NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3596-21
TIANLE LI,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent. ___________________________
Submitted April 15, 2024 – Decided May 10, 2024
Before Judges Bishop-Thompson and Jacobs.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.
Tianle Li, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Leo R. Boerstoel, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Tianle Li (Li) appeals a final agency decision of the New Jersey
Department of Corrections (DOC) finding her guilty and imposing discipline for
committing a prohibited act: *.005, "threatening another with bodily harm."
N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). We affirm.
Li is an inmate housed at the Edna Mahan Correctional Facility (EMCF).
At approximately 11:55 a.m. on June 14, 2022, Corrections Officer Butler
responded to a report that Li verbally threatened other inmates in the Hillcrest
Wing #2 housing unit of the facility. The inmates were still yelling at each other
when Butler arrived and attempted to deescalate the situation, but the yelling
continued in Butler's presence.
A group of six inmates alleged that Li had spilled coffee on the floor of
the unit. When they asked her to clean it up, Li launched a volley of threats
consisting of the following: "I did not spill the coffee. Jesus will kill the person
who did"; "Someone is going to die tonight"; "Shame on all of you liars"; "You
will die today." Butler was present when these words were uttered.
Based on the inmate complaints and witnessed events, Butler issued a
disciplinary report the following day charging Li with committing the prohibited
A-3596-21 2 act of threatening another with bodily harm. A hearing was conducted on June
20, 2022.
At the hearing, Li pleaded not guilty to the charge stating, "I did not say
that." She declined assistance of counsel substitute and the opportunity to
confront adverse witnesses. She did not elect to call any witnesses. She did not
request a video record of the incident, nor was one presented at the hearing. The
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) gave greatest weight to Butler's first-hand
account and found Li guilty. Punishment consisted of ninety days in the
Restorative Housing Unit (RHU), ninety days' loss of commutation time, and
fifteen days' loss of commissary, phone, JPay, email, and media download
privileges. Simultaneous with adjudication, the DHO suspended sixty of the
ninety days RHU punishment, in consideration that Li had been "charge-free"
since 2016.
In an appeal of the DHO's ruling filed two days later, Li raised a new
defense. A letter accompanying her appeal claimed that the other inmates
singled her out by filing "fabricated" charges and alleged it was they, not she,
who spilled coffee on the floor. Li maintained that video camera footage would
"show [her] innocence." After reviewing the "charge, investigation,
adjudication, and sanction," Associate Administrator O'Dea modified the DHO's
A-3596-21 3 decision by suspending Li's "comp time sanction," but otherwise left the finding
of guilt intact. Li appealed to this court.
In her brief in support of the appeal, Li set forth the following arguments:
POINT I
CORRECTION[S] OFFICER[S] FABRICATED THE REPORT IN THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGE, SO THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGE AND ITS SANCTION SHOULD BE VACATED AND REMOVED FROM MY RECORDS IN EDNA MAHAN CORRECTION[AL] FACILITY FOR WOMEN AND NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION[S].
POINT II
HEARING OFFICER OF EMCFW ERRED IN REFUSING TO REVIEW THE VIDEO CAMERA RECORDS AND ENTERING SANCTION.
POINT III
THE MATTER [THAT] HAPPENED ON JUNE 14, 2022 WAS SCHEMED BY INMATES AND OFFICERS.
POINT IV
THIS FABRICATED ALLEGATION IN THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGE WAS CLEARLY RETALIATION TO MY CLAIMS IN EMCFW CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT FOR SEXUAL
A-3596-21 4 HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL ABUSE, AND MY GRIEVANCES ABOUT OFFICERS' MISCONDUCTS [SIC].
POINT V
MY MOTION FOR THE VIDEO CAMERA RECORDS WAS ERRONEOUSLY DENIED BY THE APPELLATE COURT.
POINT VI
THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCE[S] AND WHOLE MATTERS ON JUNE 14, 2022 PROVED MY INNOCENCE AND . . . THE REPORT IN THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGE WAS FABRICATED AND FALSE.
Our scope of review of an agency decision is limited. In re Stallworth,
208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). As we have long recognized, "[p]risons are dangerous
places, and the courts must afford appropriate deference and flexibility to
administrators trying to manage this volatile environment." Russo v. N.J. Dep't
of Corr., 324 N.J. Super. 576, 584 (App. Div. 1999). "We [therefore] defer to
an agency decision and do not reverse unless it is arbitrary, capricious[,] or
unreasonable or not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record."
Jenkins v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 412 N.J. Super. 243, 259 (App. Div. 2010).
