Thrash v. Continental Casualty Co.

6 So. 2d 75
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 28, 1941
DocketNo. 6371.
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 6 So. 2d 75 (Thrash v. Continental Casualty Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thrash v. Continental Casualty Co., 6 So. 2d 75 (La. Ct. App. 1941).

Opinion

A 1937 Oldsmobile coupe and a motor cycle approached each other and collided on U.S. Highway 80, at its intersection with the Broad Acres Road in Caddo Parish, Louisiana, about 9:15 o'clock of the night of July 27, 1940. The automobile was being driven by Durwood A. Sutton at the request of the other occupant, Mrs. Fred Post, allegedly its owner; and the motor cycle was operated and owned by plaintiff, Harry B. Thrash.

As a result of the collision plaintiff sustained serious injuries, and his machine experienced damage amounting to $50; and he seeks a judgment for damages in this ex delicto action brought against Sutton, Mrs. Post and the Continental Casualty Company. The latter insured the Oldsmobile coupe against public liability, with a limit of $5,000 for one person, and against property damage.

The petition alleges that plaintiff was struck by the left rear part of the automobile, and that the accident was caused by *Page 76 the negligence of defendants in the following respects:

"That said car was being operated recklessly, driven at a speed exceeding sixty miles per hour during the nighttime, on unfamiliar road.

"That the driver failed to maintain a proper lookout for others using said highway, in utter disregard of the rights of your petitioner.

"That said car and its parts and equipment, particularly the brakes and steering apparatus thereof, were defective and in need of repairs.

"That said defendants were driving beyond the center line and on the left hand side of said road in derogation of the traffic laws of the State of Louisiana, which are made a part hereof by reference; that the driver steered said car to his left and then, in an attempt to immediately return to his side of the road, caused said car to strike petitioner and his motor cycle."

In a joint answer, defendants deny negligence on their part, and allege that plaintiff drove his motor cycle into the automobile which was proceeding on its right side of the highway. Alternatively, they plead that plaintiff was contributorily negligent.

The case was tried before a jury, and a verdict in plaintiff's favor for $5,050 was returned. In keeping with the verdict, the district court granted to plaintiff a solidary judgment for the named amount against defendants, Mrs. Fred Post, Durwood A. Sutton and the Continental Casualty Company.

All defendants prosecute this appeal.

At and near the locus of the accident, U.S. Highway 80 runs generally east and west, and is commonly known as the Greenwood Road. It has an 18 foot asphalt surface, is marked with a center line, and is bordered with hard dirt shoulders. Along each shoulder is a ditch. The Broad Acres Road, which is partly surfaced with gravel, intersects it on the south side and courses in a southerly direction.

For about 210 feet west of the center of such intersection, the highway is straight and inclines slightly and gradually; then it curves gently toward the south. Looking eastward from that center point, it is straight but inclines gradually for 675 feet to the crest of a small hill. No foliage or other objects, capable of obstructing the view of motorists, border the highway in the vicinity of the locus.

On the night in question clear weather prevailed, visibility was good, and the highway was dry.

About 3:45 o'clock of the afternoon of July 27, 1940, Mrs. Post and Sutton departed from Grand Prairie, Texas, in the Oldsmobile coupe. Sutton performed the driving. Their destination was Shreveport, Louisiana, 201 miles toward the east, where a visit was scheduled with Mr. and Mrs. Charles Cross, the son-in-law and daughter respectively of Mrs. Post and friends of Sutton.

Approaching the Oldsmobile on U.S. Highway 80, as it neared the Broad Acres Road intersection about 9:15 o'clock P.M. of the named day, were two motor cycles traveling 35 or 40 miles an hour toward the west. Plaintiff, Harry B. Thrash, drove one of these machines, while the other was occupied by Ralph McKenzie and Johnny Manis. These motor cyclists were a part of a group of seven persons enroute to Rose Hill Lake, a swimming resort located several miles farther west. The remaining four had preceded them, and were Albert Teague, John Piezza and Russell Burdman, occupying two other motor cycles, and Porter Wynige, who drove an automobile.

Traveling a short distance to the rear of the motor cycle ridden by plaintiff and the one occupied by McKenzie and Manis was a Plymouth sedan driven by J.T. Mauritzen. Seated beside him on his right was his wife, while their small daughter sat on the back seat.

A Ford V-8 automobile, driven by Mrs. Egan Roach, followed behind and slightly to the left of the Mauritzen machine. Her husband occupied the right side of the front seat.

The collision occurred within the aforementioned intersection of the highway and the Broad Acres Road. Contact was made between the front wheel of plaintiff's motor cycle and the left rear fender of the automobile. The latter machine, following the impact, swerved to its right, traveled easterly along the end of the Broad Acres Road and along the south shoulder and ditch of the highway, and came to a stop approximately 90 feet from the collision point. Its rear end rested in the south ditch and the front portion thereof was on the pavement, pointing northerly. One witness testified that the distance traveled by the car after the collision was 210 feet; but his testimony is contrary to a clear preponderance *Page 77 of the evidence, including that of one of plaintiff's witnesses, touching this important fact. The motor cycle, with plaintiff on it, caromed to its right and went into the north ditch a few feet west of the intersection.

Plaintiff testified that Sutton was traveling at an excessive rate of speed, about 70 miles an hour, when the accident occurred; and his companions Manis and McKenzie give somewhat similar testimony.

Mrs. Post, although an occupant of the car, did not witness the accident. She was asleep at the time. Sutton stated that he was driving not more than 45 miles an hour. It is possible that his speed was slightly faster than this, but we are satisfied that it was not excessive as plaintiff and his friends contend. If it had been excessive, a stopping of the car within 90 feet after the impact, as was done, could not have been accomplished. Then, too, it must be remembered, and it is a recognized fact, that the gauging of the speed at night of an oncoming car, as plaintiff and his witnesses sought to do, cannot be accurately performed.

Counsel for plaintiff call attention to the testimony of Mrs. Post and Sutton wherein they state that they never at any time during their trip from Grand Prairie, Texas, exceeded 45 miles an hour; and an extensive argument is presented in their brief urging "that it is a physical impossibility to travel a distance of approximately 195 miles, through various towns, particularly the City of Dallas, where any number of lights and stops must be made, within approximately five hours time, and yet not exceed a speed of 45 miles per hour." In this connection it is to be observed that these motorists were on their trip from about 3:45 o'clock P.M. until the time of the accident at 9:15 o'clock P.M., a total of five and one-half hours; and during that period, with a coverage of 195 miles, their average speed was about 36 miles per hour. Considering this calculation, and the fact that only one stop for fuel was made, we are unable to hold that their referred to testimony was fallacious.

The version of plaintiff regarding the manner of the accident's occurrence is found in the following testimony given by him.

"Q. Now when the accident actually happened what did Mrs.

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Bluebook (online)
6 So. 2d 75, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thrash-v-continental-casualty-co-lactapp-1941.