Thompson v. United States Parole Commission

553 F. Supp. 1027, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20143
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJanuary 10, 1983
DocketCiv. A. No. 82-2323
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 553 F. Supp. 1027 (Thompson v. United States Parole Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thompson v. United States Parole Commission, 553 F. Supp. 1027, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20143 (D.D.C. 1983).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES R. RICHEY, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s motion for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will deny Petitioner’s motion but it will order the Parole Commission to conduct a parole revocation hearing for Petitioner as soon as practicable and not later than thirty (30) days from the date hereof.

FACTS1

Petitioner was convicted of theft of an interstate shipment on July 16, 1976 and sentenced to a term of 5 years imprisonment. He was paroled on April 1, 1979. On October 14,1980 Petitioner was arrested again and indicted on counts of forgery and attempted uttering. Petitioner also failed to appear for urinalysis on December 9, 1980 as instructed by his parole officer. On the basis of these two violations of the conditions of his parole — rearrest and failure to appear for drug aftercare — Case Analyst Michael Santella submitted a warrant application to the Commission on January 30, 1981 to order that Petitioner be retaken into custody. A warrant for Petitioner’s arrest was signed that same day and Petitioner was taken into custody on March 3, 1981. On March 10,1981, Frederick Foster, a parole officer, conducted a preliminary interview of Petitioner, at which time he requested a parole revocation hearing.

On March 11, 1981 Petitioner pled guilty to the forgery charge on which he had been indicted in October. Case Analyst Santella was informed of the plea by Parole Officer Foster and submitted a supplement to the first warrant application to that effect on March 23, 1981. Santella also wrote a letter to Petitioner on that day. The letter explained the basis of the revocation proceedings, notified Petitioner of a finding of probable cause and informed him that he was to be transferred to a federal institution for a parole hearing. Santella enclosed a copy of the warrant application and portions of the preliminary interview.

On April 7, 1981 an order was teletyped to the United States Marshall’s Office to transport Petitioner from the District of Columbia Jail, where he was being held, to the federal institution at Danbury for a parole revocation hearing scheduled for June 3, 1981. Before the date of the hearing, however, Petitioner was charged with several new criminal offenses. On April 16, 1981, Petitioner was charged with grand larceny. On May 12,1981 he was sentenced on the original forgery conviction to between three years and six months imprisonment. The next day he was again charged with forgery and uttering. On June 24, 1981, Petitioner pled guilty to the lesser included offenses of attempted uttering and receiving stolen property. However, the Commission was not even informed that new charges were pending against Petitioner until July 15, 1981 — more than one month after Petitioner’s scheduled parole revocation hearing.

On July 30, 1981, Santella teletyped a request for clarification to the Marshall’s Office. The Marshall’s Office responded on [1029]*1029August 4, 1981 that the additional charges against Petitioner prevented him from being transported to Danbury for the hearing. Consequently, the Commission’s staff recommended that the original warrant be withdrawn and a new warrant issued and lodged as a detainer. Acting upon this recommendation, the Commission withdrew the first warrant on August 10, 1981 and issued a second warrant on August 13,1981 based on a new application submitted by Santella. The new warrant granted Petitioner credit for the time served between the execution of the original warrant and the date on which it was withdrawn.

On August 20, 1981 Petitioner was sentenced to serve consecutive terms of 300 days for each offense. The new warrant was lodged as a detainer. Subsequently, the Commission conducted a dispositional review and determined that the detainer should remain in effect. Petitioner was informed of this detainer on April 15, 1982 and a dispositional revocation hearing was scheduled for March 12, 1983, which date would be accelerated if Petitioner was released to the federal detainer prior to that date. On July 7, 1982 Petitioner was so released and a parole revocation hearing was scheduled for October 7, 1982.

Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus on August 18, 1982. This Court issued an order to show cause why the writ should not be granted. The Court also appointed counsel to represent Petitioner, which counsel submitted a Reply to Commission’s Return and Answer to Order to Show Cause, on Petitioner’s behalf. Petitioner now remains incarcerated at the D.C. Jail on this Court’s order. His scheduled parole revocation hearing was stayed by the Court’s order and, therefore, no hearing has yet been held.

ANALYSIS

I

JURISDICTION IS PROPER IN THIS COURT BECAUSE PETITIONER IS CONFINED IN THIS DISTRICT

Respondent argues that Petitioner's application should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Respondent, the United States Parole Commission, is now located in Maryland. However, this argument is misconceived. A Petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus may file a petition either in the district of his confinement or in the District in which his custodian is present. See Rheuark v. Wade, 608 F.2d 304, 305 (8th Cir.1979). See also McCall v. Swain, 510 F.2d 167 (D.C.Cir.1975). Petitioner, here, is confined at the D.C. Jail, therefore, jurisdiction is proper in this Court even though Respondent the Parole Commission is located in Maryland. Additionally, recent decisions have emphasized that the important consideration is that the Court considering the petition must be able to reach the respondent through service of process. E.g., Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 495, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 1129, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). If service can be perfected, then the Court can issue a writ “within its jurisdiction.” Id. Here service of process has been achieved and thus the Court is acting within its jurisdiction. Finally, the Court notes that Petitioner has filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the Caption and Pleadings to add E. Paul Slothouber, Administrator of the D.C. Jail as a defendant. The Court will grant that motion here. The addition of Mr. Slothouber as a named Respondent removes any doubt that this is the proper forum.

II

THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT IMPROPERLY BECAUSE A SECOND WARRANT COULD BE VALIDLY ISSUED BASED ON SUBSEQUENT VIOLATIONS

Petitioner contends that the Commission acted improperly on two counts. First, he argues that he was denied his right to have a parole revocation hearing within 90 days of his arrest on the parole violator’s warrant as required by 18 U.S.C. § 4214(c). Petitioner was initially arrested in March of 1981 and his revocation hearing has still not [1030]*1030been held.2 However, the Commission does not now seek to hold Petitioner on the original warrant — that warrant was withdrawn. It is the second warrant on which Petitioner is now held.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
553 F. Supp. 1027, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20143, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thompson-v-united-states-parole-commission-dcd-1983.