provision. At the close of the contract, the farming utensils and the stock, in the language used, “are to be accounted back in equal value.” A suggestion is made that a feme covert cannot form a copartnership. There can be no doubt, that with her husband she may enter into a partnership, as stipulated in the above contract — she having an interest in the capital.

Looking at the nature of the above contract and the language used by the parties, there is less difficulty in considering it a partnership agreement, than a mere lease for the term specified; paying rent. It provides, that in the event of the death of Leo Tibbatts, the contract should terminate. This is an unusual provision in a lease, but the principle applies to all cases of partnership, whether stipulated in the agreement or not. But let us consider the contract in this case as a lease, and see what must be the legal result from the facts. The intention of the parties is shown to be, from the language of this instrument, to derive a profit from the farm, not by the ordinary culture of grains, but as a stock farm. The contract was signed the 2d day of August, 1851, and about the 1st of May, 1852, Leo Tibbatts made, to [1195]*1195Eliphas Burnham, assessor, under oath, a return of the following stock, and its estimated value.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
23 F. Cas. 1193, 6 McLean 80, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tibbatts-v-tibbatts-circtdoh-1854.