Thurston v. Koch

4 U.S. 301
CourtUnited States Circuit Court
DecidedOctober 15, 1800
StatusPublished

This text of 4 U.S. 301 (Thurston v. Koch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thurston v. Koch, 4 U.S. 301 (1800).

Opinion

After argument, the opinion of the court was delivered by the presiding judge, in the following terms :

Paterson, Justice.

The case before the court is that of a double insurance ; and the question is, whether the insurers shall contribute ratably, or [303]*303shall pay according to priority of contract, until the insured be satisfied to the amount of his loss. The law on this subject is different in different nations of Europe, owing to the diversity of local ordinances, which have been made to regulate commercial transactions. By the ordinance of one country, the contract is declared to be void, and a forfeiture superadded; whereas, by the ordinance of other countries, the contract is merely void, without any forfeiture. By the ordinance of Spain, if a policy be signed, on the same day, by several persons, the first signer becomes first responsible, and so on, until the insured receive full satisfaction to the value of his loss ; the posterior insurers being liable only for the deficiency, and that, too, according to the order of priority. But in such case, by the ordinance of France, the several insurers, on the same day, shall contribute ratably to make up the loss; whereas, by the same ordinance, if the policies bear date on different days, the rate of contribution is rejected, and that of priority established; or, in other words, if the first policy absorb the loss, or amount to the value of the goods insured, the posterior insurers are not liable, but shall withdraw their insurances, after retaining a certain per-eentage. The solvency of the first insurer to the full value being assumed, the ordinance is predicated on the principle, that there remains no property to be insured, and of course, no risk to be run.

But suppose, the solvency of the first insurer should become doubtful, what course is to be pursued ? As this is a risk, it ought to be provided against; and accordingly, we find, that some of these ordinances have declared, that such insurer’s solvability may be insured. It is obvious, that this is a point of great delicacy ; for by questioning the solvency of a merchant, you wound his credit, and perhaps, cast him into a state of bankruptcy. Most, if not all, of these ordinances, are of ancient date, and were calculated for the then existing state of commerce in *the several countries which formed them. L

It is, however, evident, that the law-merchant varies in different nations, and even in the same nation, at different times. The course of trade, local circumstance, commercial interests and 'national policy, induce to some variation of the rule. The law in this particular, as it was understood and practised in England, prior to, and at the commencement of, our revolution, was different from the rule which prevailed in France, Spain and other countries, under their local ordinances. A double insurance is, where the same man is to receive two sums instead of one, or the same sum twice over, for the same loss, by reason of his having made two insurances upon the same ship or goods. In such case, the risk must be the same. This kind of insurance is agreeable to the practice and law of England, and is considered as being founded in utility, convenience and policy. In the case of Godin v. London Assurance Company, in February 1758, Lord Mansfield, in delivering- the opinion of the court, expressed himself as follows :

“As between them, and upon the foot of commutative justice merely, there is no color why the insurers should not pay the insured the whole: for they have received a premium for the whole risk. Before the introduction of wagering policies, it was, upon principles convenience, very wisely established, that a man should not recover more than he had lost.’ Insurance was considered as an indemnity only, in case of a loss ; and therefore, [304]*304the satisfaction ought not to exceed the loss.1 This rule was-calculated to prevent fraud; lest the temptation of gain should occasion unfair and wilful losses.
“ If the insured is to receive but one satisfaction, natural justice says, that the several insurers shall all of them contribute pro rata, to satisfy that loss against which they have all insured. No particular cases are to be found, upon this head; or, at least, none have been cited by the counsel on either side.
“Where a man makes a double insurance for the same thing, in such a manner that ho can clearly recover against several insurers, in distinct policies a double satisfaction, the law certainly says, ‘ that he ought not to recover doubly for the same loss, but be content with one single satisfaction for it.’ And if the same man, really, and for his own proper account, insures the same goods doubly, though both insurances be not made in his own name, but one or both of them, in the name of another person, yet that is just the same thing; for the same person is to have the benefit of both policies. And if the whole should be recovered from one, he ought to stand in the place of the insured, to receive contribution from the other, who was equally liable to pay the whole.” (1 Burr. 492.)

*In the case of Newby v. Reed, at sittings after term, in 1763, 2 W. Bl. 416, the same doctrine is laid down, agreed to, and confirmed. For, “ it was ruled by Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice, and agreed to be the course of practice, that upon a double insurance, though the insured is not entitled to two satisfactions ; yet, upon the first action, he may recover the whole sum insured, and may leave the defendant therein to recover a ratable satisfaction from the insurers.”

These cases have never been contradicted, and must be decisive on the subject. The law, as stated in the above adjudications, is recognised by Park and Millar, two recent and respectable writers on marine insurances. Such being the law of England, as to double insurances, before and at the commencement of our revolution, it was also the law of this country, and is so now. It is of authoritative force, and must govern the present case. Besides, if the court were at liberty to elect a rule, I should adopt the English regulation, which divides the loss ratably among the insurers. It is the most convenient, equal and consonant to natural justice, and has been practised ujion, nearly half a century, by the first commercial nation in the world. I am not clear, that the practice of France is not in conformity with this rule ; for it is probable, that they open but one policy, bearing the same date, though signed at different times, or different policies of the same date; in either of which cases, by the French ordinance, the insurers contribute ratably to satisfy the loss sustained by the insured. If so, it is precisely the English and American rule. Equality is equity : this maxim is particularly applicable to commercial transactions ; and therefore, the rule of contribution ought to be favored. The pressure, instead of crushing an individual, will be sustained by several, and be light. The result is, that the defendant must contribute ratably to make up the loss of the insured.

Peters, Justice.2

— The point in this cause is, whether in a case of double [305]

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Bluebook (online)
4 U.S. 301, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thurston-v-koch-uscirct-1800.