Thykkuttathil v. United States

88 Fed. Cl. 293, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 273, 2009 WL 2414371
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedAugust 4, 2009
DocketNo. 09-03C
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 88 Fed. Cl. 293 (Thykkuttathil v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thykkuttathil v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 293, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 273, 2009 WL 2414371 (uscfc 2009).

Opinion

OPINION

BUSH, Judge.

Job J. Thykkuttathil, Corvilia C. Thykkut-tathil and Grace M. Thykkuttathil (plaintiffs), proceeding pro se, originally filed a takings claim in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington against various federal officials and agencies. Upon transfer to this court, defendant United States moved to dismiss this suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.

BACKGROUND1

On September 25, 2008, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) of the United States Department of the Treasury seized Washington Mutual Bank (WMB). Compl. at 2. WMB was placed in receivership under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and was sold to JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association. Id. As a result of these actions, plaintiffs allege that their WMB stock became worthless. Id. Plaintiffs contend that they have suffered direct and indirect losses related to the seizure of WMB in the amount of$195,413.71. Mat4.

In the complaint, plaintiffs name OTS, FDIC, and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as well as officials at those agencies, as defendants. Compl. at 1-2. The court construes plaintiffs’ complaint to name the United States as the defendant in this suit. See Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed.Cl. 186, 190 (2003) (“Stated differently for the benefit of pro se plaintiffs, the only proper defendant for any matter before this court is the United States, not its officers, nor any other individual.” (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941))). Plaintiffs allege that the United States has effected a taking of their property in various investment accounts, and rely on the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution as support for their claim in this court. Compl. at 2.

[295]*295DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

This court’s subject matter jurisdiction over takings claims against the United States is provided by the Tucker Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006); Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed.Cir.2005) (finding that when a plaintiff “ha[s] a nonfriv-olous takings claim founded upon the Fifth Amendment, jurisdiction under the Tucker Act is proper” in this court). For jurisdictional puiposes, a plaintiff alleging a taking must merely make “a nonfrivolous allegation that it is within the class of plaintiffs entitled to recover under” the Fifth Amendment. Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed.Cir.2008). Here, plaintiffs allege that they owned stock in WMB that was rendered worthless by regulatory actions of the federal government. Compl. at 2. Jurisdiction thus lies for their suit.

II. Pro Se Litigants

The court acknowledges that plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, and are “not expected to frame issues with the precision of a common law pleading.” Roche v. U.S. Postal Serv., 828 F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed.Cir.1987). Pro se plaintiffs are entitled to a liberal construction of their pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”). Accordingly, the court has examined the complaint and plaintiffs’ response brief thoroughly and has attempted to discern all of plaintiffs’ legal arguments.

III. Standard of Review for a Motion Filed under RCFC 12(b)(6)

It is well-settled that a complaint should be dismissed under RCFC 12(b)(6) “when the facts asserted by the claimant do not entitle him to a legal remedy.” Lindsay v. United States, 295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed.Cir.2002). When considering a motion to dismiss under this rule, “the allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-15, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). “[W]hen the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6). Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

IV.Analysis

Plaintiffs’ regulatory takings claim is founded on a bank seizure by federal banking regulators. Defendant argues that takings claims based on bank seizures have been repeatedly rejected by binding precedent in this circuit. Def.’s Mot. at 5-10. The basic thrust of defendant’s argument is that investors in bank stocks have no reasonable investment-backed expectation that federal regulators will not seize a bank, if and when regulators believe it hás become necessary to intervene in a bank’s operations. See id. at 5 (“[B]eeause the seizure of a financial institution falls within the ambit of a shareholder’s investment-backed expectations, it may not serve as the basis for a Fifth Amendment takings claim.”).

The facts alleged by plaintiffs in the complaint state that federal regulators believed it was necessary to intervene in WMB’s operations:

It is our understanding that if the U.S. government seized [WMB] for the “Greater Good” of the American people, with the intention of protecting the banking system
The [OTS] took possession of [WMB] on September 25, 2008 because it believed that “it was highly likely to be unable to pay its obligations and meet its operating liquidity needs.” The bank had not yet failed but the OTS took possession because it thought it might fail.

Compl. at 2. Thus, plaintiffs’ takings claim is based on a bank seizure by federal regulators, who are alleged to have acted according to their assessment that WMB “might fail.” The question for the court is whether [296]*296a bank seizure under these conditions constitutes a takings claim.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has addressed this issue. Golden Pac. Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066 (Fed.Cir.1994) (Golden Pacific). The Federal Circuit held in

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Bluebook (online)
88 Fed. Cl. 293, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 273, 2009 WL 2414371, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thykkuttathil-v-united-states-uscfc-2009.