Thompson v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc.

2004 ME 63, 847 A.2d 406, 9 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1181, 2004 Me. LEXIS 66
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedMay 10, 2004
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 2004 ME 63 (Thompson v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thompson v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 2004 ME 63, 847 A.2d 406, 9 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1181, 2004 Me. LEXIS 66 (Me. 2004).

Opinion

RUDMAN, J.

[¶ 1] Donald A. Thompson and Frederick L. Lockwood appeal from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (York County, Fritzsche, J.) in favor of Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc. and Clifford W. Perham, Inc., on their complaint seeking unpaid overtime wages. 1 Thompson and Lockwood contend that the trial court erred in concluding that (1) the relevant statute, 26 M.R.S.A. § 664 (Supp.2003), does not apply to work done outside Maine; and (2) that “commingled” workweeks are exempt from the overtime provision of section 644(3). We affirm the judgment of the trial court on an alternate ground argued by Shaw’s and interpret the overtime provision as inapplicable to interstate drivers. 2

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Thompson and Lockwood formerly were employed as truck drivers by Clifford W. Perham, Inc., a Maine corporation, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc. Shaw’s operates supermarkets in several New England states, and Perham is engaged exclusively in the delivery to Shaw’s Supermarkets of items that are sold in those supermarkets on a daily basis. Trucks operated by Perham’s drivers are housed and maintained at a terminal in *408 Wells. The products they transport are loaded onto trailers hauled by those trucks at warehouses owned and operated by Shaw’s in Wells and in Massachusetts.

[¶ 3] The trailers hauled by the drivers are loaded with frozen foods, or agricultural produce, or dry groceries — but never a combination of the products. The drivers take the loaded trailers on “runs” to deliver the product to several stores and to return the empty trailer to the warehouse or terminal. Sometimes the driver brings back “returns” consisting of food products and/or nonfood products and sometimes the driver will stop at a vendor and “back haul” food or nonfood products to one of the warehouses. The driver’s trip report shows which loads originated at which warehouse, how much time was spent delivering each load, and how long it took to drive the truck back to the terminal after the delivery has been made.

[¶ 4] Prior to August 1999, Perham’s drivers were paid for the time they spent driving by the mile. After August 1999, drivers who drove more than two hundred eighty miles per day continued to be paid by the mile, while drivers who drove less than two hundred eighty miles per day were paid an hourly rate and were paid overtime at time and a half if they worked more than eight hours a day. Both prior to and after August 1999, drivers were paid by the hour for time spent loading or unloading the trucks, or waiting time, and for emergency maintenance. Drivers who worked moving trucks and trailers around the yard and performing other yard related duties were paid by the hour for that work and were paid overtime at time and a half at a regular hourly rate if they spent more than forty hours a week performing these duties.

[¶ 5] When they 'worked for Perham, the qualifications and hours of service of Thompson and Lockwood were subject to regulations by the Secretary of Transportation. For thirty-five years, the Maine Department of Labor interpreted Maine’s overtime law as inapplicable to interstate drivers. In March 2002, the Legislature ratified the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the overtime law when it enacted Public Law 628, “An Act to Amend the Maine Overtime Pay Provision Regarding Certain Drivers and Drivers’ Helpers.” 3

*409 [¶ 6] The statutory language at issue in this case is as follows:

3. Overtime rate. An employer may not require an employee to work more than 40 hours in any one week unless 1% times the regular hourly rate is paid for all hours actually worked in excess of 40 hours that week....

The overtime provision of this section does not apply to:

....
F. The canning, processing, preserving, freezing, drying, marketing, storing, packing for shipment or distribution of:
(1) Agricultural produce;
(2) Meat and fish products; and
(3) Perishable foods.

26 M.R.S.A. § 664(3)(F) (Supp.2003).

II. THE ISSUE

[¶ 7] The issue at the heart of this appeal is the interpretation of section 664(3)(F).

When construing a statute, we seek to give effect to the legislative intent by examining the plain meaning of the statutory language. If the plain meaning of the text does not resolve an interpretive issue raised, we then consider the statute’s history, underlying policy, and other extrinsic factors to ascertain legislative intent.

In re Wage Payment Litigation, 2000 ME 162, ¶ 4, 759 A.2d 217, 220-21 (citations omitted). The critical interpretive issue raised on this appeal, namely whether interstate motor carriers are exempt from the overtime provision, cannot be resolved by examining the plain meaning of the statutory language. Thus, we move on to extrinsic factors in order to determine legislative intent. See id,.; see also Larrabee v. Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97, 101 (Me.1984) (“[N]othing in the plain language or legislative history ... indicates that our Legislature intended a private party to have a right of action under these statutes.”).

It is a well accepted principle of statutory construction that when an administrative body has carried out a reasonable and practical interpretation of a statute and this has been called to the attention of the Legislature, the Legislature’s failure to act to change the interpretation is evidence that the Legislature has acquiesced in the interpretation.

In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736, 743 (Me.1973). The Maine Department of Labor is the agency charged by our Legislature with responsibility for enforcement of “all laws regulating payment of wages” in Maine. 26 M.R.S.A. § 42 (Supp.2003). The Department’s interpretation of the overtime provision, section 664 of the wage and hour law, dates back to April 1966, *410 shortly after the provision was enacted. Since that time, the Department’s position has been that section 664 did not require overtime to interstate motor carriers who were covered by the federal motor vehicle exemption. Despite the fact that between 1966 and 2001, our Legislature amended section 664 thirty-one times, with twelve of those amendments dealing specifically with the overtime provision, not once in that thirty-five-year-period did the Legislature amend the statute to change the interpretation that the Department had given it.

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Bluebook (online)
2004 ME 63, 847 A.2d 406, 9 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1181, 2004 Me. LEXIS 66, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thompson-v-shaws-supermarkets-inc-me-2004.