Thorogood v. Navy
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Opinion
Case: 26-1219 Document: 42 Page: 1 Filed: 06/03/2026
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________
MICHAEL G. THOROGOOD, Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, Respondent ______________________
2026-1219 ______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection Board in No. DC-0752-24-0319-I-1. ______________________
Decided: June 3, 2026 ______________________
MICHAEL THOROGOOD, Norfolk, VA, pro se.
OLIVER MCDONALD, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash- ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT SHUMATE. ______________________
Before REYNA, HUGHES, and STARK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. Case: 26-1219 Document: 42 Page: 2 Filed: 06/03/2026
Michael G. Thorogood appeals a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB” or “Board”) sus- taining his indefinite suspension from the United States Department of the Navy (“Navy”). We affirm. I For more than a decade, Mr. Thorogood worked as a Logistics Management Specialist in the Norfolk Naval Shipyard (“Norfolk”), providing supply chain support for the maintenance and repair of naval vessels such as nu- clear submarines. Like all employees at Norfolk, Mr. Tho- rogood’s Logistics Management position required a security clearance. On July 17, 2023, Mr. Thorogood was notified that his “eligibility to access classified information” was being re- voked, “based on [certain] security concerns.” Appx. 21. 1 As a result, on September 5, 2023, the Navy proposed in- definitely suspending him “for failure to meet a condition of employment.” Appx. 31. On October 26, 2023, after counsel submitted written and oral responses contesting the charge, a Navy reviewing officer found that there were grounds for instituting an in- definite suspension. On January 12, 2024, that decision was upheld by the Navy’s Personnel Security Appeals Board (“PSAB”). Mr. Thorogood appealed to the MSPB. On October 3, 2024, after a hearing, an administrative judge (“AJ”) affirmed his indefinite suspension. On No- vember 25, 2025, the Board affirmed the AJ’s decision.
1 “Appx.” refers to the appendix submitted by Mr. Thorogood, ECF No. 21, while “S.A.” refers to the Sup- plemental Appendix attached to the Navy’s brief, ECF No. 27. Case: 26-1219 Document: 42 Page: 3 Filed: 06/03/2026
THOROGOOD v. NAVY 3
Mr. Thorogood timely appealed to this court. The Board had jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 7701. We have ju- risdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). II “Our scope of review in an appeal from a decision of the Board is limited.” Cheney v. Dep’t of Just., 479 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “We will uphold a decision of the MSPB unless it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre- tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’ or ‘unsup- ported by substantial evidence.’” Jenkins v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 911 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)). “Substantial evidence means such rele- vant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade- quate to support a conclusion.” McIntosh v. Dep’t of Def., 53 F.4th 630, 638 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “On appeal, the petitioner bears the bur- den of establishing error in the Board’s decision.” Jones v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 98 F.4th 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). “[I]n a case involving a suspension resulting from the suspension of a security clearance,” “[n]either the Board nor this court may review the underlying merits of an agency’s decision to suspend a security clearance.” Cheney, 479 F.3d at 1351-52; see also Hesse v. Dep’t of State, 217 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Instead, “review of adverse actions stemming from security clearance determi- nations is limited to determining (1) whether a security clearance was denied [or revoked], (2) whether the security clearance was a requirement for appellant’s position, and (3) whether the procedures set forth in [5 U.S.C.] § 7513 were followed.” Hornseth v. Dep’t of the Navy, 916 F.3d 1369, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also Gargiulo v. Dep’t of Home- land Sec., 727 F.3d 1181, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Case: 26-1219 Document: 42 Page: 4 Filed: 06/03/2026
III Mr. Thorogood advances three principal challenges on appeal. First, he contends that the Board erred in finding that his position of Logistics Management Specialist required a security clearance. We disagree. The Board’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, including documentary and testimonial evidence the Navy presented at the hear- ing before the AJ, establishing that Mr. Thorogood’s posi- tion “[r]equires eligibility for access to classified information.” Appx. 72 (“[The] [p]osition requires eligibil- ity for access to Secret, Confidential, or ‘L’ level infor- mation.”); S.A. 52 (“[T]he position that Mr. Thorogood was occupying at the time . . . require[d] eligibility for access [to] classified information.”). The evidence that Mr. Tho- rogood was permitted, at times, to work from home, and that some of his job duties did not involve accessing classi- fied information does not undermine the AJ’s finding that it was a condition of employment that he maintain a secu- rity clearance. Second, Mr. Thorogood asserts that he was denied suf- ficient process under 5 U.S.C. § 7513. The statute “requires the agency to provide notice of denial or revocation of the security clearance; a statement of the reason(s) upon which the negative decision was based; and an opportunity to re- spond,” including with the assistance of an attorney or other representative. Hornseth, 916 F.3d at 1374 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)(1)-(4). Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that each of these requirements was satisfied here. On September 5, 2023, the Navy issued Mr. Thorogood a “Notice of Proposed Indefinite Suspension,” to take effect “no earlier than thirty (30) calendar days from the date [he] receive[d] th[e] notice.” Appx. 31. It explained the reason for the notice was his “failure to meet a condition of em- ployment, revocation of eligibility for access to classified Case: 26-1219 Document: 42 Page: 5 Filed: 06/03/2026
THOROGOOD v. NAVY 5
information and assignment to sensitive duties.” Id. The notice further advised Mr. Thorogood he had 15 days to re- spond and apprised him of additional rights, including the right to representation and to appeal; he used the subse- quent period to hire an attorney, submit a response, and then present evidence at the AJ hearing. Finally, Mr.
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