Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Nassau Electric R. Co.

108 F. 244, 1901 U.S. App. LEXIS 4547
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern New York
DecidedMarch 18, 1901
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 108 F. 244 (Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Nassau Electric R. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Nassau Electric R. Co., 108 F. 244, 1901 U.S. App. LEXIS 4547 (circtedny 1901).

Opinion

THOMAS, District Judge.

The complainants own letters patent dated November 20, 1888, numbered 398,323, issued to one Condict upon an application filed April 26, 1888, and allege that the defendants use devices infringing certain claims thereof, to wit, 27, 28, 29, and 81 of one group, 20, 21, and 22 of another group, and also claims 2, 7, 10, 23, 24, and 30. The defense is anticipation, lack of patentability, and noninfringement. The alleged infringing' apparatus is contained in controllers for electric railway motors used in the cars of the Nassau Electric Railroad Company, and manufactured by the Lorain Steel Company, and which are designated in the record as Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4. The Condict invention involves, both for the purposes of diminishing or precluding injury to the motor and for regulating speed, the combined or mixed use of external resistances and series-multiple control. The sjiecifi cation distinctly describes these two purposes and advantages, giving, however, 'chief prominence to the preservation of the machinery by use of these two means of control in suitable adjustment and sequence. Although many claims are involved, for present purposes the main invention claimed is presented with sufficient fullness in claim 31, which is as follows:

“(31) The combination of two motors, a source of electric power, a motor-circuit, a switch for coupling the coils of the motors in series or multiple to vary their internal resistance, a resistance, a switch to insert the resistance when the motor-switch is being shifted, and a connection between said switches to operate both simultaneously.”

The term “mixed control” has been employed to describe Con-diet’s invention, and the definition of the term by Mr. Bentley, complainants’ expert, may be useful:

“1 understand that it relates to a principle of controlling or regulating railway motors, partly on the variation of the internal resistance of the motors by changing tlieir circuits from series to multiple, and partly upon the variation of the circuit resistance external to the motors by a dead resistance.”

The present inquiry is aided, and at the same time somewhat constrained, by the decision of Judge Townsend in Electric Car Co. of America v. Hartford & W. H. R. Co. (C. C.) 87 Fed. 733, where the Condict patent was sustained and infringement found; and by the order of Judge La combe, whereby a temporary injunction was granted in the present suit (Electric Car Co. v. Nassau Electric R. Co. [C. C.] 89 Fed. 204), which was affirmed on appeal, Judge Shipman writing the opinion (Electric Car Co. of America v. Nassau Electric R. Co., 83 C. C. A. 420, 91 Fed. 142). Inasmuch as Judge Townsend had decided upon final hearing, Judge Lacombe accepted bis construction of the Condict claims, and held that the defendant’s devices infringed them; and Judge Shipman considered the question on appeal, not only in the light of the Hartford decision, but also in view of any new evidence contained in the motion papers. The record in the Hartford Case was not before the circuit court of appeals, and the anticipatory patents presented to that court are alleged to be those of Buell, No. 255,249; Thomson & Houston, No. 220,948; Spang, No. 279,036; Edison, No. 273,490; Hunter, No. 385,055; and Paine, No. 321,749. Other evidences of prior use and knowledge [246]*246are presented in this record which were not before Judge Townsend or the circuit court of appeals, but they amplify the view of the prior art, and lead to a somewhat different conclusion respecting it. The principal contention herein relates to Nassau controller No. 4, and, if it shall be found to be an infringement of a valid patent, a like conclusion should be reached in regard to the other controllers. It is urged that the resistances used in No. 4 are rheostatic, pure and simple, and that they have no functions and give no advantages not present in rheostatic control. That is, they are used purely for the purpose of regulating speed, and not for the purposes of preventing the injury more specifically pointed out by Condict. It may be said at this time that the evidence does not seem to sustain this claim of the defendants, for it appears from the record, and seems to be conceded on the argument, that the preservative influence upon the motor is always present, although it is claimed that the advantage is incidental and very subsidiary. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how the two advantages may be separated, whatever principal purpose may have influenced the use 'of the two systems; for, as stated in the defendants' brief, “The same means which prevent too rapid acceleration are always available for regulating speed.” No proper appreciation of the prior art may be obtained, save by a thorough understanding of the intimate knowledge that existed concerning both rheostatic and series-multiple control. It is quite safe to say that the use of external resistance was known for the last half of the nineteenth century, and that it was’ commonly employed to regulate electric motors. All the expert witnesses state that the rheostatic method was common before the Condict invention. Mr. Bentley, for the complainants, says that “prior to the Condict invention the most common method of regulation was to insert an artificial resistance between the motor and its source of current, which could be varied in amount, and check ■to any desired degree the flow of current to the motor,” and that it was the “standard arrangement used by Mr. Van Depoele, the Thomson-ETouston Electric Company, the Bentley-Knight Electric Railway Company, the Westinghouse Company, and others.”

Dr. Kennelly, for the defendants, says:

“It was the common practice, therefore, in starting any "but the smallest motors from rest, to inject a resistance or rheostat into their circuit for the purpose of checking- the flow of current until such time as the armature of the motor had heen brought to speed, and had been enabled to protect itself against unduly heavy currents by opposing the requisite and automatically adjusted counter electro-motive forces.”

Mr. Wightman, for the defendants, states:

“The use of resistances to choke down the flow of current to prevent too sudden acceleration of the motor was as common and well-understood a device in the hands of the electrical engineer as the throttle valve to the steam engineer.”

The use of resistance in accelerating a motor gradually from one speed to another -was also common in the prior art. While the use of the rheostat was so familiarly known in the prior art as something that could be employed or laid aside at will, it was equally well understood that it was wasteful of energy, because it reduced [247]*247the effective voltage by consuming it, and thereby withholding it from use in propelling the motor. As Mr. Bentley stated:

“Tliis resistance acted to absorb to a greater or less degree the impressed electro-motive force delivered from the line wire, and leave only a remainder to be applied to the motor. The amount absorbed represented a dead loss.”

Ho in letters patent No. 271,042, issued to Curtis & Crocker, it is stated that the rheostatic method is objectionable “for the reason that, whenever any resistance external to the motor is introduced into the circuit, electrical energy is absorbed by it, and transformed into heat, without producing any useful electro-dynamic effect in the motor.”

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Meriwether v. Publishers
123 S.W. 1100 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1909)
American Street Car Advertising Co. v. Jones
122 F. 803 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern New York, 1903)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
108 F. 244, 1901 U.S. App. LEXIS 4547, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomson-houston-electric-co-v-nassau-electric-r-co-circtedny-1901.