Thomas Wilson v. in Re: Estate of Peter Loftin

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: September 18, 2024
• Docket: 3D2023-0179
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed September 18, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-0179 Lower Tribunal No. 19-5257 ________________

Thomas Wilson, Appellant,

vs.

In Re: Estate of Peter Loftin, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jorge E. Cueto, Judge.

GrayRobinson, P.A., and Jack R. Reiter and Sydney Feldman D'Angelo, for appellant.

Damian | Valori | Culmo, and Russell Landy and Christopher Perse, for appellee Jorian Loftin.

Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY and LOBREE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Thomas Wilson appeals two orders granting Jorian Loftin’s (“Jorian”) counsel’s petition for payment of Class 1 Administrative Expenses, which

found Wilson lacked standing to object to the petition. We reverse, finding

Wilson had standing to object to the petition as co-trustee of a revocable trust

that is the residuary beneficiary of the estate. “Section 733.6171(5) of the

Probate Code, which governs the compensation of attorneys for the personal

representative, confers standing to object to a fee request upon an

‘interested person’ . . . .” Duff-Esformes v. Mukamal, 332 So. 3d 17, 19 (Fla.

3d DCA 2021) (citing § 733.6171(5), Fla. Stat. (2021)). An “interested

person” is defined as “any person who may reasonably be expected to be

affected by the outcome of the particular proceeding involved” and as the

trustee of a trust in any proceeding affecting the expenses of the

administration of a decedent’s estate. § 731.201(23), Fla. Stat. (2022). We

conclude, based on the plain language of statues, that Wilson had standing

as co-trustee to object to the petition for attorney’s fees and costs filed by

Jorian’s counsel. However, we find Wilson’s objection is limited to the

reasonableness of the fees sought, as the parties entered into an agreement

that provides that all parties agreed to the entitlement of fees. See Harley v.

Lopez, 784 So. 2d 447, 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (stating that where appellant

had agreed in writing other party was entitled to attorney’s fees, question

before trial court “was not whether such fees and costs would be awarded,

2 but only what amount would constitute ‘reasonable’ costs and fees”).

Reversed and remanded.