Thompson v. Tower Manufacturing Co.

104 Ala. 140
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedNovember 15, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 104 Ala. 140 (Thompson v. Tower Manufacturing Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thompson v. Tower Manufacturing Co., 104 Ala. 140 (Ala. 1893).

Opinion

HEAL, J.

On January 3, 1889, Yon. L. Thompson, then engaged in the book, stationery and printing business in Anniston, Ala., sold and conveyed to his mother, C. A. Thompson, the bulk of his stock of goods, and assigned the residue of his assets to J. H. Nunnelee, as trustee for the benefit of his creditors. The recited consideration of the deed to his mother was its acceptance by her in payment of an indebtedness of $8,977.20, borrowed money ; $980, due her for the board of certain hands employed in the printing office, and $360 for house rent. At the time of this sale, V. L. Thompson was indebted to the complainants and others, for merchandise purchased during the year 1888, amounting to about $14.000. The complainants file the bill to vacate the sale to the mother, as fraudulent. It avers that the alleged indebtedness mentioned as the consideration of the sale was largely, if not wholly, fictitious and simulated, that the goods delivered were greatly in excess, in value, of even the amount mentioned in the deed, and that the execution of the instrument was a fraud against the creditors and was designed and executed for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding complainants and other creditors, and not for the purpose of paying off any just demand from V. L. Thompson to his mother, and that she accepted said instrument and the property conveyed therein with a lull knowledge of the condition of her son and his purpose in making the same. It is further averred that C. A. Thompson has not had, since the manhood of her son, the sum of $8,977.20 in cash, and ñas never loaned him any such sum ; and that the [144]*144other sums mentioned in the bill of sale were equally without foundation. Mrs. Thompson and her husband, J. D. Thompson, removed to Anniston from Union Springs, Ala., in April, 1885. In 1886 and to April 1, 1887, her son, then twenty-two years old, beginning with a capital, as he says, of about $60, carried on a small milk-shake and news stand. At the latter date, April 1, 1887, he purchased a stock of books, stationery, &c., at the price of $4,683.50, and thereafter carried on the book and stationery business, adding to it, some time in 1888, a job printing office. On January 3, 1889, when he sold out to his mother, he had on hand goods amount: ing, at cost prices, according to his answer to the bill, to about $11,500, to $12,000. The goods sold to his mother invoiced at $9,583.

Upon this statement of the case, without more — with the consideration of the sale challenged by the bill, in the manner stated — it was incumbent upon Mrs. Thompson, thus dealing with her son, to clearly satisfy the mind of the chancellor, first, by full, explicit and direct answer to the bill, and, next, by proof, of the same character, that the sale to her was what it purported to be— a real sale in payment of a valid, subsisting indebtedness actually owing to her by her son, not materially less in amount than the fair cash value of the goods sold; and to this end, the chancellor should have required her to show clearly that she had the means, and how she acquired them, to make these large advances to a son just setting out, as he did, and whose ventures, under the eyes of herself and husbadd, so soon terminated in such disastrous results. We can conceive of nothing simpler or easier for her to do, if it were true that she made the alleged advances', then to show clearly and in detail, and to the mind’s entire satisfaction, when and where she obtained the money, and that her condition aud ability were such as enabled her to make them. On the contrary, the difficulty of an undertaking on the. part of creditors to prove fully and. directly .that she did not have •the means; will be readily appreciated. The' means' of proof being in her hands, she should have been required to use them. This principle’ pervades past decisions of •this court on the. subject. Calhoun v. Hannan, 87 Ala. 277 ; Hubbard v. Allen, 59 Ala. 283; Bell v, Kendall, 93 [145]*145Ala. 489: Cartwright v. Bamberger, Bloom & Co., 99 Ala. 622; Harrell v. Mitchell, 61 Ala. 270.

The case of Cartwright v. Bamberger, Bloom & Co., 90 Ala. 405, was a bill in equity by creditors of an insolvent merchant to set aside an attachment levied upon the goods, as collusive and fraudulent. Cartwright, who sued out the attachment, was not related by blood or marriage to the insolvent, but sustained peculiarly intimate and confidential relations to him. His answer to the bill, setting up the validity of his claims upon which the attachment was based, was general. This court, speaking through Judge Somerville, said : “The defendant Cartwright’s answer to the bill nowhere explains with sufficient certainty the consideration of the large debt which he claims to hold against the defendant in attachment, the very execution and bona fides of which were challenged by the complainant’s bill. It was charged that this demand was largely simulated — having no reality of existence except in appearance merely — except for a very small sum. The answer should have met the charge fairly and without evasion. The matter must have been within the knowledge of the claimant. He should not only have denied the fact of the alleged debt being feigned, and have asserted the valuable character of the consideration, but he should have stated fully and without evasion, the nature of such consideration, whether it was for money loaned, labor done, for goods or other property sold, or otherwise, and-the particular nature and kind of service or property, if any. The answer, in this particular, to say nothing of other defects in its averments, was insufficient to justify a dissolution of the injunction.”

The case of Harrell v. Mitchell, 61 Ala. 270, supra, though a case of a sale upon a present cash consideration, in which the actual payment of the alleged consideration and ability of the purchaser to make it were disputed by existing creditors, is not unlike the present, in the principle we extract from it. Brickell, C. J., said in that case : “It is so easy for parties standing in the relation of grantor and grantee to feign a consideration for the transfer of the property of the one to the other, and to fabricate the evidence of its payment, that the transaction cannot be sustained, unless it is shown that there was a real adequate consideration actually paid; [146]*146and whatever there may be not in the ordinary or usual course of such transactions, should be fully explained. When, as in the present case, the consideration is large, amounting to several thousand dollars, there should be clear proof by the vendee, if his ability to purchase is questioned, of his means, or of the source from which he obtained the money. The absence of evidence of the disposition made by the grantor of the money it is alleged he received, becomes a material circumstance. Clear evidence of ability to make the purchase is vital to sustain the transaction against creditors whose right to appropriate the property of the grantor to the satisfaction of their demands is clear and founded on law and good conscience. * * * * It may be, the v¿ndee had accumulated some mouey, but his evidence of the source from which he obtained the money paid the vendor in the presence of witnesses, is too vague and indefinite to support a transaction attended with the indicia of fraud which attend the conveyance to him. Where the money had been kept, if he had it on hand for any length of time prior to the purchase., could have been easily proved.

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Bluebook (online)
104 Ala. 140, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thompson-v-tower-manufacturing-co-ala-1893.