A-3596-21 5 "A reviewing court 'may not substitute its own judgment for the agency's,
even though the court might have reached a different result.'" Stallworth, 208
N.J. at 194 (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)). "This is particularly
true when the issue under review is directed to the agency's special 'expertise
and superior knowledge of a particular field.'" Id. at 195 (quoting In re
Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)). But our review is not "perfunctory," nor is
"our function . . . merely [to] rubberstamp an agency's decision." Figueroa v.
N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 191 (App. Div. 2010) (first quoting
Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002); and then
citing Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000)).
Instead, "our function is to 'engage in "a careful and principled consideration of
the agency record and findings."'" Ibid. (quoting Williams, 330 N.J. Super. at
204).
A hearing officer's findings must be "sufficiently specific under the
circumstances of the particular case to enable the reviewing court to intelligently
review an administrative decision and ascertain if the facts upon which the order
is based afford a reasonable basis for such order." Blackwell, 348 N.J. Super.
at 122 (quoting N.J. Bell Tel. Co. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 5 N.J. 354, 377
(1950)). We review a decision of the DOC in a prisoner disciplinary proceeding
A-3596-21 6 to determine whether the record contains substantial evidence the inmate has
committed the prohibited act, and whether in making its decision the DOC
followed the regulations adopted to afford inmates procedural due process. See
McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 194-95 (1995).
To find an inmate guilty of a prohibited act under N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1, a
hearing officer must find substantial evidence of the inmate's guilt. N.J.A.C.
10A:4-9.15(a). "'Substantial evidence' means 'such evidence as a reasonable
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3596-21
TIANLE LI,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent. ___________________________
Submitted April 15, 2024 – Decided May 10, 2024
Before Judges Bishop-Thompson and Jacobs.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.
Tianle Li, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Leo R. Boerstoel, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Tianle Li (Li) appeals a final agency decision of the New Jersey
Department of Corrections (DOC) finding her guilty and imposing discipline for
committing a prohibited act: *.005, "threatening another with bodily harm."
N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). We affirm.
Li is an inmate housed at the Edna Mahan Correctional Facility (EMCF).
At approximately 11:55 a.m. on June 14, 2022, Corrections Officer Butler
responded to a report that Li verbally threatened other inmates in the Hillcrest
Wing #2 housing unit of the facility. The inmates were still yelling at each other
when Butler arrived and attempted to deescalate the situation, but the yelling
continued in Butler's presence.
A group of six inmates alleged that Li had spilled coffee on the floor of
the unit. When they asked her to clean it up, Li launched a volley of threats
consisting of the following: "I did not spill the coffee. Jesus will kill the person
who did"; "Someone is going to die tonight"; "Shame on all of you liars"; "You
will die today." Butler was present when these words were uttered.
Based on the inmate complaints and witnessed events, Butler issued a
disciplinary report the following day charging Li with committing the prohibited
A-3596-21 2 act of threatening another with bodily harm. A hearing was conducted on June
20, 2022.
At the hearing, Li pleaded not guilty to the charge stating, "I did not say
that." She declined assistance of counsel substitute and the opportunity to
confront adverse witnesses. She did not elect to call any witnesses. She did not
request a video record of the incident, nor was one presented at the hearing. The
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) gave greatest weight to Butler's first-hand
account and found Li guilty. Punishment consisted of ninety days in the
Restorative Housing Unit (RHU), ninety days' loss of commutation time, and
fifteen days' loss of commissary, phone, JPay, email, and media download
privileges. Simultaneous with adjudication, the DHO suspended sixty of the
ninety days RHU punishment, in consideration that Li had been "charge-free"
since 2016.
In an appeal of the DHO's ruling filed two days later, Li raised a new
defense. A letter accompanying her appeal claimed that the other inmates
singled her out by filing "fabricated" charges and alleged it was they, not she,
who spilled coffee on the floor. Li maintained that video camera footage would
"show [her] innocence." After reviewing the "charge, investigation,
adjudication, and sanction," Associate Administrator O'Dea modified the DHO's
A-3596-21 3 decision by suspending Li's "comp time sanction," but otherwise left the finding
of guilt intact. Li appealed to this court.
In her brief in support of the appeal, Li set forth the following arguments:
POINT I
CORRECTION[S] OFFICER[S] FABRICATED THE REPORT IN THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGE, SO THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGE AND ITS SANCTION SHOULD BE VACATED AND REMOVED FROM MY RECORDS IN EDNA MAHAN CORRECTION[AL] FACILITY FOR WOMEN AND NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION[S].
POINT II
HEARING OFFICER OF EMCFW ERRED IN REFUSING TO REVIEW THE VIDEO CAMERA RECORDS AND ENTERING SANCTION.
POINT III
THE MATTER [THAT] HAPPENED ON JUNE 14, 2022 WAS SCHEMED BY INMATES AND OFFICERS.
