Thompson v. Liberty

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedJanuary 20, 2022
DocketKENcv-18-06
StatusUnpublished

This text of Thompson v. Liberty (Thompson v. Liberty) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thompson v. Liberty, (Me. Super. Ct. 2022).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, SS. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-18-0006

MICHAEL THOMPSON, Plaintiff DECISION AND ORDER ON V. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RANDALL LIBERTY, ET ALS., Commissioner of the Maine Department of Corrections, Defendants 1

INTRODUCTION Before the court is the Motion for Summary Judgment brought by all Defendants except Defendant Joseph Chaplin. Throughout this Decision and Order these Defendants will be referred to as the "Department" or "MDOC." The motion seeks the entry of summary judgment on all counts of the Third Amended Complaint, which is the operative complaint in this action.

1 Former Commissioner Joseph Fitzpatrick was originally named as a Defendant. Current Commissioner Randall Liberty has been substituted as a Defendant in accordance with M.R.Civ.P. 25(d)(l). Similarly, former Maine State Prison Warden Randall Liberty was originally named as a party Defendant in that capacity. Current Warden Matthew Magnusson has been substituted for former Warden Liberty. The remaining Defendants are: Deputy Wardens of the Maine State Prison Troy Ross, Robert Walden and Michael Tausek; Director of Classifications Scott McCaffery; Maine Department of Corrections; the Maine State Prison, and; former Corrections Officer Joseph Chaplin. All of the Defendants, with the exception of Mr. Chaplin, are represented by the Office of the Attorney General. Mr. Chaplin is represented by private counsel. As the court reads the Third Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff has brought his claims against the Defendants in their official capacities, except as to Counts 4-7 which are brought against Defendant Chaplin in his individual capacity. The summary judgment record, and the case file in general, is voluminous. This case has been aptly described as "sprawling." As an initial matter, the court is compelled to point out that the Plaintiff's adherence to and compliance with the requirements of M.R.Civ.P. 56, governing summary judgment practice, is deficient in many respects. For example, in instances too numerous to count, the Plaintiff has failed to present "a separate, short, and concise opposing statement." M.R.Civ.P. 56(h)(2). He routinely offers no, or inadequate record citations. He regularly adds factual assertions and arguments without record citations, even when he has admitted a statement of material fact made by the Department. He has commingled additional facts, usually without sufficient record citation, in his opposing statement. Facts contained in a supporting statement of material facts are deemed admitted "unless properly controverted." M.R.Civ.P. 56(h)(4). Moreover, the court may disregard any statement of fact not properly supported by a specific record citation. The court has reviewed the entire summary judgment record and finds that the Plaintiff's opposition to the Department's motion for summary judgment is replete with failures to comply with Rule 56. 2 Accordingly, the court will deem as admitted those statements of fact not properly controverted by the Plaintiff and will disregard statements made by the Plaintiff that have not been properly supported by specific record citations. Handlin v. Broadreach Public Relations, LLL, 2022 ME 2, 12, n.2.

2 The Plaintiff has also filed what is characterized as an "Objection" to the court's consideration of certain affidavits submitted in support of the Department's motion for summary judgment. The "Objection" consists of 14 pages of argument as to why the court should not consider the affidavits in question. The Department describes the objection as a motion to strike, which is explicitly not permitted by M.R.Civ.P. 56 (i)( 1). Having read the objection, it appears that most of it is based on the Plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the Department's compliance with discovery. The court concludes that the Plaintiff's objection is without merit and, therefore, denies it.

2 In his Third Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff, Michael Thompson, an inmate at MDOC 's correctional facilities since 1998, has set out a total of seven (7) counts. In Count One, he asserts a cause of action of unlawful discrimination pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 4592(1 )(E) (Maine Human Rights Act) by alleging that he was denied, because of his disability of near blindness, "the services, programs or activities of a public entity," i.e., MDOC. In Count Two, Thompson asserts a cause of action of unlawful employment discrimination pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 4572(2) (Maine Human Rights Act) by alleging that he was denied employment as an inmate at one or more of MDOC 's facilities because of his visual disability. In Count Three, Thompson asserts a claim of retaliation pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 4633 by alleging that he was transferred from the Maine State Prison (MSP) to the Maine Correctional Center (MCC) in November 2016 because he filed or was about to file a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission. In Count Four, Thompson asserts a cause of action for the violation of his civil rights by Defendant Joseph Chaplin, a former MDOC employee, pursuant to 5 M.R.S. 4682 (Maine Civil Rights Act) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by alleging that Chaplin sexually harassed him and physically assaulted him, and he seeks damages against the MDOC Defendants "in their respective official capacities." In Count Five, Thompson asserts a claim of sexual harassment as a form of employment discrimination under 5 M.R.S. § 4572 (Maine Human Rights Act) and seeks damages against the MDOC Defendants "in their respective official capacities."

3 In Count Six - Negligence,3 Thompson asserts a cause of action for negligence against Defendant Chaplin "and the remaining Defendants" and is presumably brought pursuant to the Maine Torts Claim Act. Finally, Count Seven of the Third Amended Complaint seeks injunctive relief. FACTS The following material facts, which the court determines to be undisputed, are taken from the summary judgment record. Thompson has been incarcerated at various MDOC facilities since 1998 and remains so at this time. He is visually impaired. On several occasions during his imprisonment Thompson has engaged in misconduct that resulted in disciplinary action against him. Moreover, at various points in his incarceration Thompson has sought a paying job at MSP and MCC, but his efforts to obtain such a paying prison job were adversely affected by his history of misconduct, the limited number of paying jobs available in the prison environment and his demand that he be paid at a rate of pay more than what other inmates earned in similar jobs. Thompson alleges that he was unlawfully denied employment while imprisoned because of his visual disability and that MDOC failed to make reasonable accommodations for him so that he could obtain a paying prison job. In March 2019, Thompson was given a paid job at MCC in its recreation department. He held that job, and other paid jobs until November 2020 (except for a brief period when he was transferred to Mountain View Correctional Facility in July

3 The Third Amended Complaint is misnumbered, in that there are two causes of action labelled Count Six. One Count Six alleges Assault and appears to be brought solely against Defendant Chaplin "in his individual and official capacity." The other Count Six is labelled Negligence and purports to be brought against Chaplin and the "remaining Defendants."

4 2019), when he was discharged from a kitchen job for stealing sugar, an ingredient that can be used to make alcohol. In December 2015, Thompson was part of a special class at MSP for inmates with disabilities who were preparing for the high school equivalency test (HiSET).

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Bluebook (online)
Thompson v. Liberty, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thompson-v-liberty-mesuperct-2022.