Thrash Ltd. Partnership v. County of Buncombe

673 S.E.2d 706, 195 N.C. App. 678, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 253
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedMarch 17, 2009
DocketCOA08-327
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 673 S.E.2d 706 (Thrash Ltd. Partnership v. County of Buncombe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thrash Ltd. Partnership v. County of Buncombe, 673 S.E.2d 706, 195 N.C. App. 678, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 253 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion

STEELMAN, Judge.

Where a zoning ordinance amendment was not adopted in accordance with Buncombe County’s own zoning ordinance procedures, the amendment is invalid.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Lott Partnership II is a North Carolina Limited Partnership which owns a parcel of land in eastern Buncombe County. Plaintiff Thrash Limited Partnership sold its land during the pendency of this action and the action is moot as to Thrash Limited Partnership.

Defendant Buncombe County (“County”) first exercised its zoning authority pursuant to Article 18 of Chapter 153A in the 1970’s by enacting a community-based zoning plan that only applied zoning to townships in which the residents requested zoning. As of March of 2007, Limestone and Beaverdam were the only townships to request zoning, and those ordinances are codified, respectively, as Articles III and IV of the Buncombe County Code.

On 8 March 2007, the Buncombe County Commissioners adopted a resolution which referred a draft of “the proposed amendments to *680 the zoning ordinance of Buncombe County, North Carolina as well as the amended zoning maps” (the “Amended Zoning Ordinance”) to the Buncombe County Planning Board (“Planning Board”). The Amended Zoning Ordinance was modeled after the Limestone Township Zoning ordinance, and was the first county-wide zoning ordinance, superceding Articles III and IV of the County Code. The Planning Board considered the text of the Amended Zoning Ordinance on 19 and 26 March, and 2 April. On 2 April, the Planning Board adopted a resolution setting forth its recommendations regarding the text of the Amended Zoning Ordinance.

On 10 and 17 April 2007, a notice of a public hearing was published in the Asheville Citizen-Times stating that the “Buncombe County Board of Commissioners will conduct a public hearing on the 24th day of April 2007 ... to consider the adoption of the Amended County Zoning Ordinance and Zoning Maps.” The notice further provided that “[a] copy of the amended ordinance can be accessed at buncombecounty.org ... .” The public hearing was held on 24 April.

On 1 May 2007, the board of commissioners adopted the Amended' Zoning Ordinance enacting county-wide zoning. On 15 June 2007, plaintiff filed an action seeking to have the Amended Zoning Ordinance declared invalid, alleging that the Ordinance was adopted without compliance with the requirements of County’s Zoning Ordinance and state law. Following a summary judgment hearing on 4 December 2007, Judge Downs entered an order on 21 December 2007, ruling that plaintiff had standing to bring the action and granting summary judgment in favor of County. Plaintiff appeals. County cross-assigns as error the trial court’s finding and conclusion, that plaintiff had standing.

II. Standing

We first address County’s contention that plaintiff did not have standing to institute this action because it had not sought a permit to develop its land and had no active plans to build multi-family units on its land. We disagree.

“Standing is a necessary prerequisite to a court’s proper exercise of subject matter jurisdiction.” Aubin v. Susi, 149 N.C. App. 320, 324, 560 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2002) (citation omitted). As the party invoking jurisdiction, plaintiffs have the burden of establishing standing. Neuse River Found. v. Smithfield Foods, 155 N.C. App. 110, 113, 574 S.E.2d 48, 51 (2002) (citation omitted).

*681 North Carolina’s case law makes clear that landowners in the area of a county affected by a zoning ordinance are allowed to challenge the ordinance on the basis of procedural defects in the enactment of such ordinances. See Frizzelle v. Harnett County, 106 N.C. App. 234, 416 S.E.2d 421 (1992) (plaintiffs, as landowners in the area of the county affected by the zoning ordinance, were allowed to challenge the ordinance on the basis of inadequate notice); Lee v. Simpson, 44 N.C. App. 611, 261 S.E.2d 295 (1980) (plaintiffs, who were owners of property adjacent to property that was rezoned, succeeded in overturning the rezoning ordinance for lack of proper notice); George v. Town of Edenton, 294 N.C. 679, 680, 242 S.E.2d 877, 878 (1978) (“Plaintiffs, as residents of Chowan County within the jurisdiction of the zoning powers of defendants, challenge in their complaint the legality of both actions of the Town Council and ask the court to determine their validity.”); Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 544, 187 S.E.2d 35, 42 (1972) (“The plaintiffs, owners of property in the adjoining area affected by the ordinance, are parties in interest entitled to maintain the action.”).

County contends that plaintiff does not have standing because it “ha[s] not alleged that the County has sought to apply the Ordinance under challenge to the Plaintiff[] or that the Plaintiff[] ha[s] applied for or been denied anything related to use of their property.” County argues that the instant case is controlled by Andrews v. Alamance County, 132 N.C. App. 811, 513 S.E.2d 349 (1999). In Andrews, the plaintiff alleged an intention to develop her property as a manufactured home community and brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to declare the county ordinance establishing minimum lot requirements as invalid as applied to her. This Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue because she did not allege in her complaint that she had taken any steps to begin developing her property, such as applying for a permit or filing a subdivision plat with the county. Andrews, 132 N.C. App. at 815, 513 S.E.2d at 351. In the instant case, County contends that since plaintiff has not sought to use its property for a multi-family dwelling use, it is not an “aggrieved party.”

We find Andrews to be distinguishable. The plaintiff’s challenge to the zoning ordinance in Andrews was based on arbitrariness, equal protection, or constitutionality as applied to the plaintiff’s land. As the case necessarily involved a specific consideration of plaintiff’s land, plaintiff was required to show that she had an immediate risk of sustaining an injury in order to have standing. In contrast, plaintiff’s *682 challenge in the instant case to the Amended Zoning Ordinance is based on the alleged failure of County to follow the proper procedures to enact the zoning ordinance. Thus, plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action is not an “as-applied” challenge, but rather is an attack on the validity of the Amended Zoning Ordinance.

This argument is without merit.

III.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
673 S.E.2d 706, 195 N.C. App. 678, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 253, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thrash-ltd-partnership-v-county-of-buncombe-ncctapp-2009.