Thornhill v. Bancroft Bag Factory

144 So. 781
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 16, 1932
DocketNo. 4371.
StatusPublished

This text of 144 So. 781 (Thornhill v. Bancroft Bag Factory) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thornhill v. Bancroft Bag Factory, 144 So. 781 (La. Ct. App. 1932).

Opinion

PALMER, J.

This is a suit to recover compensation under the Employer’s Liability Act (Act No. 20 of 1914 and amendments thereto). Plaintiff was employed by defendant T. O. Bancroft, operating under the trade name of Bancroft Bag Factory, as a truck driver. His duties were to load a truck with bundles of paper bags, weighing from 40 pounds to 119 pounds, manufactured by the defendant, and then drive the truck to the place where 'the paper bags were to be delivered and there unload them. He had been employed by the defendant about three and one-half years, during which time he performed this same character of work. Prior to his employment by defendant he worked as a truck driver for W. C. Salley.

On June ¾ 1931, plaintiff, while performing his regular duties, and while driving the truck from the city of Monroe out the Ster-lington Road, received the injuries producing the disability of which he complains, by the road caving from under the truck, causing it to overturn in a ditch. The Union Indemnity Company carried workmen’s compensation insurance on the employees of Bancroft Bag Factory, and hence is made a party defendant in this case.

Plaintiff alleges that he- was receiving, at the time of his injuries, $28 per Week, but it developed that the correct amount was $25.38. He was paid 65 per cent, of his weekly wages from the time he was injured up to and including the week ending January 9, 1932, at which time further compensation was refused on the ground that he had fully recovered.

Plaintiff alleges that he was badly injured and was rendered unconscious for a short space of time; that he suffered a tearing of the muscles in his back and a rupture of the ligaments therein, as well as several bruises to his back and side and a sprain of his hip joint.

He further alleges that his said injuries have produced a total and permanent disability in him for the performance of any reasonable physical labor, which is the sole means he has for earning a livelihood, and he therefore seeks to recover 65 per cent.' of his weekly wages for a period of 400 weeks, beginning at the time he received his injuries, subject to a credit for payment of all compensation due for the weeks intervening between June 2, 1931, and January 9, 1932. He also seeks to recover the maximum amount allowed by law for medical attention.

Defendants admit plaintiff’s employment. They further admit that he was injured while engaged in work in the course of his employment, but they aver he was receiving weekly wages in the sum of only $25.38, which plaintiff does not contradict. In fact, there is no dispute over the question that plaintiff was entitled to compensation. The only question in controversy is the extent of plaintiff’s injuries. Defendants contend that on January 9, 1932, at the time they discontinued payment of compensation, plaintiff had sufficiently recovered to resume his regular work. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants in solido in the amount of 65 per cent, of plaintiff’s weekly wages of $25.38, over a period of 400 weeks, less a credit for the payments made covering the weeks intervening between July 2, 1931, and January 11, 1932, with 5 per cent, per annum interest on all weekly payments past due since January 11, 1932. The judgment is silent as to plaintiff’s demands for the maximum amount allowed by law for medical attention, and therefore this demand may be considered as having been rejected.

Opinion.

If plaintiff, as a result of his said injuries, is permanently totally disabled for the performance of any reasonable physical labor, he is entitled to 65 per cent, of his weekly wages, since such payments were discontinued, during the period of disability, not to exceed a total of 400 weeks. Section 8, subsection b; Act No. 20 of 1914, as amended by Act No. 242 of 1928. Clearly, therefore, a decision in this case hinges upon the facts and the facts only.

There is a sharp conflict between the testimony of plaintiff and his witnesses on the one side and the testimony of defendants’ witnesses on the other side, regarding the question of the extent of plaintiff’s injuries. The physicians who testified in the case were unable to agree on the nature and extent of plaintiff’s injuries. Much was said by all of them relative to objective and subjective symptoms. In the ease all the physicians testifying for plaintiff say they found objective symptoms, which, with the subjective symptoms furnished by the plaintiff, constituted'the basis of their testimony, while on the other hand the physicians testifying for the defendants in the main said they were unable to findany objective symptoms. We shall first, therefore, consider the testimony given by the physicians placed on the stand by plaintiff.

Dr. A. D. Tisdale examined plaintiff in September, 1931, and again examined him just before the trial, which was about six months later. He said he found the same conditions *783 •present in both examinations. He said that plaintiff had tenderness over the right hip, and that in placing him on the table and flexing his legs there was pain produced in his hip joint, and that in abducting or throwing the leg out from the mid line of the body it produced a greater amount of pain. He said that in placing your hand over the hip joint and flexing the right leg with the other hand there was crepitation noted in the hip joint. In his opinion this crepitation was due to one or the other of two causes: (1) Arthritis, an inflammation of the hip joint; or.(2) lacerated ligaments. It was his opinion that it was lacerated or torn ligaments. He said that condition could be caused by anything that would strain the leg. Basing his opinion on his findings and the history of the case — -that is, both objective and subjective symptoms— he said he thought plaintiff’s disability would last as long as he lives. It was his opinion that plaintiff has a torn teres ligament, which holds the head of the femur in the articular joint, that is, the hip joint.

Dr. E. J. Young also examined plaintiff and testified concerning his injuries as follows: “Well, from physical examination and from the objective and subjective symptoms, my diagnosis would be he had a sprain of the ligaments of the hip joint and the sacroiliac joint both, with a possibility of some of the ligaments being torn. A possibility, but I would say they were sprained.”

When asked to state on what he based his opinion, he said: “From the physical exam-, ination, different motions of the leg with the patient in different positions; and from the subjective symptoms, pain on different motions and from different joints; pain from the sacroiliac joint and pain from the hip joint; and tenderness also.”

Dr. Young says if plaintiff has what he (Dr. Young) thinks he has, in his opinion he is totally disabled to do heavy work. Both Drs. Tisdale and Young said that an X-ray would not reveal a torn or sprained ligament. In fact, the doctors for the defendants also said the same thing.

Defendant placed three physicians on the stand. We shall consider their testimony in the order in which they gave it. Dr. M. B. Pierce, who examined plaintiff several time's, said he was unable to find any objective symptoms of the injuries from which plaintiff claims he suffers.

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144 So. 781, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thornhill-v-bancroft-bag-factory-lactapp-1932.