Thompson v. Riverside County Sheriff's Department

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 17, 2026
• Docket: 24-737
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MELODY THOMPSON, No. 24-737 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 5:19-cv-00122-AB-SHK v. MEMORANDUM* RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; MOON, Officer, as an individual Erroneously Sued As Heather Moon; COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California André Birotte, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 29, 2026**

Before: LEE, SANCHEZ, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Melody Thompson was arrested outside a Riverside County courthouse after

refusing an officer’s order to leave the area and was charged with two state law

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). misdemeanors. After the prosecutors dropped the charges, Thompson sued Deputy

Officer Heather Moon, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department (RCSD), and

several Doe defendants, alleging, among other claims, violations of her First and

Fourth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thompson now appeals

the district court’s order granting summary judgment for the defendants. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The First Amendment and Fourth Amendment claims. The district court

correctly granted summary judgment for defendants. See Weiner v. San Diego

County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (reviewing de novo summary judgment

grant). Thompson’s Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest and First Amendment

retaliation claims are predicated on the assumption that Officer Moon lacked

probable cause to arrest her. In other words, if Deputy Moon had probable cause to

arrest her, Thompson’s First and Fourth Amendment claims necessarily fail. See

Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2009) (requiring

probable cause for warrantless arrest); Hill v. City of Fountain Valley, 70 F.4th 507,

518 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he existence of probable cause defeats a retaliatory arrest

claim).

The record shows that Deputy Moon had probable cause to arrest Thompson.

Deputy Moon responded to a request for additional assistance by security personnel

guarding the courthouse entrance. Upon arrival, the officer observed Thompson

2 24-737 partially obstructing the narrow area in front of the security screening area and

yelling loudly at another woman. Thompson continued to yell, and told Deputy

Moon she did not need to leave, ignoring multiple requests to clear the security

screening area. During her deposition, Thompson admitted she was repeatedly

asked to leave the screening area and refused to comply with official orders. Given

that “[p]robable cause is not a high bar,” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S.

48, 57 (2018) (simplified), Deputy Moon had probable cause to arrest Thompson,

see Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1) (punishing persons “who willfully resist[], delay[],

or obstruct[] any public officer [or] peace officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to

discharge any duty of his or her office”).

2. Motion to compel additional discovery. We review discovery orders for

abuse of discretion. Pizzuto v. Tewalt, 136 F.4th 855, 863 (9th Cir. 2025).

Thompson claims that the defendants tampered with the existing surveillance

footage, and that the missing video would show she was not yelling when she

initially encountered Deputy Moon. But Thompson provides no support for this

claim, and the defendants stated that they had supplied all footage of the incident in

their possession. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to

compel production of evidence that may not exist.

3. Authentication of surveillance video. We review a district court’s

evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion. See Orr v. Bank of Amer., NT & SA,

3 24-737 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, the district court properly concluded that

the surveillance footage is authenticated by Deputy Moon’s declaration, which

verifies that the video depicts the incident. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(b) (evidence may

be authenticated by witness with knowledge who testifies item “is what it is claimed

to be”).

AFFIRMED.

4 24-737