Thompson v. Intermodal Cartage Co., LLC.

District Court, S.D. Mississippi·Decided October 25, 2024·No. 2:24-cv-00034·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI EASTERN DIVISION

CAMERON THOMPSON, et al. PLAINTIFFS

v. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:24-cv-34-KS-MTP

INTERMODAL CARTAGE, CO., LLC, et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Julian Davis and Intermodal Cartage Co., LLC’s Urgent and Necessitous Motion for Protective Order Limiting the Scope of Plaintiffs’ Amended Notice of 30(b)(6) Deposition of Intermodal Cartage Co., LLC [72] and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Extend Expert & Opinion Witness Designation Deadline [75]. Having carefully considered Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order [72] and the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that the Motion [72] should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth below. Further, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Extend [75] should be DENIED without prejudice. BACKGROUND On December 21, 2022, Plaintiff Cameron Thompson and his son, J.C., were involved in a wreck with Defendant Julian Davis (“Davis”). At the time of the accident, Davis was driving an “eighteen-wheeler” for his employer, Defendant Intermodal Cartage Co., LLC (“IMC”). Davis, while allegedly using his cellphone, drove through a stop sign and into Plaintiff Thompson’s vehicle. On March 7, 2024, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit asserting various claims against Defendants Davis and IMC, including varying negligence and respondeat superior liability claims against IMC. See Notice of Removal [1]. Plaintiffs also seek punitive damages against IMC. On August 8, 2024, Defendants filed their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the Direct Negligence and Punitive Claims against IMC [27]. On September 23, 2024, Defendants also filed a “Stipulation of Liability,” stating that Davis was negligent in the

operation of his motor vehicle at the time of the accident and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. See [51]. Defendant IMC further stipulated that Davis was, at all times, an employee of IMC and was operating his vehicle in the course and scope of his employment with IMC, imputing his negligence to IMC, Davis’s employer. Id. As such, Defendants posit that the only remaining questions in discovery “are those surrounding damages.” [76] at 1. On September 20, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Notice of 30(b)(6) Deposition of IMC. See [50]. The deposition was set to occur on October 10, 2024. Defendants then filed their first Motion for Protective Order [67], seeking to limit the scope of the topics noticed by Plaintiffs to

topics related only to the issue of Plaintiffs’ damages. See [67] at 3. The Court held a telephonic discovery with the parties, wherein Plaintiffs agreed to revise the scope of the 30(b)(6) deposition of IMC and the parties were directed to confer further regarding the scope thereof and to inform the Court if they failed to reach a resolution regarding the same. Though Plaintiffs revised their 30(b)(6) notice, no resolution was reached. The instant Motion for Protective Order [72] followed on October 7, 2024. Because the 30(b)(6) deposition was imminent, the Court again directed the parties to resolve the remaining disputes. Failing resolution, the Court informed the parties that the deposition would be stayed and that they would be required to brief the instant Motion for Protective Order [72]. Again, no resolution was reached. The Court stayed the deposition, and the parties briefed Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order [72]. In the Motion [72], Defendants move to limit the scope of twenty topics outlined in the 30(b)(6) notice and to strike Plaintiffs’ requests for production of documents associated with the 30(b)(6) notice. Specifically, Defendants argue that “any discovery beyond the scope of

Plaintiffs’ damages is neither relevant nor proportional to the needs of the case. Alternatively, any discovery as to Plaintiffs’ claims should be limited to Davis’s handheld cellphone usage and training and Plaintiffs’ 30(b)(6) notice should be modified accordingly.” [76] at 2. To date, there has been no ruling on Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [27], so all of Plaintiffs’ claims remain in this case. Unsurprisingly then, Plaintiffs disagree with Defendants’ position and argue that each topic addressed in their revised 30(b)(6) notice is directly relevant to their case. ANALYSIS “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any

party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). At the discovery stage, relevancy is broadly construed, and information is considered relevant if it “encompass[es] any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). Rule 26 also specifies that “[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The rules of discovery are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment to achieve their purpose of adequately informing litigants in civil trials. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979). At some point, however, discovery yields diminishing returns, needlessly increases expenses, and delays the resolution of the parties’ dispute. District courts have broad discretion to determine the scope of discovery. Cruz v. Maverick Cnty., 957 F.3d 563, 570 (5th Cir. 2020). Within the Court’s discretion, the Court “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” including by limiting the scope of a 30(b)(6) deposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Indeed, under

Rule 26(c), “[t]he court may limit a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice to the extent it requests the organization to designate an agent to testify on topics of information that are overly broad, vague, or ambiguous.” Dean v. Shell Pipeline Co., LP, 2020 WL 2813521, at *3 (M.D. La. May 29, 2020) (collecting cases). Rule 26(c)’s “good cause” requirement dictates that the party seeking a protective order has the burden “to show the necessity of its issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978)). Having carefully considered the Motion [72], the Court rules as

follows: Topics of Inquiry Topic No. 3 The Motion is GRANTED as to Topic No. 3. As written, the topic is overly broad and disproportionate to the needs of the case. The scope of Topic No. 3 is limited to the hiring, training, supervision, and discipline of Davis by IMC during his employment with IMC as it relates to any prior instances of improper handheld cellphone use by Davis and/or efforts to discover the same during the hiring process, any training or supervision related to handheld cellphone use, and any prior instances of discipline related to handheld cellphone use by Davis. Topic No. 4 The Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as to Topic No. 4.

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Thompson v. Intermodal Cartage Co., LLC., (S.D. Miss. 2024).

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Related

In Re Terra International, Inc.
134 F.3d 302 (Fifth Circuit, 1998)
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders
437 U.S. 340 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Herbert v. Lando
441 U.S. 153 (Supreme Court, 1979)
United States v. Garrett
571 F.2d 1323 (Fifth Circuit, 1978)