Tianikwa Haywood v. No Bull Investments, LLC

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)
• Decided: June 11, 2026
• Docket: 10-23-00376-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-23-00376-CV

Tianikwa Haywood, Appellant

v.

No Bull Investments, LLC, Appellee

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Ellis County, Texas Judge James S. Chapman, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 23-C-3967

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this forcible-detainer action, Tianikwa Haywood, acting pro se,

appeals from a final judgment granting No Bull Investments, LLC (No Bull)

possession of the premises at 3222 Burgundy Lane, Midlothian, Texas 76065. 1

We will affirm.

1 The appellant’s brief, for the first time, adds Paul Douglas Celestine as an additional appellant. The appellant’s reply brief also includes Celestine as an appellant. But Celestine is identified in the appellant’s reply brief as a “Chief Maritime Judge” from Houston, Texas—not an occupant of the subject property. Furthermore, Celestine was not a party to the suit in the lower On or about September 14, 2018, Haywood purchased the real property

commonly known as 3222 Burgundy Lane, Midlothian, Texas 76065. As part

of that transaction, Haywood granted a deed of trust in favor of her mortgagee

DHI Mortgage Company, Ltd. Several years later, after her loan was

purportedly sold to PennyMac Loan Services, LLC, Haywood allegedly

defaulted on her mortgage, and her new mortgagee instituted nonjudicial

foreclosure proceedings. On September 6, 2022, No Bull purchased the subject

property at a foreclosure sale.

The following day, No Bull sent Haywood written notice to vacate the

property within thirty days. Haywood v. No Bull Invs., LLC, No. 13-22-00609-

CV, 2023 WL 4940543, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 3,

2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). No Bull then filed a forcible-detainer action against

Haywood in the local justice court on October 7, 2022. Id. A bench trial was

held on October 24, 2022. Id. at *2. That same day, the justice court granted

No Bull a judgment of possession. Id. Haywood then perfected an appeal to

the county court at law. Id. A bench trial was conducted in the county court

on November 30, 2022. Id. The county court entered a judgment of possession

for No Bull. Id.

courts, and Haywood is the only party who has filed a notice of appeal. Therefore, it appears that Celestine has been added as an additional appellant in error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 3.1(a) (“Appellant means a party taking an appeal to an appellate court.”). Accordingly, we consider Haywood to be the sole appellant in this appeal. See id.

Haywood v. No Bull Invs., LLC Page 2 Haywood subsequently perfected an appeal to this Court, and the appeal

was transferred to the Thirteenth Court of Appeals pursuant to a docket-

equalization order issued by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE

ANN. § 73.001. Thereafter, the Thirteenth Court, without reaching the merits

of the appeal, set aside the judgment of possession for No Bull and dismissed

the case for want of jurisdiction. Haywood, 2023 WL 4940543, at *4.

The Thirteenth Court explained the applicable law as follows: “The sole

focus of a forcible-detainer action is the right to immediate possession of real

property.” Id. at *3 (quoting Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471,

478 (Tex. 2017)). But neither the justice court, nor a county court on appeal,

has jurisdiction to determine issues of title to real property in a forcible-

detainer action. Id. (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(b) and Ward v.

Malone, 115 S.W.3d 267, 269 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, pet.

denied)). Therefore, “when a forcible detainer action presents a genuine issue

of title so intertwined with the issue of possession that a trial court would be

required to determine title before awarding possession, . . . a justice court lacks

jurisdiction to resolve the matter.” Id. (quoting Yarbrough v. Household Fin.

Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.)).

“[O]ne indication that a justice court (and county court on appeal) is called on

to adjudicate title to real estate in a forcible detainer case—and, thus, exceed

its jurisdiction—is when a landlord tenant relationship is lacking.” Id.

Haywood v. No Bull Invs., LLC Page 3 (quoting Aguilar v. Weber, 72 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no

pet.)). Accordingly,

[t]o establish a superior right to immediate possession, No Bull had the burden to prove (1) No Bull owns the property, (2) Haywood is a tenant at sufferance, (3) No Bull gave proper notice to Haywood to vacate the premises, and (4) Haywood refused to vacate the premises. See [Shields Ltd. P’ship, 526 S.W.3d at 478.]

Haywood, 2023 WL 4940543, at *3.

The Thirteenth Court then determined that No Bull “failed to

demonstrate that Haywood became a tenant at sufferance upon her alleged

default.” Id. at *4. The Thirteenth Court reasoned that although the evidence

No Bull produced referred to a publicly available deed of trust, the deed was

never produced and that, “[w]ithout it, the justice court was left to speculate

about the contents of the deed and whether it created an independent right to

possession upon Haywood’s alleged default.” Id. The Thirteenth Court

therefore concluded that the justice court (and county court on appeal) was

required to determine title before awarding possession and thus lacked

jurisdiction to consider the case. See id. at *3–4. Accordingly, as stated above,

the Thirteenth Court, without reaching the merits of the appeal, set aside the

judgment of possession for No Bull and dismissed the case for want of

jurisdiction. Id. at *4.

