Thorne v. New York City Transit Authority

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Thorne v. New York City Transit Authority

127 A.D.2d 651, 511 N.Y.S.2d 782, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 43138

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 9, 1987

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 127 A.D.2d 651 (Thorne v. New York City Transit Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Thorne v. New York City Transit Authority, 127 A.D.2d 651, 511 N.Y.S.2d 782, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 43138 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1987).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Williams, J.), dated September 24, 1985, as granted a motion by the plaintiff for leave to amend her summons and complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs, and the motion is denied.

Under the circumstances presented, there was no basis for invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel so as to preclude the New York City Transit Authority from asserting the Statute of Limitations as a defense (see, Luka v New York City Tr. Auth., 100 AD2d 323, affd 63 NY2d 667; Rosas v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 109 AD2d 647). Accordingly, it was error to grant the plaintiff’s motion to amend her summons and complaint to substitute the New York City Transit Authority for the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority as the defendant after the time in which to commence an action against the former had expired. Mollen, P. J., Bracken, Lawrence and Sullivan, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Williams, J.), dated September 24, 1985, as granted a motion by the plaintiff for leave to amend her summons and complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs, and the motion is denied.

Under the circumstances presented, there was no basis for invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel so as to preclude the New York City Transit Authority from asserting the Statute of Limitations as a defense (see, Luka v New York City Tr. Auth., 100 AD2d 323, affd 63 NY2d 667; Rosas v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 109 AD2d 647). Accordingly, it was error to grant the plaintiff’s motion to amend her summons and complaint to substitute the New York City Transit Authority for the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority as the defendant after the time in which to commence an action against the former had expired. Mollen, P. J., Bracken, Lawrence and Sullivan, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

127 A.D.2d 651, 511 N.Y.S.2d 782, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 43138, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thorne-v-new-york-city-transit-authority-nyappdiv-1987.

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