Threlkeld v. Jones

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

Threlkeld v. Jones

1 Ky. Op. 369, 1866 Ky. LEXIS 334

DecidedOctober 8, 1866

StatusPublished

This text of 1 Ky. Op. 369 (Threlkeld v. Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Threlkeld v. Jones, 1 Ky. Op. 369, 1866 Ky. LEXIS 334 (Ky. Ct. App. 1866).

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Opinion

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Robertson :

We presume, that under the decretal sale, the land was bought for the vendor, W. Threlkeld, and, therefore, as no lien which Samuel M. J ones may have had would be affected by the sale he does not appear to have been prejudiced by the decree. Moreover, he did not offer to intervene, nor did Threlkeld in his cross-petition or otherwise require him to be made a party. And, therefore, and especially as the appellant, J. H. Jones, cannot be presumed to have had notice of S. M. Jones’ subsequent lien, except from the suggestion to that effect in Threlkeld’s answer, we cannot reverse the decree of sale and set aside the sale merely because the appellee S. M. Jones did not make S. M. Jones a defendant, which it seems to us it was not his duty to do. Nor, as Threlkeld did not make S. M. Jones a party, can he complain.

Nor do we see any other error in the decree.

The lien enforced by the decree was expressly and properly reserved in Solomon Jones’ deed to Coleman, who conveyed after its registration to Threlkeld, and the amount and manner of the decree seem to be right, and the sale regular.

Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.

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Opinion of the Court by

Judge Robertson :

We presume, that under the decretal sale, the land was bought for the vendor, W. Threlkeld, and, therefore, as no lien which Samuel M. J ones may have had would be affected by the sale he does not appear to have been prejudiced by the decree. Moreover, he did not offer to intervene, nor did Threlkeld in his cross-petition or otherwise require him to be made a party. And, therefore, and especially as the appellant, J. H. Jones, cannot be presumed to have had notice of S. M. Jones’ subsequent lien, except from the suggestion to that effect in Threlkeld’s answer, we cannot reverse the decree of sale and set aside the sale merely because the appellee S. M. Jones did not make S. M. Jones a defendant, which it seems to us it was not his duty to do. Nor, as Threlkeld did not make S. M. Jones a party, can he complain.

Nor do we see any other error in the decree.

The lien enforced by the decree was expressly and properly reserved in Solomon Jones’ deed to Coleman, who conveyed after its registration to Threlkeld, and the amount and manner of the decree seem to be right, and the sale regular.

Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

1 Ky. Op. 369, 1866 Ky. LEXIS 334, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/threlkeld-v-jones-kyctapp-1866.