THOMPSON v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

• Court: District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 17, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01095
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ARTHUR THOMPSON, : Plaintiff, : : v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-1095 : FEDERAL BUREAU OF : INVESTIGATION, et al., : Defendants. : ORDER AND NOW, this 17th day of March, 2025, upon consideration of Plaintiff Arthur Thompson’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. No. 1), and pro se Complaint (Doc. No. 2), it is ORDERED that: 1. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 2. The Complaint is DEEMED filed. 3. For the reasons stated in the Court’s Memorandum, the Complaint is dismissed as follows: a. All criminal conspiracy claims brought under 18 U.S.C. § 241 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. b. All constitutional claims against the FBI, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Court of Common Pleas, Attorney Gamburg, Judges Shaffer and Johnson, and Assistant District Attorney Goggin are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. c. All other claims, i.e., Thompson’s civil conspiracy claims against all named Defendants and constitutional claims against the Philadelphia Police Department, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, and the Philadelphia Gun Task Force are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. 4. Thompson may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order only as to his civil conspiracy claims against all named Defendants and his constitutional claims against the City of Philadelphia. Any amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended complaint and shall state the basis for Thompson’s claims against each defendant. The amended complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. When drafting his amended complaint, Thompson should be mindful of the Court’s reasons for dismissing the claims in his initial Complaint as explained in the Court’s Memorandum. Upon the filing of an amended complaint,

the Clerk shall not make service until so ORDERED by the Court. 5. If Thompson does not wish to amend his Complaint and instead intends to stand on his Complaint as originally pled, he may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Complaint,” and shall include the civil action number for this case. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703–04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs’ decision not to replead those claims” when the district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the

dismissal of those claims”). 6. If Thompson fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that Thompson intends to stand on his Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case.1 See Weber, 939 F.3d at 239–40 (explaining that a plaintiff’s intent to stand on his complaint may be inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective complaint). BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen Spencer Marston KAREN SPENCER MARSTON, J.

1 The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff’s intention to stand on his complaint. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the Poulis factors); see also Elansari v. Altria, 799 F. App’x 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an analysis under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend his complaint, leaving the case without an operative pleading. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 F. App’x 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff’s behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).