Thomasson v. Hudmon

196 S.E. 462, 185 Ga. 753, 1938 Ga. LEXIS 812
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedFebruary 19, 1938
DocketNo. 12199
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 196 S.E. 462 (Thomasson v. Hudmon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomasson v. Hudmon, 196 S.E. 462, 185 Ga. 753, 1938 Ga. LEXIS 812 (Ga. 1938).

Opinion

Grice, Justice.

The plea of res judicata was properly stricken, or, as the record recites, “overruled.” It was held in Walden v. Mahnks, 178 Ga. 825 (174 S. E. 538, 95 A. L. R. 1101) : “Although letters of administration have been granted upon a supposed intestacy and the administrator has obtained a final discharge, a will thereafter presented to the court of ordinary may nevertheless be admitted to probate, and this without previous annulment of the former judgments.” That decision in principle controls the point here made. There the caveators sought to plead the judgment as a bar to the application for probate; but this court, while recognizing that the court of ordinary, within the scope of its jurisdiction, had determined an intestacy, said that such an adjudication, if it could be so designated, is not conclusive to the same extent as other judgments.

Counsel for the defendant in error insist that J. T. Thomas-son, who had previously been appointed administrator on the theory that Mrs. Thomasson died intestate, was not a proper party to the proceeding asking for probate in solemn form; and for this they cite the Code, § 63-303. If J. T. Thomasson was improperly joined, the defect was one of form, and not of substance. Such defect must be taken advantage of at the first term. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Tice, 124 Ga. 459 (52 S. E. 916, 4 Ann. Cas. 200). A complaint appearing for the first time as a ground of a motion for new trial, that the court refused to sustain a motion to strike him as a party, comes too late.

It is not a ground for new trial that the sheriff, without the knowledge and consent of movants, selected as jurors certain persons one of whom was actually accepted as a trior, the names of the extra jurors' not being drawn from the jury-box as required by the act approved March 31, 1937. Such a point can not be successfully raised for the first time after verdict. It must be held that such an irregularity is ground only for a challenge propter defectum, which must be made before verdict; and unless a challenge is 'so made, the selection of the jury in the manner indicated is not cause for new trial, no matter when it is discovered. Com[756]*756pare Wright v. Davis, 184 Ga. 846, 851 (193 S. E. 757). The point was expressly decided by the Court of Appeals in Lindsey v. State, 57 Ga. App. 158 (194 S. E. 833), in a well-considered opinion by Judge Guerry, holding that “a failure to comply with the provisions of this act makes the juror disqualified propter defectum, and is a good cause for challenge, but is not a good ground for new trial, even though the defendant did not know of the defect until after verdict.”

The remaining grounds of the motion for new trial have been examined. These complain that the court erred: In refusing to rule out testimony that the copy of the will attached to the petition to probate was a substantial copy of the will signed by Mrs. Thomasson, the witness giving the testimony being a subscribing witness to the will. Also, in permitting a witness to testify that J. T. Thomasson stated that he had a memorandum or inventory of the personal property of the alleged testatrix. Also, in permitting a witness to testify that on the day after the funeral of Mrs. Thomasson, J. J. Thomasson stated to the witness that “she changed her will and left my three daughters out, and I am sorry.” Also, in permitting J. J. Thomasson to testify that when he received the paper it had on it a blank space for Mrs. Thomasson to sign; that he mailed Mrs. Barber a list of the personal property; and that in the memorandum, in the handwriting of the alleged testatrix, was an item for Mrs. Nancy Barber. And in admitting other testimony as to the contents of the memorandum; testimony of Mrs. Nancy Barber, as to conversations with Thomasson; testimony of Mrs. Fleming, Mrs. Luck, and Mrs. Meadows, to the effect that Mrs. Thomasson told her she had her will fixed; testimony of J. L. Smith, that the copy of what is alleged as the will that was filed for probate was presented to Mrs. Emma Goodwin, and that she read it; and evidence concerning the alleged copy, after it had been introduced in evidence, tending to show that it was a copy of the instrument signed by Mrs. Thomasson as her will. Also, in excluding from evidence a certified copy of the letters of administration granted by the probate court of Alabama to Trawick as administrator of the alleged testatrix. Also, in failing to charge the jury, without request, the law of circumstantial evidence. And that in a colloquy with counsel over the admission of testimony the judge, in the presence of the jury, used the following language: [757]*757“You have here a man who is a party to the cause. He says no such will was made. Now he is attempting to prove that this party to the case made a statement to somebody that a will was executed.” None of the errors here complained of are such as to require the grant of a new trial.

While the original petition in the court of ordinary was one to prove a copy of a will, court and counsel, when the writing bearing the signature of the subscribing witnesses was.produced, treated it as one, not to establish and prove a lost will, but as a proceeding to probate a will in solemn form. Counsel on both sides take this view in their briefs. As a practical question, it makes no difference what nomenclature is given the petition. The writing bearing the attestation clause and the signatures of three attesting witnesses was not lost or destroyed. It was produced. Near the bottom of the fourth page of typewritten matter, at the end of what was evidently intended to be the will of Mrs. Thomasson, are the words and figures: “This the-day of August, 1935.” Nothing else is on the page, written or printed, except a blank, black line apparently made by a typewriter, followed at the end of the blank line by the word “(Seal).” The following page is the one that contains the attestation clause, containing the usual recital: “Signed, sealed, and published by Mrs. Safronia Trawick Thomas-son as her last will and testament in the presence of the undersigned as witnesses,” etc., to which the signatures of three witnesses are subscribed. The four pages are attached with a single brad. The caveator insists that Mrs. Thomasson never signed the instrument, and no sheet was produced containing her signature. The propounder contends that she did sign it, but that the third sheet at the bottom of which she signed was withdrawn, and another sheet substituted for it, identical with it, except that the substituted sheet contained no signature. In one of the briefs filed by counsel for caveators this statement occurs: “The question is only this: Did Mr. J. J. Thomasson or any one else change this will, and put back the sheet with the names of the three witnesses, as they actually appear?” And this: “The question in this case further is, did Mrs. Thomasson sign-this will which was produced, and which they had produced ?”

An examination of the brief of the evidence discloses that three witnesses swore that not long before she died Mrs. Thomasson said [758]*758to each, of them, on different occasions, that her will “was fixed.” Mrs. Fleming testified: “Sometime in the summer of 1935, before we went to Tennessee, Mrs. Thomasson asked us to witness her will. We left, I think, about June 1st. I think we got back about September 1, 1935. She never talked to me about it after that. She said her will was fixed.” Mrs. Luck’s testimony was: “She just said her will was all right. Everything fixed, and Mrs. Goodwin had signed it.” Mrs.

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15 S.E.2d 632 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1941)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
196 S.E. 462, 185 Ga. 753, 1938 Ga. LEXIS 812, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomasson-v-hudmon-ga-1938.