The Thirteenth Court issued its opinion and judgment on August 3, 2023.

On September 1, 2023, No Bull sent Haywood another written notice to vacate

Haywood v. No Bull Invs., LLC Page 4 the subject property within ten days. The notice was sent by certified mail,

return receipt requested, and regular mail. On September 22, 2023, No Bull

then filed a second forcible-detainer action against Haywood, i.e., the lawsuit

underlying this appeal, in the justice court.

In response to the second forcible-detainer action, Haywood filed a

combined “[m]otion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; motion to dismiss claims

are res[] judicata; [and] motion for summary judgment,” in which she argued

that No Bull’s claims were barred as a matter of law by res judicata. The

justice court did not rule on the motions and, on October 10, 2023, granted No

Bull a judgment of possession. Haywood subsequently perfected an appeal to

the county court at law.

A bench trial was conducted in the county court on November 14, 2023.

No Bull first called Pamela Scott as a witness. Scott testified that she

purchased the subject property at the foreclosure sale for No Bull. No Bull

then moved to admit a certified copy of the foreclosure sale deed showing No

Bull to be the purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale. Haywood

stated that she had no objection to the document, and the county court

admitted the document into evidence. Scott thereafter confirmed that the

document was the deed that was recorded, conveying the subject property to

No Bull, after she purchased the property at the foreclosure sale.

Haywood v. No Bull Invs., LLC Page 5 No Bull then moved to admit a certified copy of the deed of trust executed

by Haywood in favor of her original mortgagee DHI Mortgage Company, Ltd.

Haywood stated that she had no objection to the document, and the county

court admitted the document into evidence. Scott thereafter confirmed that

the previously admitted foreclosure sale deed referenced the recording

information of the deed of trust executed by Haywood. Scott testified that the

deed of trust executed by Haywood was therefore purportedly the deed of trust

that was foreclosed upon at the foreclosure sale. Section 24 of the deed of trust

executed by Haywood provided in pertinent part:

If the Property is sold pursuant to this Section 24, Borrower or any person holding possession of the Property through Borrower shall immediately surrender possession of the Property to the purchaser at that sale. If possession is not surrendered, Borrower or such person shall be a tenant at sufferance and may be removed by writ of possession or other court proceeding.

Scott then acknowledged that this suit was the second forcible-detainer

action that No Bull had brought against Haywood. Scott testified that

Haywood had thus been given plenty of notice and opportunity to leave but

that No Bull had heard nothing from her. Scott testified that there had been

at least two, and maybe three, notices to vacate that had been sent to Haywood.

No Bull moved to admit a copy of the latest notice to vacate that had been sent

to Haywood on September 1, 2023. Haywood stated that she had no objection

to the document, and the court admitted the document into evidence.

Haywood v. No Bull Invs., LLC Page 6 No Bull also called Haywood as a witness. Haywood acknowledged that

she had signed the deed of trust that was admitted into evidence. Haywood

further acknowledged that she or someone at her house had received all the

notices to vacate. Haywood explained, however, that she is the rightful owner

of the house. Haywood testified: “I have paid for that house outright in full

when I signed on that dotted line. And that was pay taken out of the money

out of my trust which is at the U.S. Treasury so it has been paid in full.”

Haywood later stated: “[M]y signature paid for that house outright when I

signed in 2018.”

During closing arguments, Haywood again argued that No Bull’s claims

were barred by res judicata. The county court, however, entered a judgment

of possession for No Bull. This appeal ensued.

Haywood appears to raise eight issues, in which she primarily contends

that No Bull’s second forcible-detainer action was barred by res judicata.

The doctrine of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars lawsuits that arise out of the same subject matter as a prior suit when, with the use of diligence, that subject matter could have been litigated in the prior suit. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 449 (Tex. 2007) (explaining the transactional approach to res judicata); Barr v. Resol[.] Tr. Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992). The doctrine is necessary to “bring an end to litigation, prevent vexatious litigation, maintain stability of court decisions, promote judicial economy, and prevent double recovery.” Daccach, 217 S.W.3d at 449. . . . The elements of res judicata are: “(1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the same claims that were raised

Haywood v. No Bull Invs., LLC Page 7 or could have been raised in the first action.” [Id.] (citing Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996)).

Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. TRO-X, L.P., 619 S.W.3d 699, 705–06 (Tex. 2021). The

party asserting the defense of res judicata has the burden of proving each

element of the defense. Id. at 706 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 94 and Travelers Ins.

Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010)).

No Bull argues that the first element required of the res judicata defense,

i.e., that there be a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent

jurisdiction, was not satisfied here because the Thirteenth Court, without

reaching the merits of the appeal, set aside the judgment of possession for No

Bull in the first forcible-detainer action and dismissed the case for want of

jurisdiction. We agree.

Without subject-matter jurisdiction, a court is powerless to render

judgment on the merits of a lawsuit. Ab–Tex Beverage Corp. v. Angelo State

Univ., 96 S.W.3d 683, 686 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (citing Black v.

