Thompson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.

113 F. Supp. 900, 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2506, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2680
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Alabama
DecidedJuly 28, 1953
DocketCiv. A. No. 7154
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 113 F. Supp. 900 (Thompson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thompson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 113 F. Supp. 900, 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2506, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2680 (S.D. Ala. 1953).

Opinion

LYNNE, Chief Judge.

This cause was submitted upon plaintiff’s amended complaint and defendant’s amended motion to dismiss.

Basing his claim on the so-called Washington Job Agreement of May, 19361, plaintiff, alleging that as the result of coordination2 between two carriers he has been deprived of employment3, seeks to re[901]*901cover the coordination allowance 4 provided by the agreement.

Asserting that the primary jurisdiction of this action is in the National Railroad Adjustment Board, defendant seeks to have this action dismissed on the authority of Slocum v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577, 94 L.Ed. 735.

It does not appear from the complaint that plaintiff’s status as an employee has been wrongfully terminated. On the contrary, it is clear that under the provisions of the agreement copied in the margin5, plaintiff still has the status and subsisting rights of an employee even though he has been temporarily deprived of his employ-[902]*902merit as a result of coordination. Without considering all of plaintiffs possible rights under the agreement, it is entirely possible that plaintiff might yet' be called to return to defendant’s service with the protection accorded by the agreement during the period of his re-employment. Moreover it does not appear that plaintiff has resigned and is suing to recover the separation allowance provided in Section 9 6 of the Washington Job Agreement.

Since plaintiff still has the status of an employee, the jurisdiction of the Railroad Adjustment Board to adjust a dispute of the type here involved is exclusive within the rationale of Slocum v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., supra. Under these circumstances, the holding in Moore v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 312 U.S. 630, 61 S.Ct. 754, 85 L.Ed. 1089, that a wrongfully discharged employee is not required by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., to resort to the Railroad Adjustment Board as a prerequisite for a suit to wrongful discharge is inapposite. The court therefore is of the opinion that the primary jurisdiction of the controversy involved in the present litigation is vested in the Railroad Adjustment Board by the Railway Labor Act.

In the alternative it does not appear that plaintiff has exhausted the administrative remedies provided by Section 137 of the Washington Job Agreement. In Trans[903]*903continental and Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653, 73 S.Ct. 906, 97 L.Ed. -, it was held that, when required by the law of the state in which suit is brought, an employee must exhaust his administrative remedies under his employment contract before resorting to the courts.

In Bell v. Western Railway of Alabama, 1934, 228 Ala. 328, 153 So. 434, 438, Bell, an employee of the railroad brought an action for breach of contract. The contract upon which the suit was based provided that “all disputes growing out of grievances, or the interpretation, or application of agreements between the carrier and its employees, should be handled by the board of adjustment, in the manner provided by said Railway Labor Act.” After referring to the cognate provisions of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577, the Supreme Court of Alabama concluded that the parties to such contract were under an obligation to submit their disputes to arbitration by a Board of Adjustment before resorting to the courts.

The Court has found no case wherein the Alabama Supreme Court has had occasion to re-examine its holding since the 1934 amendment to the Railroad Labor Act, when Section 153 (i) was amended by substituting the word “may” for “shall”, but the court is of the opinion that the Alabama Court would hold that where contracting parties agree that either “may” resort to a designated tribunal for an adjustment of grievances, they must exhaust such remedy before resorting to the courts for redress. Compare, Reed v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., Mo.App., 1936, 95 S.W.2d 887, not published in state reports.

It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that this action be and it hereby is dismissed.

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Bluebook (online)
113 F. Supp. 900, 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2506, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2680, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thompson-v-st-louis-san-francisco-ry-co-alsd-1953.