Thompson v. Breeding

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: December 8, 2003
• Docket: 03-5247
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Thompson v. Breeding, et al. No. 03-5247 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0433P (6th Cir.) File Name: 03a0433p.06 _________________ COUNSEL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ARGUED: Jonathan Ray Spalding, Lebanon, Kentucky, for FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Appellant. Timothy L. Edelen, BELL, ORR, AYERS & _________________ MOORE, Bowling Green, Kentucky, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jonathan Ray Spalding, Elmer J. George, AVIS THOMPSON, X Lebanon, Kentucky, for Appellant. Timothy L. Edelen, Plaintiff-Appellant, - BELL, ORR, AYERS & MOORE, Bowling Green, - Kentucky, for Appellees. - No. 03-5247 v. - _________________ > , OPINION TOMMY and ELIZABETH - _________________ BREEDING , - Defendants, - BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Avis Thompson - appeals the magistrate’s grant of summary judgment in favor JAMES KNIFLEY and JIMMIE - of James Knifley and Jimmie Knifley Realty Co., Inc., on - various claims for damages arising out of a failed real estate KNIFLEY REALTY CO ., INC., - sale. Two issues are presented in this appeal. The first is Defendants-Appellees. - whether the magistrate correctly determined that Thompson N has no right of action against Knifley or Knifley Realty for Appeal from the United States District Court damages caused by their alleged violations of section 330.110 for the Western District of Kentucky at Bowling Green. of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. The second is whether No. 00-00140—E. Robert Goebel, Magistrate Judge. Thompson’s negligence claim was properly dismissed on summary judgment. While we disagree with the magistrate’s Argued: September 30, 2003 reasoning as to the first issue, we find that his ultimate conclusions were correct as to both issues and, therefore, we Decided and Filed: December 8, 2003 affirm.

Before: MARTIN, MOORE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges. I. The essential facts of this case are not in dispute. In May 2000, Thompson contacted the Knifley Realty office and spoke to Knifley about purchasing real estate in Campbellsville, Kentucky. During the week of May 14, Knifley showed Thompson various local properties that were

1 No. 03-5247 Thompson v. Breeding, et al. 3 4 Thompson v. Breeding, et al. No. 03-5247

available for sale. One of those properties belonged to this damage contributed to her ultimate decision not to close Tommy and Elizabeth Breeding and was scheduled to be on the property.1 auctioned on Saturday, May 20, at an auction conducted by Knifley himself. Thompson attended the auction, which was Unable to complete the sales transaction with Thompson, held at the Breedings’ home, and decided to bid on the the Breedings hired Knifley to conduct a second auction of property. Her $136,000 bid prevailed and she agreed to pay the property on August 12. The high bid at the second an advertised ten percent buyer’s commission, bringing the auction was $150,200 – $14,200 more than Thompson’s high total purchase price to $149,600. bid. With the ten percent buyer’s commission, the total purchase price amounted to $165,020 – $15,420 more than A few hours after the auction had ended, Thompson the total purchase price Thompson had agreed to pay. returned to the property with a friend in order to measure rooms in the home. The Breedings’ son had given Thompson Thompson filed a complaint against Knifley, Knifley a garage door opener earlier in the day to allow access to the Realty and Tommy and Elizabeth Breeding, alleging house, but apparently the garage door was already open when violations of section 330.110(10) and (11) of the Kentucky she arrived. Thompson entered through the garage and Revised Statutes, as well as claims for negligence and breach noticed a large wet and slimy patch on the garage floor, which of contract. The district court had diversity jurisdiction she walked around on her way into the house. From a back pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and the parties consented to try window, she observed three young men in the yard carrying the matter before a magistrate. The magistrate granted items that she surmised were stolen from the property. summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims, Thompson quickly walked back through the garage toward holding that (1) Thompson had no right of action against any the outside so that she could confront them, and in doing so of the defendants for damages caused by their alleged caught her left foot on a garden hose lying on the garage violations of section 330.110; (2) Thompson could not prevail floor, causing her right foot to land on the wet spot and slip on her negligence claim because none of the defendants owed out from under her. Thompson fell and sustained injuries. In her a duty in light of the open and obvious nature of the her deposition, Thompson admitted that she was aware of the hazard that caused her injury; and (3) it was Thompson, not wet spot before she stepped in it and, in fact, that the wet spot the defendants, who had breached the contract for sale. “was obvious . . . to anyone who was looking.” Thompson subsequently settled her dispute with the Breedings, but she appealed the magistrate’s rulings with A few days after the auction, a storm damaged the property, respect to her section 330.110 and negligence claims against blowing down at least two trees and damaging several others. Knifley and Knifley Realty. Knifley and the Breedings believed that this damage did not materially affect the contract for sale and offered to replace the mature trees with new trees and to clean up the fallen limbs. Thompson, however, had chosen the property partially because of the trees and the cover they provided. Therefore, 1 Thompson had argued that the defendants materially breached the contract for sale b y refusing to replace the d amaged trees with mature trees or to reduce the purchase price of the property by $15,000. T he magistrate rejected that argument and held that Thompson had breached the contract by refusing to close on the property. That ruling has not been appealed. No. 03-5247 Thompson v. Breeding, et al. 5 6 Thompson v. Breeding, et al. No. 03-5247