Jackson, 82 S.W.3d 44, 56 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.), and Li v. Univ. of

Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Hous., 984 S.W.2d 647, 654 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)). Therefore, an order that dismisses a lawsuit for want

of subject-matter jurisdiction is not res judicata of the merits of that lawsuit

and does not bar the plaintiff from bringing the same cause again once the

impediment to jurisdiction has been removed. Id.; see Engelman Irrigation

Haywood v. No Bull Invs., LLC Page 8 Dist. v. Shields Bros., 514 S.W.3d 746, 750 (Tex. 2017) (“Under Texas law, res

judicata does not apply when the first tribunal lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction.”).

As detailed above, in the appeal regarding No Bull’s first forcible-

detainer action against Haywood, the Thirteenth Court, without reaching the

merits of the appeal, set aside the judgment of possession for No Bull and

dismissed the case for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. Haywood, 2023 WL

4940543, at *4. Thus, there was no final judgment on the merits in the first

forcible-detainer action. See Engelman Irrigation Dist., 514 S.W.3d at 750; Ab–

Tex Beverage Corp., 96 S.W.3d at 686. Accordingly, the first element required

of a res judicata defense, i.e., that there be a prior final judgment on the merits

by a court of competent jurisdiction, was not met. See Eagle Oil & Gas Co.,

619 S.W.3d at 705–06. Consequently, No Bull’s second forcible-detainer action

against Haywood was not barred by res judicata.

Additionally, in her appellate issues, Haywood conclusorily argues that

No Bull’s filing of a second forcible-detainer action against her violated several

statutory and constitutional provisions. But Haywood’s bare assertions

provide no explanation for how the authorities to which she refers apply in this

case. Accordingly, these arguments by Haywood are inadequately briefed and

waived on appeal. See Martinez v. El Paso Cnty., 218 S.W.3d 841, 844–45 (Tex.

App.—El Paso 2007, pet. struck); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1.

Haywood v. No Bull Invs., LLC Page 9 In her appellate issues, Haywood further appears to contend that

maritime law should have applied in this case because “every state and federal

court are under postal Union, thus every court is under the maritime

Authority.” In her reply brief, Haywood also refers to her house as a “vessel.”

But Haywood cites no authority to support this argument, and No Bull’s

lawsuit against Haywood was only a forcible-detainer action regarding

possession of real property. No Bull’s action was therefore governed by

Chapter 24 of the Property Code. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002.

Finally, in her reply brief, Haywood asserts that No Bull “is attempting

to steal” the subject property without standing or a contract. “An issue raised

for the first time in a reply brief is ordinarily waived and need not be considered

by this Court,” White v. Lozano, 719 S.W.3d 407, 420 n.7 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2025, no pet.) (quoting City of Donna v. Ramirez, 548 S.W.3d

26, 34 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, pet. denied)), but subject-

matter jurisdiction, including standing, which is a component of subject-matter

jurisdiction, cannot be waived, Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852

S.W.2d 440, 444–45 (Tex. 1993)).

In this case, like in the first forcible-detainer action against Haywood,

No Bull presented evidence that it purchased the subject property at a

foreclosure sale, that it sent written notice to Haywood to vacate the premises,

and that Haywood refused to vacate the premises. Unlike in the first forcible-

Haywood v. No Bull Invs., LLC Page 10 detainer action, however, No Bull additionally alleged in this second forcible-

detainer action that Haywood had executed a deed of trust that provided that

if the subject property was sold at a foreclosure sale, then Haywood would

immediately surrender possession of the property to the purchaser at the

foreclosure sale or become a tenant at sufferance. Furthermore, a copy of the

deed of trust executed by Haywood was admitted as evidence at trial, and, as

stated above, section 24 of the deed of trust executed by Haywood provided in

pertinent part:

If the Property is sold pursuant to this Section 24, Borrower or any person holding possession of the Property through Borrower shall immediately surrender possession of the Property to the purchaser at that sale. If possession is not surrendered, Borrower or such person shall be a tenant at sufferance and may be removed by writ of possession or other court proceeding.

A person who refuses to surrender possession of real property on demand

commits a forcible detainer if the person is a tenant at will or by sufferance.

TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002(a)(2). Accordingly, unlike in the first forcible-

detainer action, the justice court, and the county court at law on appeal, were

able to determine the right to immediate possession of the subject property

without resolving a title dispute. Cf. Haywood, 2023 WL 4940543, at *3–4.

Furthermore, No Bull had standing to bring this second forcible-detainer suit.

See, e.g., Bell v. Sun W. Mortg. Co., No. 14-22-00229-CV, 2023 WL 3964509, at

*2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 13, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

Haywood v. No Bull Invs., LLC Page 11 (holding that post-foreclosure property owner had standing to bring forcible-

detainer suit against tenant at sufferance who refused to surrender subject

property after being given proper notice to vacate). The justice court, and the

county court at law on appeal, therefore had subject-matter jurisdiction of this

suit. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 24.004, 24.005107.

For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Haywood’s issues and affirm the

county court at law’s judgment.

MATT JOHNSON Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: June 11, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed CV06

Haywood v. No Bull Invs., LLC Page 12