Thornton v. Estate of Thornton

886 P.2d 779, 126 Idaho 474, 1994 Ida. LEXIS 141
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 13, 1994
Docket21146
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 886 P.2d 779 (Thornton v. Estate of Thornton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thornton v. Estate of Thornton, 886 P.2d 779, 126 Idaho 474, 1994 Ida. LEXIS 141 (Idaho 1994).

Opinion

JOHNSON, Justice.

This is a civil case. The dispositive issue is whether the trial court properly certified an order denying a motion to dismiss as a final judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b). We conclude that the trial court improperly certified the order as a final judgment.

I.

THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.

Laura B. Thornton sued the estate of her deceased former spouse, Stuart B. Thornton, and the personal representative of the estate, Diane Hiekox.

After a series of delays in the prosecution of the case and orders of the trial court concerning dismissal for lack of prosecution, Thornton moved for partial summary judgment. The estate and Hiekox made a special appearance and moved for dismissal of Thornton’s motion.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and certified the denial as a final judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b). The estate and Hiekox appealed. Thornton cross-appealed, challenging the certification of the denial as a final judgment.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CERTIFIED THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS AS A FINAL JUDGMENT.

Thornton asserts that the trial court improperly certified the denial of the motion to dismiss as a final judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b). We agree.

I.R.C.P. 54(b) provides a means for a trial court to certify a ruling as a final judgment “only when there was more than one claim for relief and one or more but less than all of those claims were disposed of against all parties against whom those claims were made.” Pichon v. L.J. Broekemeier, Inc., 99 Idaho 598, 601, 586 P.2d 1042, 1045 (1978).

*475 In this case, the denial of the motion to dismiss did not dispose of any claim. Therefore, it was not proper for the trial court to certify the denial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b).

III.

CONCLUSION.

We dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

We award costs on appeal, but not attorney fees, to Thornton.

TROUT, SILAK, JJ., and WOODLAND and REINHARDT, JJ., Pro Tern., concur.

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Related

Williams v. State, Board of Real Estate Appraisers
239 P.3d 780 (Idaho Supreme Court, 2010)
Thornton v. Estate of Thornton
918 P.2d 1218 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1996)
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460 S.E.2d 54 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
886 P.2d 779, 126 Idaho 474, 1994 Ida. LEXIS 141, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thornton-v-estate-of-thornton-idaho-1994.