Thompson v. Community Mental Health Ctrs. of Warren Cty., Inc.

1994 Ohio 223

Opinion

Thompson, Appellee, v. Community Mental Health Centers of Warren

County, Inc. et al., Appellants.

[Cite as Thompson v. Community Mental Health Ctrs. of Warren

Cty., Inc. (1994), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.]

Statutes of limitations — Action against licensed independent

social worker, licensed psychologist, or licensed mental

health care facility for negligence is not governed by R.C.

2305.11.

A cause of action arising from the claimed negligence of a

licensed independent social worker, a licensed psychologist

or a licensed mental health care facility is not a claim for

malpractice and is therefore not governed by R.C. 2305.11.

(No. 94-79 — Submitted October 26, 1994 — Decided December 14,

1994.)

Certified by the Court of Appeals for Warren County, No. CA92-08-

072.

From July 21, 1989 until November 3, 1989, plaintiff-

appellee, Linda Thompson, received treatment for emotional and

mental problems from defendants-appellants, Community Mental

Health Centers of Warren County, Inc. (“CMHC”), William J.

Malone, and Russell W. Dern, Ph.D. CMHC is a licensed mental

health facility. Malone, a licensed independent social worker,

and Dern, a licensed psychologist, are both employees of CMHC.

More than one year after her treatment terminated, Thompson

filed suit against appellants alleging various theories of

negligence in her care and treatment which proximately resulted

in emotional and physical injury. Upon appellants’ motion, the

trial court dismissed Thompson’s claims for psychological and emotional injury, finding them to be time barred by R.C.

2305.11(A). The court of appeals reversed, holding that claims

against mental health care providers do not fall within the one-

year statute of limitations for malpractice actions.

The appellate court, finding its judgment to be in conflict

with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County in

Nowlin v. Northeast Community Mental Health Ctr. (Apr. 9, 1992),

App. No. 60284, unreported, 1992 WL 74327, certified the record

of the cause to this court for review and final determination.

__________________

Thomas J. Leksan, for appellee.

Lindhorst & Dreidame and Leo J. Breslin, for appellants.

Moyer, C.J. The question certified by the court of appeals

is “* * * whether the term ‘malpractice’ should, for purposes of

determining the statute of limitations set forth in R.C.

2305.11(A), be defined narrowly as at common law or broadly to

encompass other types of professional negligence.” The issue we

decide is whether the negligent acts of a nonphysician who

provides mental health care constitute malpractice under R.C.

2305.11(A).

It is well-established common law of Ohio that malpractice

is limited to the negligence of physicians and attorneys Thirty

years ago we recognized the distinction between common notions of

malpractice and its common-law legal definition when we wrote:

“[T]he term, malpractice, is sometimes used loosely to refer to

the negligence of a member of any professional group. However,

legally and technically, it is still subject to the limited common-law definition. It is well established that where a

statute uses a word which has a definite meaning at common law,

it will be presumed to be used in that sense and not in the loose

popular sense.” Richardson v. Doe (1964), 176 Ohio St. 370, 372-

373, 27 O.O.2d 345, 347, 199 N.E.2d 878, 880, citing Grogan v.

Garrison (1875), 27 Ohio St. 50, 63. We further observed in

Richardson that in 1894, when the General Assembly amended the

one-year statute of limitations to include malpractice actions,

the legal definition of “malpractice” was limited to negligence

on the part of doctors and attorneys. Id., 176 Ohio St. at 372,

27 O.O.2d at 347, 199 N.E.2d at 880.

Since that time, we have repeatedly declined to extend the

definition of malpractice when presented with claims concerning

other professions. See Investors REIT One v. Jacobs (1989), 46

Ohio St.3d 176, 546 N.E.2d 206, and cases cited therein. In

these cases, we have reasoned that the General Assembly was aware

of the common-law definition of malpractice and until the statute

is amended to specifically include other professions, the common-

law definition limits the scope of the statute. Therefore,

causes of action for malpractice are limited to actions arising

from the negligence of attorneys and physicians under the common

law and those other professions expressly designated by the

General Assembly.

Appellants argue that the 1987 amendments to R.C. 2305.11

express an intent by the General Assembly to expand the

definition of malpractice beyond its common-law meaning. Prior

to October 20, 1987, R.C. 2305.11(A) provided in pertinent part:

“An action for * * * malpractice, including an action for

malpractice against a physician, podiatrist, hospital, or dentist * * * shall be brought within one year after the cause thereof

accrued * * *.” 141 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3228. The statute has

been amended to read: “An action for * * * malpractice other

than an action upon a medical, dental, optometric, or

chiropractic claim, * * * shall be commenced within one year

after the cause of action accrued * * *.” Appellants argue that

the insertion of the words “other than” in the statute

contemplates the existence of malpractice actions beyond those

defined at common law. We are unpersuaded by appellants’

argument.

The revised statute specifically includes chiropractic

claims for the first time in subsection (A) and brings registered

nurses, physical therapists and hospital employees within the

definition of a medical claim under subsection (D)(3). 142 Ohio

Laws, Part II, 3322, 3324. The term “malpractice” was not

altered. The new language is wholly consistent with the

assumption that the General Assembly was well aware of Supreme

Court decisional law when the amendments were adopted. The

amendments expressly include registered nurses and hospital

employees in the definition of “medical claim”; our past

decisions had excluded them from the common-law definition.

Furthermore, in 1990, the General Assembly again amended R.C.

2305.11(D)(13) to bring another new profession, athletic

trainers, within the one-year statute of limitations. 143 Ohio

Laws, Part I, 489. Having expressly included some disciplines

heretofore excluded, it is not logical to assume that other

disciplines are to be joined by silent implication.

We conclude that a cause of action arising from the claimed negligence of a licensed independent social worker, a licensed

psychologist or a licensed mental health care facility is not a

claim for malpractice and is therefore not governed by R.C.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of

appeals is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Wright, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney and

Pfeifer, JJ., concur.