Thompson v. Commissioner of Public Safety

567 N.W.2d 280, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 877, 1997 WL 434095
CourtCourt of Appeals of Minnesota
DecidedAugust 5, 1997
DocketC2-96-2346
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 567 N.W.2d 280 (Thompson v. Commissioner of Public Safety) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thompson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 567 N.W.2d 280, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 877, 1997 WL 434095 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

OPINION

HARVEY A. HOLTAN, Judge *

On appeal from the denial of his petition for reinstatement of his school bus endorse *281 ment, Glen Thompson argues the district court erred in interpreting Minn.Stat. § 171.3215, subd. 2 (Supp.1995), to find that revocation of his license under the implied consent statute required cancellation of his school bus endorsement. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Glen Thompson’s driver’s-license was revoked for 90 days pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169.123, subd. 4 (1994), after testing showed his alcohol concentration was over .10. Thompson pleaded guilty to a violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.122 (1994) (open bottle), but never was convicted of a violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.121 (1994 & Supp.1995) (driving while under the influence); Minn. Stat. § 169.129 (1994) (aggravated driving while under the influence); or a similar driving statute. The Department of Public Safety notified Thompson that the revocation of his driver’s license required cancellation of the school bus endorsement on his license and that his endorsement could not be reinstated for five years.

Thompson petitioned the district court for reinstatement of his school bus endorsement. The parties submitted the case for decision based on stipulated facts and written memo-randa. By the date of submission, the 90-day revocation period had expired and Thompson’s driver’s license had been reinstated.

The district court denied Thompson’s petition for reinstatement. The court determined that Minn.Stat. § 171.3215, subd. 2 (Supp.1995), required cancellation of Thompson’s school bus endorsement because his driver’s license had been revoked under the implied consent statute and that Thompson was not entitled to reinstatement of his school bus endorsement for five years.

ISSUE

Did the district court err in determining Thompson was not entitled to reinstatement of his school bus endorsement?

ANALYSIS

The decision whether to cancel a driver’s license endorsement rests with the Commissioner of Public Safety. Minn.Stat. § 171.25 (1994); Askildson v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 403 N.W.2d 674, 676 (Minn.App.1987), review denied (Minn. May 28, 1987). A presumption of regularity and correctness attaches to this administrative act. Id. An appellate court generally will not reverse an administrative agency’s decision unless the decision was fraudulent, arbitrary, unreasonable, or outside the agency’s jurisdiction and power. Id.

A person whose driver’s license endorsement has been cancelled may file a petition with the district court seeking reinstatement of the endorsement. See Minn. Stat. § 171.19 (1994) (driver’s license cancellation). The district court’s fact findings will not be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. See Berge v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn.1985) (implied consent case). The interpretation of a statute, however, is a question of law reviewed de novo by this court. Hibbing Educ. Ass’n v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 369 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Minn.1985).

The object of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1996). When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we must give effect to the statute’s plain meaning. Tuma v. Commissioner of Econ. Sec., 386 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn.1986).

MinmStat. § 171.3215, subd. 2 (Supp. 1995), provides:

Within ten days of receiving notice under section 631.40, subdivision la, or otherwise receiving notice for a nonresident driver, that a school bus driver has been convicted of a gross misdemeanor, or a violation of section 169.121, 169.129, or a similar statute or ordinance from another state, and within ten days of revoking a school bus driver’s license under section 169.123, the commissioner shall cancel the school bus driver’s endorsement on the offender’s driver’s license or the nonresident’s privi *282 lege to operate a school bus in Minnesota for five years.

In the present case, Thompson argues that the word “and” in Minn.Stat. § 171.3215, subd. 2, must be given its ordinary, conjunctive meaning. See Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (1996) (words in statute are construed according to their common usage). Thompson then claims that the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 171.3215, subd. 2, shows his school bus endorsement cannot be cancelled unless he has been convicted (a criminal action) of driving while under the influence or a similar driving offense and has had his license revoked under the implied consent statute (an administrative action).

These are two dissimilar sets of occurrences. In this context, “and” is not a conjunctive. When the word “and” is read in the context of the entire sentence, the plain language of Minn.Stat. § 171.3215, subd. 2, shows the Commissioner is required to cancel the school bus endorsement of a person who has been convicted of a driving while under the influence offense and also of a person whose driver’s license has been revoked under the implied consent statute. The legislature used the word “and” in this context, instead of the word “or,” because it repeated the phrase “within ten days” .in each clause, but did not include any notice language in the revocation phrase. Grammatical errors such as this cannot eviscerate the law, and words and phrases may be added in aid of construction. Minn.Stat. § 645.18 (1996).

In any event, the common usage canon of construction may not be observed if it would produce “a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature, or repugnant to the context of the statute.” Minn.Stat. § 645.08 (1996); see also Kugling v. Williamson, 231 Minn. 135, 139, 42 N.W.2d 534, 538 (1950) (statutory words and phrases should be construed according to common and approved usage unless to do so would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature). It is well settled that

laws relating to the revocation of driving privileges * * * are not “penal” in nature, but are remedial statutes intended for the protection of the public and are to be liberally construed towards that end.

Szczech v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 343 N.W.2d 305, 306 (Minn.App.1984). Further, the legislature intends to favor the public interest as against private interest. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(5) (1996).

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567 N.W.2d 280, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 877, 1997 WL 434095, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thompson-v-commissioner-of-public-safety-minnctapp-1997.