Thorpe v. State

Indiana Court of Appeals

Thorpe v. State

695 N.E.2d 967, 1998 Ind. App. LEXIS 606, 1998 WL 211286

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals

DecidedApril 30, 1998

Docket52A05-9605-CR-190

StatusPublished

This text of 695 N.E.2d 967 (Thorpe v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Thorpe v. State, 695 N.E.2d 967, 1998 Ind. App. LEXIS 606, 1998 WL 211286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).

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Opinion

OPINION ON REMAND

KIRSCH, Judge.

On the State’s petition for transfer from our memorandum decision of July 16, 1997 and opinion on rehearing of October 17,1997, our supreme court denied transfer and remanded this case for further consideration by this court. For the reasons set forth in Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466 (Ind.1997) and Grinstead v. State, 684 N.E.2d 482 (Ind.1997), we now reverse that portion of our prior decision in which we held that double jeopardy principles barred Thorpe’s convictions for both attempted murder and burglary as a Class A felony because a single injury to a single individual could not support both convictions. Because Thorpe did not argue that the Indiana constitution provides different or greater protections than those found in the federal constitution, our supreme court has held we may not address this issue. See Valentin v. State, 688 N.E.2d 412 (Ind.1997). Therefore, the trial court is affirmed in all respects.

SULLIVAN and FRIEDLANDER, JJ., concur.

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OPINION ON REMAND

KIRSCH, Judge.

On the State’s petition for transfer from our memorandum decision of July 16, 1997 and opinion on rehearing of October 17,1997, our supreme court denied transfer and remanded this case for further consideration by this court. For the reasons set forth in Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466 (Ind.1997) and Grinstead v. State, 684 N.E.2d 482 (Ind.1997), we now reverse that portion of our prior decision in which we held that double jeopardy principles barred Thorpe’s convictions for both attempted murder and burglary as a Class A felony because a single injury to a single individual could not support both convictions. Because Thorpe did not argue that the Indiana constitution provides different or greater protections than those found in the federal constitution, our supreme court has held we may not address this issue. See Valentin v. State, 688 N.E.2d 412 (Ind.1997). Therefore, the trial court is affirmed in all respects.

SULLIVAN and FRIEDLANDER, JJ., concur.

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695 N.E.2d 967, 1998 Ind. App. LEXIS 606, 1998 WL 211286, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thorpe-v-state-indctapp-1998.

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