Thompson v. Lumpkin

Opinion

Southern District of Texas ENTERED UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT March 07, 2022 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

OVERILLE DENTON THOMPSON, JR., §

Plaintiff, □□

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:21-CV-00154 >

BOBBY LUMPKIN, et al., Defendants. ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION □□□

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Julie Hampton’s Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”). (D.E. 19). The M&R recommends that Plaintiffs motions for a temporary restraining order (D.E. 2, D.E. 12) and for a preliminary injunction (D.E.7)

be denied. (D.E. 19, p. 6). Plaintifftimely filed objections to the M&R on January 20, 2022. (DE.21). |

First, Plaintiff objects that the M&R based its decision to recommend denying

_ Plaintiff injunctive relief on Plaintiff's inadvertent use of the word “possible” rather than “probable” when Plaintiff was arguing likelihood of irreparable harm. /d. at 1. Plaintiff argues that the M&R focused on this word, and as such, mischaracterized his argument. /d. However, contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, the M&R did not recommend denying injunctive relief based on Plaintiff's use of the word “possible.” See (D.E. 19). Rather, the M&R concluded that injunctive relief should be denied because Plaintiff “cannot

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demonstrate a substantial threat that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied.” Jd. at 5. The Court agrees and, as such, OVERRULES Plaintiff's objection. "Second, Plaintiff objects that the M&R failed to provide a full procedural background concerning the “attack” on his complaint. (D.E. 21, p. 2). Because of this, Plaintiff argues that the “fact-finding process” was rendered defective, which could mislead the Court to “overlook the omitted relevant facts and arguments presented” by Plaintiff. See (D.E. 19, p. 1-3). The Court has carefully reviewed the record and OVERRULES Plaintiff's objection. □

Third, Plaintiff objects to the M&R’s findings recommending dismissal of his motions for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction. (D.E. 21, p. 3, 6). Generally, Plaintiff claims that the M&R uses an erroneous legal standard and misapplies this standard to the facts of this case. See generally (D.E. 21, p. 3-7). However, after making a de novo review, the Court finds that the M&R used the correct legal standard and correctly applied that standard. See (D.E. 19, p. 4-6). Plaintiff has neither alleged facts showing that “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage” occurred nor met his burden of proving the elements necessary for a preliminary injunction. See FED. R. CIv. P. 65; see also Texans for Free Enter. v. Tex. Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535, 536-37 (Sth Cir. 2013). The Court therefore OVERRULES Plaintiff's objections. Having carefully reviewed the proposed findings and conclusions of the M&R, the record, the applicable law, and having made a de novo review of the portions of the M&R

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to which the Plaintiffs objections were directed, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's objections (D.E. 21). Accordingly: (1) The Court ADOPTS the M&R in its entirety. (D.E. 19). (2) The Court ORDERS that Plaintiff's motions for a TRO are DENIED (D.E. 2; D.E. 12). (3) The Court ORDERS that Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED (D.E. 7) □

SO ORDERED.

DA S-MORALES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Dated: Corpus Christi, Texas March74+2022

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