ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corp. and Sedgwick CMS v. Randy Blackmon

District Court of Appeal of Florida

ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corp. and Sedgwick CMS v. Randy Blackmon

180 So. 3d 250, 2015 WL 9590330

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedDecember 30, 2015

Docket1D15-2515

StatusPublished

This text of 180 So. 3d 250 (ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corp. and Sedgwick CMS v. Randy Blackmon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corp. and Sedgwick CMS v. Randy Blackmon, 180 So. 3d 250, 2015 WL 9590330 (Fla. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

After Appellant received an extension of time to file his initial brief, but failed to do so, Appellee moved for, attorneys’ fees expended in anticipation of receiving and responding to the initial brief. Appellant had assured her he was filing a brief, indicating it would be filed by the extended deadline. Two days after the filing of the fees motion, Appellant filed a. notice of voluntary dismissal.

Appellee’s entitlement to fees is based on section 440.34(5), . Florida Statutes, which states:

(5) If any proceedings are had for review of any claim, award, or compensation order before any court, the court may award the injured employee or dependent an attorney’s fee to be paid by the employer or carrier, in its discretion, which shall be paid as the court may direct.

§ 440.34(5), Fla. Stat. (2015). An award of fees, as indicated, is discretionary. Entitlement is a case-by-case determination that can be based on circumstances that are shown to justify the expenditure of appellate fees.

Ordinarily, entitlement is not established where an appellant files, a notice of appeal and soon thereafter seeks dismissal, leaving little doubt about whether the appeal will be pursued. In sharp contrast, the facts here show that the Appellant received1 an extension of time for filing its initial brief, missed the extended deadline, and'told Appellee’s counsel that the brief was almost done and the he intended to file it. Even after this Court issued a show cause order, a brief never materialized; instead, a voluntary dismissal was filed. Under these circumstances, Appel-lee’s appellate counsel was justified in undertaking typical appellate tasks that required the expenditure of attorney time.

Accordingly, Appellee’s motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED, and this matter is REMANDED for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.1

ROBERTS, C.J., SWANSON, and MAKAR, JJ., concui.

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PER CURIAM.

After Appellant received an extension of time to file his initial brief, but failed to do so, Appellee moved for, attorneys’ fees expended in anticipation of receiving and responding to the initial brief. Appellant had assured her he was filing a brief, indicating it would be filed by the extended deadline. Two days after the filing of the fees motion, Appellant filed a. notice of voluntary dismissal.

Appellee’s entitlement to fees is based on section 440.34(5), . Florida Statutes, which states:

(5) If any proceedings are had for review of any claim, award, or compensation order before any court, the court may award the injured employee or dependent an attorney’s fee to be paid by the employer or carrier, in its discretion, which shall be paid as the court may direct.

§ 440.34(5), Fla. Stat. (2015). An award of fees, as indicated, is discretionary. Entitlement is a case-by-case determination that can be based on circumstances that are shown to justify the expenditure of appellate fees.

Ordinarily, entitlement is not established where an appellant files, a notice of appeal and soon thereafter seeks dismissal, leaving little doubt about whether the appeal will be pursued. In sharp contrast, the facts here show that the Appellant received1 an extension of time for filing its initial brief, missed the extended deadline, and'told Appellee’s counsel that the brief was almost done and the he intended to file it. Even after this Court issued a show cause order, a brief never materialized; instead, a voluntary dismissal was filed. Under these circumstances, Appel-lee’s appellate counsel was justified in undertaking typical appellate tasks that required the expenditure of attorney time.

Accordingly, Appellee’s motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED, and this matter is REMANDED for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.1

ROBERTS, C.J., SWANSON, and MAKAR, JJ., concui.

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Bluebook (online)

180 So. 3d 250, 2015 WL 9590330, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thyssenkrupp-elevator-corp-and-sedgwick-cms-v-randy-blackmon-fladistctapp-2015.