Thomason v. Rigney
This text of 314 S.W.2d 450 (Thomason v. Rigney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This is a suit for specific performance of a written contract to convey land; or, in the alternative, for damages for its breach. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the suit is affirmed.
Raymond Thomason, Sr., and Raymond Thomason, Jr., doing business as Thoma-son Partnership, sued Frank E. Rigney, one of the parties described as a “seller” in the contract, but Cora R. Rigney, the joint “seller” therein, was not joined in the suit. The trial court sustained appellee Rigney’s special exceptions holding in effect that the land description in the contract sued upon was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 3995, Vernon’s Annotated Texas Civil Statutes (Statute of Frauds). The court also sustained exceptions to the measure of damages pled by appellants, but the latter action becomes immaterial under the disposition which is made of the case. The appellants elected to stand upon their original pleading and declined to amend, and the trial court dismissed the suit.
The sales contract in this case 1 has very little to distinguish it from that of Burrows v. Seale, 148 Tex. 411, 225 S. W.2d 966, except that the parties described *452 as “seller” in the first paragraph of this contract have a clause following their names reading, “as their interests may appear”; and near the end of the instrument a paragraph labeled “Special Conditions”; also, of course, the description of land differs, it reading: “the following described property; Lying and situated in Taylor County, Texas, and being One Hundred acres, more or less, in Abstract 466, Survey 95, John C. Donley.”
Burrows v. Seale, supra, and the many cases cited therein control the disposition of this case and require that the trial court judgment be affirmed.
Appellants allege in their trial petition that appellee Rigney and his co-seller, Mrs. Cora R. Rigney, own only one tract of land in the John C. Donley Survey of Taylor County and now contend that proof of this would make certain the land described in the contract and would meet the requirements of Article 3995. They rely on and seek to invoke the rule discussed in Pickett v. Bishop, 148 Tex. 207, 223 S.W.2d 222, 223, there stated in this manner:
“The settled rule in this state is that such a description, by reason of the use in the memorandum or contract of such *453 words as 'my property’, ‘my land’, or ‘owned by me’, is sufficient when it is shown by extrinsic evidence that the party to be charged and who has signed the contract or memorandum owns a tract and only one tract of land answering the description in the memorandum.”
They argue that the words “as their interests may appear” is descriptive of the land when taken in connection with the designation of appellee and Cora R. Rig-ney as “Seller”. Their argument running further that this considered with the other language of the contract is a reference to ownership which furnishes a means, when explained by extrinsic evidence, of identifying the particular land appellee Rigney owned in the Donley Survey of Taylor County, and therefore the sales contract contained a sufficient description under the cited authority to meet requirements of the statute of frauds.
The argument of appellant cannot be sustained because the clause “as their interests may appear” is plainly prospective, not referring to an existing interest at the time the contract was made but to such interest as might appear at the time the transaction was closed without regard to the character of the interest or the time when it may have arisen. See Atlas Reduction Co. v. New Zealand Insurance Co., 10 Cir., 138 F. 497, 9 L.R.A.,N.S., 433. Thus such language is not descriptive of the land. It is not the assertion of a present claim or interest in the fee and therefore does not aid in describing the land by stating its ownership.
The initial wording of the sales contract provides that Frank E. Rigney and Cora R. Rigney are to be called “Seller” throughout the contract. In Wilson v. Fisher, Tex.Com.App., 144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150, it is held that it is not a necessary inference that a party who contracts to sell land owns it. To same effect is Starkey v. Texas Farm Mortgage Co., Tex.Civ.App., 45 S.W.2d 999, wr. ref.
Appellants filed an able and concise brief. Each point of error has been considered and they are each respectively overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
. “The State of Texas, "I By This Agree-j- ment and Con-County of Taylor J tract,
“Frank E. Rigney and Cora R. Rigney
“As their interests may appear.
hereinafter called Seller, acting through the undersigned and duly authorized Agent, hereby sells and agrees to convey unto Thomason Partnership, hereinafter called Purchaser, the following described property; Lying and situated in Taylor County, Texas, and being One Hundred acres, more or less, in Abstract 466, Survey 95, John C. Don-
“The purchase price is $57,500.00, payable as follows:
$S,625.00 Cash (of which Purchaser has deposited with the undersigned Agent $5,125.00 as part payment, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by said Agent):
“The balance is to be paid in ten (10) equal annual installments of $4,887.50 each, the first installment being due on October 1, 1956 and a like installment being due on October 1, of each succeeding year thereafter until the full amount is paid. The vendors lien note is to bear interest at the rate of four (4) per cent per annum, payable annually as it accrues. Said vendors lien note is to be payable on or before; however, payment during the year of 1955 will not exceed twenty nine (29) per cent of the purchase price. Grantor agrees to release any portion of land from the vendors lien when said indebtedness is paid at the rate of $375.00 per acre. Land to be released in tracts of 5 acres or more; said tracts to run contiguously. The said executed note to be secured by Vendor’s Lien and Deed of Trust with power of sale and with the usual covenants as to taxes, insurance, and default. *452 “Seller agrees to furnish Complete Ab-traet to said property, which shall be conveyed free and clear of any and all encumbrances except those named herein.
“If abstract is furnished, Purchaser agrees, within ten days from the receipt of said abstract either to accept the title as shown by said abstract or to return it to the undersigned Agent with the written objections to the title. If said abstract is not returned to the Agent with the written objections noted within the time specified, it shall be construed as an acceptance of said title.
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314 S.W.2d 450, 1958 Tex. App. LEXIS 2078, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomason-v-rigney-texapp-1958.