II. Thompson argues that section 446.070 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes provides a mechanism that allows her to sue We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary Knifley and Knifley Realty for their alleged violations of judgment. Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 490 section 330.110. Section 446.070 provides: (6th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment should be granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and A person injured by the violation of any statute may admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show recover from the offender such damages as he sustained that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that by reason of the violation, although a penalty or the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” forfeiture is imposed for such violation. FED . R. CIV . P. 56(c). Because this is a diversity case, we apply the law of the forum state, which the parties agree is Knifley and Knifley Realty argue, and the magistrate held, Kentucky. Gahafer v. Ford Motor Co., 328 F.3d 859, 861 that section 330.110 is a “regulatory” statute for which there (6th Cir. 2003). is no private right of action. For that proposition they rely exclusively upon Lewis v. Charolais Corporation, 19 S.W.3d A. 671, 674 (Ky. App. 2000), in which the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that no private right of action existed for The first issue is whether Thompson has a right of action violation of chapter 151 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes against Knifley and Knifley Realty for damages caused by because that chapter was “regulatory in nature.” their alleged violations of section 330.110 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. Section 330.110 was passed as part of the While the magistrate’s ultimate conclusion was correct, the Auctioneers License Law of 1962, which is now codified as rationale that he employed in reaching that conclusion is chapter 330 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. See KRS flawed. The issue is not, as the magistrate assumed, whether § 330.010. Auctioneers and auction house operators must be chapter 330 is “regulatory” in nature, but rather whether licensed by the state of Kentucky and must abide by the section 446.070 affords a private right of action for damages requirements set forth in chapter 330. Section 330.110 caused by a violation of chapter 330. Therefore, the prohibits licensees from engaging in various types of conduct magistrate’s reliance upon Lewis is misplaced, as that case and provides for penalties in the event of a violation. never even cites section 446.070. Thompson alleges that Knifley and Knifley Realty violated section 330.110(10) and (11) through various misdeeds Nevertheless, our review leads us to the conclusion that associated with the auction of the Breedings’ property. Thompson has no right of action against Knifley or Knifley Subsections (10) and (11) prohibit licensees from engaging in Realty for damages caused by their alleged violations of conduct “which demonstrates bad faith, dishonesty, section 330.110. Section 446.070 “was passed to remove any incompetency, or untruthfulness,” or “[a]ny other conduct that doubt that might arise as to the right of a person for whose constitutes improper, fraudulent, dishonest, or negligent protection a statute was passed to recover for a violation of dealings,” respectively. Because we find that Thompson has that statute, where the statute was penal in its nature, or where no right of action for damages caused by these alleged by its terms the statute did not prescribe a remedy for its violations, we need not address the substance of her enforcement of violation.” Hackney v. Fordson Coal Co., 19 allegations. S.W.2d 989, 990 (Ky. 1929); see also Ezell v. Christian Cty., 245 F.3d 853, 856 (6th Cir. 2001); The Travelers Indem. Co. No. 03-5247 Thompson v. Breeding, et al. 7 8 Thompson v. Breeding, et al. No. 03-5247

