Thompson v. City of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedDecember 6, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-10371
StatusUnknown

This text of Thompson v. City of New York (Thompson v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thompson v. City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK TREVOR FORREST; KWAINE THOMPSON, Plaintiffs, 21-CV-10152 (LTS) -against- ORDER DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, et al., Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Trevor Forrest and Kwaine Thompson, who are currently detained in the George R. Vierno Center on Rikers Island, filed this unsigned pro se complaint claiming that Defendants violated their constitutional right to practice their Muslim faith and subjecting them to lockdown practices that impede their ability to access medical services and recreation. (ECF 2.) Plaintiffs submitted two applications for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), but both are deficient.1 (ECF 1, 5.) Both Plaintiffs submitted prisoner authorizations and a motion for pro bono counsel. (ECF 3, 4, 6.) For the reasons set forth below, the claims of Forrest and Thompson are severed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. DISCUSSION A. Order Severing Claims Generally, Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows multiple plaintiffs to join in one action if (1) they assert any right to relief arising out of the same occurrence or series of occurrences, and (2) if any question of law or fact in common to all plaintiffs will arise in the

1 One IFP application lists only Forrest’s name in the caption, but only Thompson signed it, and thus it is not clear to whom the information applies. (ECF 1.) The other IFP application, signed only by Thompson, is incomplete because the signature page is taken from an application for pro bono counsel. (ECF 5.) action. See, e.g., Kalie v. Bank of Am. Corp., ECF No. 12-CV-9192 (PAE), 2013 WL 4044951, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2013) (Courts “look to the logical relationship between the claims and determine ‘whether the essential facts of the various claims are so logically connected that considerations of judicial economy and fairness dictate that all the issues be resolved in one

lawsuit’” (quoting United States v. Aquavella, 615 F.2d 12, 22 (2d Cir. 1979))). Courts have the authority to deny joinder, or to order severance under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even without a finding that joinder is improper, if joinder “will not foster the objectives of the rule, but will result in prejudice, expense or delay.” Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1652 (3d ed.) (citations omitted); see Wyndham Assoc. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 618 (2d Cir. 1968) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 “authorizes the severance of any claim, even without a finding of improper joinder, where there are sufficient other reasons for ordering a severance”); Ghaly v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 228 F. Supp. 2d 283, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that “district courts have broad discretion to decide whether joinder is appropriate, even when the requirements of Rule 20(a) have been met”) (citation omitted).

In determining whether to deny joinder or order severance of parties, courts consider the requirements of Rule 20 and additional factors, “including (1) whether severance will serve judicial economy; (2) whether prejudice to the parties would be caused by severance; and (3) whether the claims involve different witnesses and evidence.” Kehr v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 821, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (considering motion to sever under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 and 21); see also Laureano v. Goord, ECF No. 06-CV-7845 (SHS) (RLE), 2007 WL 2826649, at *8 (SD.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007) (When considering severance, “courts should be guided by ‘considerations of convenience, avoidance of prejudice to the parties, and efficiency’” (quoting Hecht v. City of New York, 217 F.R.D. 148, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). While Forrest’s and Thompson’s claims are similar in nature, the facts underlying their claims are specific to each plaintiff. Even if Forrest and Thompson were properly joined in this action, however, the Court finds that the practical realities of managing this pro se two-prisoner litigation militate against

adjudicating their claims in one action. As pro se litigants, Forrest and Thompson may appear only on their own behalf; one may not appear as an attorney for the other. See United States v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A]n individual who is not licensed as an attorney ‘may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause’”) (citations omitted); Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause pro se means to appear for one’s self, a person may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause”). In addition, Rule 11(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every pleading, written motion, or other paper be signed by every party personally who is unrepresented. During the course of this action, each plaintiff would therefore be required to sign any motion or notice filed. But because of the transitory nature of a pretrial detention facility

such as Rikers Island, where an inmate could be released or transferred at any time, and because of security concerns related to inmate correspondence and face-to-face communications, Forrest and Thompson would have at best only a very limited opportunity to discuss case strategy, share discovery, or even provide each other with copies of the motions and notices that they file with the Court. Further, this can result in piecemeal submissions, delays, and missed deadlines. See Perkins v. City of New York, ECF No. 14-CV-3779 (WHP), 2014 WL 5369428, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2014) (finding that multi-prisoner case should be severed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 into individual actions based on unwieldy complaint, security considerations, and plaintiffs’ likely inability to jointly litigate the case because they were housed in different facilities or given limited opportunities to associate). Based on these logistical issues, the Court concludes that allowing this case to proceed as a two-plaintiff case would not be fair to Forrest and Thompson and would not achieve judicial

economy. Allowing each plaintiff to proceed separately on the other hand, would facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of the litigation. The Court will therefore sever this action into individual cases. Trevor Forrest will proceed as the sole plaintiff in this action. Kwaine Thompson will be assigned a new case number. A copy of the complaint, Thompson’s prisoner authorization, the deficient IFP applications (ECF 1, 2, 3, and 5) and this order will be docketed in the new case.

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United States Ex Rel. Mergent Services v. Flaherty
540 F.3d 89 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Kehr Ex Rel. Kehr v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA
596 F. Supp. 2d 821 (S.D. New York, 2008)
Ghaly v. United States Department of Agriculture
228 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D. New York, 2002)
Iannaccone v. Law
142 F.3d 553 (Second Circuit, 1998)
Hecht v. City of New York
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Kalie v. Bank of America Corp.
297 F.R.D. 552 (S.D. New York, 2013)

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Thompson v. City of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thompson-v-city-of-new-york-nysd-2021.