Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Western Electric Co.

72 F. 530, 19 C.C.A. 1, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 1726
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedMarch 5, 1896
DocketNo. 232
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 72 F. 530 (Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Western Electric Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Western Electric Co., 72 F. 530, 19 C.C.A. 1, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 1726 (7th Cir. 1896).

Opinion

WOODS, Circuit Judge.

The objections made to the opinion ■of the court in this case will be considered briefly, though some of them can be of but little importance, because directed to matters which were expressly waived when the ten propositions of counsel for appellant were assumed to be true. The essential question is whether, on that assumption, a consistent and proper conclusion was reached. The statement in the opinion that the second patent does not specify “in just what feature of the construction or of the mode of use the novelty and utility entitled to be called invention were supposed by the patentees to be found,” has been misapprehended. No reference to the requirements of section 4888 of the Revised Statutes was intended. In the first paragraph of the statement of the case by the court it had been said that the controversy turns mainly upon a comparison of the patent in suit with the [531]*531earlier letters, No. 223,659; and in order to make that comparison the court was seeking an exact and undisputed statement of the “improved construction and mode of use of the apparatus employed in patent No. 223,659,” in which the patentees supposed their second invention to consist, and, not finding what was desired in the specification of the patent, quoted from the brief of counsel the statements which they had found it convenient, if not necessary, to make in aid of their discussion of the question, which the court, as best it could, was endeavoring first to’ state, and then to solve. There had been no suggestion that the claims of the second patent did not meet the requirements of the statute, and it was not in the thought of the court to question their validity on that ground.

It is now contended that in comparing the two patents only the face of the letters, and not the evidence concerning the construction and operation of devices made in alleged exemplification of the patented devices, should be considered. Accordingly, the suggestion in our opinion concerning the first patent, that “it does not seem to follow, necessarily, that no current was intended to pass through the controller magnet, A,' except current resulting from the difference of potential between successive segments at the moment when the forward one passes from under the main brush,” is denied; and quotations are made of parts of the specification, and of the first, fifth, and seventh claims of the patent, to show that “in every part of the patent, from beginning to end,” “the patentees have affirmed, over and over, by argument and by inference, that the current which flows in the accessory circuit is that due to the difference of potential between the successive segments as they pass from under the main brush,” and so it is assumed to be unquestionable “that patent No. 223,659 describes on its face an apparatus in which an accessory collector takes up the current due to difference between the potential of the leaving segment and the one under the main brush, but no other,” and that “the twro patents describe devices which differ palpably in their mechanism, and in the principles and modes of operation attributed to them in the patents.” The clause, “attributed to them in the patents,” is italicized in the briefs, and, as stated, means that it must be determined whether the two patents cover different devices and inventions by a mere reading of the specifications and claims, unaided by the proofs, however satisfactory, of the actual operation of devices constructed in illustration of either patent; or, as it is elsewhere expressed, the intention is “to hold the discussion where it belongs, — to the patents as they read.” To this mode of "discussion section 4888 is pertinent. It requires that an application for a patent (not the claim) shall contain a written description of the supposed invention, and of the manner of constructing and using it, “in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art * * * to make and use the same”; and it follows that, in determining whether the invention described in one patent differs from that [532]*532described in another, evidence may be he^rd — and, in a difficult case, manifestly ought to be heard — concerning the construction and actual operation of each. Specifications and claims are necessary, but inventions consist in things, not in words. To quote from the petition upon another point, “In the construction of a patent, it is not the personal intent or understanding of the pat-entee, but the actual facts regarding .the invention, that are material.” This is equally true when two patents are being construed and compared for the purpose of determining whether the devices are essentially different. It may be conceded to have been the clear intention of the patentees, by their first letters, to cover an apparatus in which an accessory collector takes up the current due solely to difference of potential between the leaving segment and the one under the main brush. They may have understood that to be the chief, and possibly the only valid, feature of invention. But it is at the same time evident that the claims are not all so limited, and, unless there is something in the prior art of which proof has not been made, the patent ought not to be so restricted. It is conceded that “in the. second, third, and fourth claims the accessory collector and controller magnet are included as parts of the combination, without any express limitation as to the origin of the current which flows through them.” Indeed, it is clear, as shown by questions 39 and 40 and the answers thereto, set out in the statement of the case [16 C. C. A. 642, 70 Fed. 83], that there may “always be found flowing in the accessory circuit some current other than that due wholly to the difference of potential between the adjacent-segments”; and though it is plain that, if that current should not be sufficient to overcome the retractile spring which opposes the magnet of the combination, the effective operation of the apparatus would depend upon the varying current produced by the varying difference of potential between adjacent segments, it is also clear, as stated in our opinion, after quoting from the specification, that “it does not seem to follow necessarily that no current was intended to j>ass through the controller magnet, A, except current resulting from the difference of potential between successive segments.” None of the claims are, in specific terms, so limited, and some of them cannot fairly be so construed. Certainly a charge of infringement of that patent could not have been escaped by showing that a device made in all other respects in conformity with the specification was so proportioned that there might always be found flowing in the accessory circuit some current other than that due to the difference of potential between adjacent segments, — a fact which it is shown could be determined only by the employment of suitable tests upon each apparatus. It may be added, as a deduction from what has been said, that if the current in the accessory circuit, which results from the difference of potential of the brushes when touching a single segment, is barely insufficient to overcome the spring opposed to the magnet, A, a change in the external circuit, causing an increase in the main current, would cause a corresponding in[533]

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Bluebook (online)
72 F. 530, 19 C.C.A. 1, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 1726, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomson-houston-electric-co-v-western-electric-co-ca7-1896.