Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Exeter, H. & A. St. Ry. Co.

110 F. 986, 1901 U.S. App. LEXIS 4938
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts
DecidedAugust 9, 1901
DocketNo. 1,183
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 110 F. 986 (Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Exeter, H. & A. St. Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Exeter, H. & A. St. Ry. Co., 110 F. 986, 1901 U.S. App. LEXIS 4938 (circtdma 1901).

Opinion

COLT, Circuit Judge.

The Condict patent, No. 393,323, dated November 20, 1888, upon which this suit is brought, is for an improved switch or controller for electric cars. The patent has been the subject of extensive litigation. It has been construed and sustained in three carefully considered opinions in the Second circuit: By Judge Townsend, in the circuit court, on final hearing, in the case of Electric Car Co. v. Hartford W. H. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 87 Fed. 733; by Judge Racombe, in the circuit court, on motion for preliminary injunction, in the case of Electric Car Co. v. Nassau Electric R. Co. (C. C.) 89 Fed. 204; and on appeal in the same case, by the circuit court of appeals, in an opinion by Judge Shipman, reported in 33 C. C. A. 420, 91 Fed. 142.

In the suit at bar, the complainants filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against three types of controllers used by the defendant; and an injunction was granted against two of these. With respect to the third, the original motion was withdrawn; and the present hearing was had on the renewal of the motion to enjoin this controller, which- is known as “Type Nó. 38.” On the original motion, after the defendant’s affidavits were filed, it was found that there was a material disagreement of fact as to the construction of this controller. This disputed question has been eliminated; the complainants now admitting that No. 38 controller is constructed substantially as shown by the defendant’s affidavits on the original motion.

The complainants’ proofs on the original motion brought this controller fairly within the Condict patent as interpreted by the courts [987]*987in the decisions referred to; and the testimony of the experts in support of the motion was based upon the same theories, and proceeded along the same general lines, as in the prior cases. If the complainants could have maintained their original position, the determination of this motion would have been comparatively free from difficulty. But the case which is now presented is very different. When we exclude from the defendant’s apparatus the important feature which it was assumed by the complainants to contain on the original motion, we have a structure towards which the Condict patent bears a very different relation from what it did in the other structures which were held by the courts to infringe that patent. On this renewal motion, the complainants have been confronted with a situation where it has become necessary, in order to show infringement, to advance new theories respecting the scope and meaning of the Condict patent, and to ask thi£»court to give a broader construction to the patent than it has heretofore received.

The general principles underlying the subject-matter of the Condict patent are not difficult to understand; but, when we descend to particulars, questions may arise which are involved, obscure, and troublesome; and when such questions are presented for the first time on motion, and the only proofs are the affidavits of experts, who advance inconsistent and contradictory theories in relation thereto, it becomes almost impossible for the court to reach any conclusion which rests upon the satisfactory determination of such questions, whatever amount of time and labor may be given to the subject. On motion for preliminary injunction, and in the absence of the cross-examination of witnesses and the full and orderly proofs presented on final hearing, the court should not be asked to pass for the first time upon the conflicting theories of experts relative to the mode of operation in certain positions of a complicated electrical apparatus like a controlling switch for motor regulation. When the complainánts go beyond what the courts have decided in prior adjudications, and base their motion upon new and disputed theories respecting the Condict patent, or upon a new and enlarged construction of the patent; issues are raised not pertinent to a motion for preliminary injunction, and whose determination, properly, should be reserved for final hearing.

The court, without going further, might deny this motion with the simple statement that it appears upon an inspection of the record that to hold infringement in the first particular charged is to overrule the construction given to the Condict patent by the courts in prior suits; that to hold infringement in the second particular charged involves a new, extended, and doubtful construction of the patent, and the determination of electrical questions upon which the experts disagree; and that to hold infringement in the remaining particular charged is to pass upon the conflicting opinions of experts as to the action of the defendant’s controller at a particular time, in relation to which it is not entirely clear that the patent has any application. But, on consideration, it seems to me, although some of the questions raised can only be properly determined on final hearing, in view of the importance of the case and the carefully prepared [988]*988and able briefs óf counsel, that the disposition of the motion-calls! for a somewhat fuller statement and discussion of the general .ques- ■ tions presented.

The ordinary electric car, like the one shown in the Condict patent, contains two motors. These motors consist of two armatures and two fields and their connections. In starting-, and at slow speed, the two armatures and the two fields are connected in series, or in a single path. At full speed, the two armatures and the two fields are connected in multiple or parallel paths. The motor changes from series to parallel involve a temporary disorganization and rearrangement of the circuit. These changes may be quite sudden, or by gradual and progressive steps. During this transition period, unless the flow of current from the trolley, or generator is checked, the circuit changes will be too severe to be borne by the motors, and there is great danger from spar.king. The main purpose of the controller or switch is to regulate the supply of current delivered to the motors during the shifting of motor connections from series to parallel, or vice versa.

The principle of motor regulation through a controlling switch is based upon interposed resistances, which reduce the flow of current. These resistances are wire coils, which are cut in and out of the circuit. These coils may be either entirely separate from the motor coils, or they may be the motor coils themselves, or they may consist partly of motor coils and partly of external coils. The first form, in which the resistances are wire coils external to the motor, is known as the “rheostatic,” or “external,” method of control. The second form, in which the motor coils of the armatures and fields are substituted for external coils, is known as the “series parallel,” or “internal,” method of control. The third form, in which both external and motor coils are utilized, is known as the “mixed,” “compound,” or “composite,” method of control. The rheostatic, or external, method was open to the objection of waste of energy, since the current was converted into heat and lost. Hence the resistance is called “dead” resistance, as distinguished from the “live” resistance of the motor coils. This method went into extensive use. The series parallel method proved to be impracticable for general use, for the reason that, when the circuit changes were numerous, involving only slight changes of internal resistance, the apparatus was too complicated, and when the circuit changes were large, involving large changes in the resistance, it was too severe upon the motor, and sometimes dangerous to the motorman.

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Bluebook (online)
110 F. 986, 1901 U.S. App. LEXIS 4938, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomson-houston-electric-co-v-exeter-h-a-st-ry-co-circtdma-1901.