Thrift Oil & Gas Co. v. Thermatomic Carbon Co.

2 La. App. 232, 1925 La. App. LEXIS 422
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 9, 1925
DocketNo. 2218
StatusPublished

This text of 2 La. App. 232 (Thrift Oil & Gas Co. v. Thermatomic Carbon Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thrift Oil & Gas Co. v. Thermatomic Carbon Co., 2 La. App. 232, 1925 La. App. LEXIS 422 (La. Ct. App. 1925).

Opinion

REYNOLDS, J.

This is a suit by Thrift Oil & Gas Company, Inc., to recover judgment for $1860.00 against Thermatomic Carbon Company for gas contracted for by defendant from the gas wells of plaintiff for the months of July and August, 1923, under a contract reading, in part, as follows:

“This agreement made this 16th day of December, 1921, between Thrift Oil & Gas Company, Inc., a corporation organized under the laws of Louisiana, having its principal office in the City of Monroe, State of Louisiana, (hereinafter referred to as Thrift), party of the first part, and E. N. Gillespie, of Freeport, Pennsylvania, as Trustee (hereinafter referred to as the Trustee), party of the second part:
First: Thrift agrees to sell and hereby does sell to the Trustee and the Trustee agrees to buy and hereby does buy from Thrift for a period of ten (10) years from March 1st, 1922, all the gas which may be required for the operation of a carbon plant to be erected on or near the above mentioned Smith lease up to a monthly average of five million (5,000,000) cubic feet of gas per day, at and for the price of three (3)cents per thousand cubic feet, measured at eight (8) ounce pressure above atmosphere. The Trustee monthly shall pay for a daily average of one million (1,000,000) cubic feet of gas per day whether or not gas to that amount has been taken by the above mentioned plant, unless the plant is shut down on account of accidents or other causes beyond the control of its owners. (Exclusive of market conditions.) In such event the Trustee shall not be required to pay for any gas not used and if the shutdown should extend beyond a period of three months, Thrift 'shall have the right to sell gas to other parties until such time as the plant resumes operations.”

Defendant denied liability for the minimum of gas contract for the months of July and August, 1923, and asked, in re-convention, for $5520.00 paid plaintiff by defendant through error for the minimum of gas provided for in the contract during the months of March, April, May, June, July and August, 1922, during which time thé plant was being constructed and before the plant had begun to use the minimum of gas provided in the contract.

On these issues the case went to trial. There was judgment in the lower court for the plaintiff for the full amount sued for and rejecting defendant’s reconventional demand. Defendant appealed.

OPINION

In this case there are two questions presented for determination.

I.

Was the date at which defendant was to begin paying for the minimum if 1,000,000 cubic feet of gas per day under the contract to begin March 1, 1922, or to begin when the plant was completed and ready to begin operations?

The terms of the contract appear to us to be plain and subject to but one construction. It says:

“Thrift agrees to sell and hereby does sell to the Trustee and the Trustee agrees to buy and hereby does buy from Thrift for a period of ten (10) years from March 1st, 1922. * * * ”

From this language we are certain that the parties to the contract understood at the time they made it that defendant was to ' begin paying for the minimum of 1,000,000 cubic feet of gas per day on March 1, 1922, whether it used that amount of gas per day or not.

If there could be any doubt as to how the parties to the contract understood it, that doubt was removed by the construction the plaintiff and defendant placed on it immediately after the contract was entered into, for plaintiff began to pay defendant from March 1, 1922, for the minimum of gas provided for in the contract and paid monthly for said amount during the time its plant was being constructed.

Undoubtedly the parties to. the contract construed it to mean that the minimum [234]*234of gas was to begin to be paid for from March 1st, 1922, and we concur in their construction of the contract.

Article 1956 of the Civil Code provides:

“When the intent of the parties is doubtful, the construction put upon it, by the manner in which it has been executed by both, or by one with the express or implied assent of the other, furnishes a rule for its interpretation.”

II.

The second question to be decided is, was defendant’s carbon plant shut down during the month of July and August, 1923, on account of accident or other causes beyond the control of its owner.

The contract provides:

“The Trustee monthly shall pay for a daily average of one million (1,000.000) cubic feet of gas per day whether or not gas to that amount has been taken by the above mentioned plant,. unless the plant is shut down on account of accident or other causes beyond the control of its owners.”

In interpretating the exception in the clause of the contract above quoted, we must read the entire clause and interpret it as a whole.

In the case of American Bridge Company vs. Glenmore District Company, (Ky.) 107 S. W. 279, the court said:

“Under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis the general language following the specific enunciation of the causes- which prevented the appellant from being responsible for non-performance of its contract within the stipulated time must be limited to include causes similar to those set out; and, under this rule, we think it clear that the failure of the appellant to provide material with which to carry into effect its contract was not a circumstance beyond its reasonable control. None of the specified causes for non-responsibility could possibly be controlled by foresight on the part of appellant; but foresight would undoubtedly suggest, before making a contract so urgent in its nature as the one before us, that the material with which it was to be carried into effect should have been secured in advance, and therefore tlie failure to exercise these cannot be said to , be a cause for non-fulfillment beyond the reasonable control of the appellant.

In Michel vs. American Central Insurance Co., 44 N. Y. Supp. 832, the court said:

“In a statute or in a contract where general words follow specific words, the general words are not construed to mean things of different kinds from those described by the specific words, but denote things of the same kind.”

In Lehman vs. M. L. & T. R. Co., 115 La. 1, 4, 38 South. 873, the court said:

“The words ‘accidental or uncontrollable events’ known to the Civil Code Law of Louisiana, are equivalent of ‘cas fortuit ou force majeure’ of the French law and denote that which happens by a cause which we cannot resist, something which can neither be foreseen nor prevented.”

Under these authorities we must determine from the evidence whether or not the plant was shut down “on account of accident or other causes beyond the control of its owners”.

E, N. Florsheim testified (pages 10 and 11) regarding discussions that took place at and before the time the contract was signed, as follows:

“Q. Was that not, to your knowledge, ' and experiment?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. Had there ever been any carbon plant in operation ■ on that process?
“A. Mr. Uhlinger told us in Pittsburg there was.
“Q.

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Related

Lehman, Stern & Co. v. Morgan's Louisiana & Texas R. & S. S. Co.
38 So. 873 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1905)
Michel v. American Cent. Insurance
44 N.Y.S. 832 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1897)

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2 La. App. 232, 1925 La. App. LEXIS 422, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thrift-oil-gas-co-v-thermatomic-carbon-co-lactapp-1925.