v. Reker, 100 S.W.3d 756, 762-63 (Ky. 2003); State Farm licensee fails to do so, id. at § 330.192(2)(a).2 This is the type Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 117-18 (Ky. of statutory remedy that precludes the operation of section 1988); Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1985). 446.070. Because chapter 330 both “declares the unlawful act However, “[w]here the statute both declares the unlawful act and specifies the civil remedy available to the aggrieved and specifies the civil remedy available to the aggrieved party,” Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at 401, section 446.070 provides party, the aggrieved party is limited to the remedy provided no private right of action to Thompson. Accordingly, by the statute,” Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at 401, and may not sue summary judgment in favor the defendants was proper. under section 446.070. B. The Kentucky Supreme Court has carefully limited the applicability of section 446.070 to situations where the statute The second issue is whether the magistrate erred in granting that was allegedly violated provides no remedy for the summary judgment for Knifley and Knifley Realty on aggrieved party. Compare Travelers, 100 S.W.3d at 762-63 Thompson’s negligence claim. The magistrate held that the (section 446.070 inapplicable where the Workers’ open and obvious nature of the wet spot precluded Thompson Compensation Act provides remedies for violations of from demonstrating that any of the defendants owed her a workers’ compensation statutes), and Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at duty with respect to that hazard. We agree. There can be no 401 (section 446.070 inapplicable where Chapter 334 of the negligence in the absence of a duty on the part of a defendant Kentucky Revised Statutes provides the remedy of filing a and, under Kentucky law, no duty arises with respect to complaint with the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights), hazards that are open and obvious. PNC Bank v. Green, 30 with State Farm, 763 S.W.2d at 118 (section 446.070 S.W.3d 185, 186 (Ky. 2000); Rogers v. Prof’l Golfers Ass’n, provides right of action because the Unfair Claims Settlement 28 S.W.3d 869, 872-73 (Ky. App. 2000). Thompson Practices Act contains no remedy for the aggrieved party). admitted in her deposition that the wet spot “was obvious . . . These principles are consistent with the general rule of to anyone who was looking.” This admission is sufficient to statutory construction that “as between legislation of a broad defeat her negligence claim. See Corbin Motor Lodge v. and general nature on the one hand, and legislation dealing Combs, 740 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Ky. 1987) (granting summary minutely with a specific matter on the other hand – the judgment for defendant where plaintiff admitted that he knew specific shall prevail over the general.” City of Bowling the sidewalk on which he slipped was “slick”); Rogers, 28 Green v. Bd. of Educ., 443 S.W.2d 243, 247 (Ky. App. 1969). S.W.3d at 873-74 (granting summary judgment for defendant where the slippery golf course hillside on which plaintiff Chapter 330 provides that complaints against licensed slipped was open and obvious as a matter of law). auctioneers for violating any section in the chapter are to be made before the Board of Auctioneers, KRS § 330.115, and that if a licensee is found guilty of a violation the Board is authorized to pay damages to the aggrieved party if the 2 Thompson never pursued the remedy provided in chapter 330, and now it appears that this remedy is no longer available. See KRS § 330 .192 (3)(f) (“All the claims for monetary damages or relief . . . must be made in writing on a proof of loss form subm itted to the bo ard within six (6) months of the act of the auctioneer giving rise to the loss. Failure to file such claims w ithin the six (6 ) month period shall bar the claim.”). No. 03-5247 Thompson v. Breeding, et al. 9

Thompson’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. First, she argues that Kentucky has adopted a comparative fault scheme that makes summary judgment inappropriate at this stage. The doctrine of comparative fault, however, presupposes that a defendant is liable for negligence in the first place – which cannot be demonstrated in this case. Second, Thompson argues that the presence of the young men on the property distracted her and somehow made the hazard less open and obvious. Even assuming, however, that Thompson’s attention was distracted away from the wet spot, that does not make the hazard any less open and obvious, nor does it make Knifley or Knifley Realty any more at fault for her fall. Thompson’s negligence claim against Knifley and Knifley Realty also fails for an additional reason: neither Knifley nor Knifley Realty was in control or possession of the Breeding property at the time of Thompson’s fall. Where a person has neither title to nor possession of the premises, he cannot be liable for injury resulting from a dangerous condition on the premises. See Sabiston’s Adm’r v. Otis Elevator Co., 64 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Ky. App. 1933). Even assuming Knifley or Knifley Realty controlled or possessed the property during the auction, Thompson’s fall occurred hours after the auction had ended and the Breedings had resumed control and possession of the property. Therefore, the Breedings are the only ones who could potentially be held liable for negligence, and Thompson has settled her dispute with them. For the foregoing reasons, the magistrate’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Knifley and Knifley Realty is AFFIRMED.