POINT IV
THIS FABRICATED ALLEGATION IN THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGE WAS CLEARLY RETALIATION TO MY CLAIMS IN EMCFW CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT FOR SEXUAL
A-3596-21 4 HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL ABUSE, AND MY GRIEVANCES ABOUT OFFICERS' MISCONDUCTS [SIC].
POINT V
MY MOTION FOR THE VIDEO CAMERA RECORDS WAS ERRONEOUSLY DENIED BY THE APPELLATE COURT.
POINT VI
THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCE[S] AND WHOLE MATTERS ON JUNE 14, 2022 PROVED MY INNOCENCE AND . . . THE REPORT IN THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGE WAS FABRICATED AND FALSE.
Our scope of review of an agency decision is limited. In re Stallworth,
208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). As we have long recognized, "[p]risons are dangerous
places, and the courts must afford appropriate deference and flexibility to
administrators trying to manage this volatile environment." Russo v. N.J. Dep't
of Corr., 324 N.J. Super. 576, 584 (App. Div. 1999). "We [therefore] defer to
an agency decision and do not reverse unless it is arbitrary, capricious[,] or
unreasonable or not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record."
Jenkins v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 412 N.J. Super. 243, 259 (App. Div. 2010).
A-3596-21 5 "A reviewing court 'may not substitute its own judgment for the agency's,
even though the court might have reached a different result.'" Stallworth, 208
N.J. at 194 (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)). "This is particularly
true when the issue under review is directed to the agency's special 'expertise
and superior knowledge of a particular field.'" Id. at 195 (quoting In re
Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)). But our review is not "perfunctory," nor is
"our function . . . merely [to] rubberstamp an agency's decision." Figueroa v.
N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 191 (App. Div. 2010) (first quoting
Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002); and then
citing Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000)).
Instead, "our function is to 'engage in "a careful and principled consideration of
the agency record and findings."'" Ibid. (quoting Williams, 330 N.J. Super. at
204).
A hearing officer's findings must be "sufficiently specific under the
circumstances of the particular case to enable the reviewing court to intelligently
review an administrative decision and ascertain if the facts upon which the order
is based afford a reasonable basis for such order." Blackwell, 348 N.J. Super.
at 122 (quoting N.J. Bell Tel. Co. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 5 N.J. 354, 377
(1950)). We review a decision of the DOC in a prisoner disciplinary proceeding
A-3596-21 6 to determine whether the record contains substantial evidence the inmate has
committed the prohibited act, and whether in making its decision the DOC
followed the regulations adopted to afford inmates procedural due process. See
McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 194-95 (1995).
To find an inmate guilty of a prohibited act under N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1, a
hearing officer must find substantial evidence of the inmate's guilt. N.J.A.C.
10A:4-9.15(a). "'Substantial evidence' means 'such evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Figueroa, 414 N.J.
Super. at 192 (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376
(1961)). The substantial evidence standard permits an agency to apply its
expertise where the evidence supports more than one conclusion. See Murray
v. State Health Benefits Comm'n, 337 N.J. Super. 435, 442 (App. Div. 2001).
At the outset, we note that Li's first five arguments concern a defense and
an evidence request not raised before the DHO. "Normally, we do not consider
issues not raised below at an administrative hearing." In re Stream
Encroachment Permit, Permit No. 0200-04-0002.1 FHA, 402 N.J. Super. 587,
602 (App. Div. 2008) (citing Bryan v. Dep't of Corr., 258 N.J. Super. 546, 548
(App. Div. 1992)). The Supreme Court stated that where a claim "was not
included in the original pleadings or in the prehearing order setting forth the
A-3596-21 7 issues . . . [and] was apparently never explicitly advanced as a claim until the
hearing had concluded," the issue was not fully litigated, and declined to rule on
the matter. Ibid. (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Abbott by Abbott
v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 390 (1990)). Those considerations are not present here.
Accordingly, Li's first five arguments are rejected.
Li's sixth argument maintains that the totality of the circumstances proves
her innocence and again touches on a defense that evidence against her was
fabricated. The record before us in its totality does not include any circumstance
that would legally justify the remarks uttered by Li. Even if there were video
evidence of someone other than Li spilling coffee, it would be of no moment.
Objectively assessed, Li's statements threatening imminent harm resulting in
death are sufficient to "convey[] a basis for fear." Jacobs v. Stephens,139 N.J.
212, 222 (1995). We note that conveying a threat of imminent death is
recognized as a means to instill fear. A threat of imminent death is codified as
the indictable offense of terroristic threats. See N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b).
From our review of the record, we are, therefore, satisfied the DHO
properly accounted for the statements of all concerned. It was within the DHO's
discretion to give predominant weight to the responding officer and six
A-3596-21 8 complainants. Accordingly, the DOC's finding, consistent with the DHO's
findings of guilt, was based on substantial credible evidence in the record.
Affirmed.
A-3596-21 9