THOMAS W. BERRY, III v. THE BELTRAMI LAW FIRM, P.C.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: May 20, 2026
• Docket: A26A0696
• Status: Published

Opinion

FOURTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, P. J., WATKINS and PADGETT, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

May 20, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A0696. BERRY et al. v. THE BELTRAMI LAW FIRM, P. C., et al.

MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.

Thomas Berry, III and Heather Berry (collectively, “the Berrys”) appeal from

the dismissal of their legal malpractice tort and breach of contract claims against The

Beltrami Law Firm, P. C. and Louis J. Beltrami (collectively, “Beltrami”). Because

the trial court correctly ruled that the claims are barred by the applicable statutes of

limitation, we affirm.

1. Facts and procedural posture

In February 2025, the Berrys filed a complaint asserting, among other things,

claims against Beltrami for legal malpractice sounding in tort and breach of contract.

The complaint alleged that the Berrys had purchased certain real property in April 2014; that they had contracted with Beltrami to conduct a title search with respect to

the property prior to the purchase; that Beltrami had failed in the title search to

discover and disclose an easement encumbering the property prior to the purchase;

and that the Berrys did not learn of the easement until March 2021, resulting in

damages.

Beltrami filed a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings, asserting

that the claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation and that Beltrami

had no attorney-client relationship with, and thus owed no duty to, the Berrys. The

trial court granted the motion to dismiss on both grounds, finding that the legal

malpractice tort and breach of contract claims were barred by the applicable statutes

of limitation and that Beltrami owed no duty to the Berrys. This appeal followed.

2. Statutes of limitation

The Berrys contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their claims against

Beltrami on the basis that they were barred by applicable statutes of limitation. We

disagree.

2 “When determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss a . . . claim as barred

by the statute of limitation, the threshold question is which statute of limitation

applies to the claim.” Titshaw v. Geer, 320 Ga. 128, 140 (3) (d) (907 SE2d 835) (2024).

After determining which statute of limitation applies to a plaintiff’s . . . claim, a court ruling on a motion to dismiss the claim as barred by the statute of limitation must consider whether it is possible, within the framework of the complaint, for the plaintiff to prove that the . . . claim was filed within the applicable limitation period. Only if it is certain that the plaintiff cannot make such a showing should the court grant the motion to dismiss the . . . claim as barred by the statute of limitation.

Id. at 141 (3) (d).

Here, the statute of limitation applicable to the Berrys’ legal malpractice tort

claim was at most four years. See Armstrong v. Cuffie, 311 Ga. 791, 793 (1) n.4 (860

SE2d 504) (2021) (“It has long been the law in this state that a cause of action for legal

malpractice, alleging negligence or unskillfulness, is subject to the four-year statute of

limitation in OCGA § 9-3-25.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). But compare

Titshaw, supra at 130 (1), n. 3 (leaving open the question of whether legal malpractice

claims sounding in tort are governed by the four-year period in OCGA § 9-3-25 or by

the one-year or two-year limitation periods provided by OCGA § 9-3-33). And the

statute of limitation applicable to their breach of contract claim was at most six years.

3 See Titshaw, supra at 129, 132-134 (3) (a), 140 (3) (d) (a

breach-of-contract-for-legal-services claim can be governed by either OCGA §

9-3-24’s six-year statute of limitation or OCGA § 9-3-25’s four-year statute of

limitation, depending on various factors, including whether it is premised on a written

or oral contract).

In Georgia, “[w]hether sounding in contract or tort, a legal malpractice action

accrues and the applicable statute of limitation commences to run from the date that

the alleged wrongful act breached the attorney-client relationship. The cause of action

arises immediately upon the wrongful act having been committed.” Titshaw v. Geer,

368 Ga. App. 266, 268 (1) (888 SE2d 301) (2023) (citations and punctuation omitted),

vacated in part on other grounds by Titshaw, 320 Ga. at 129, 141 (3) (c). See also Frates

v. Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, 164 Ga. App. 243, 244 (1) (296 SE2d 788) (1982)

(“The statute [of limitation] commences to run from the date of the breach of duty,

and not from the time when the extent of the resulting injury is ascertained.”)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

Here, the alleged wrongful act by Beltrami was committed during the title

examination for a real estate transaction that closed in 2014. So even under the longest

4 possible statutes of limitation of four and six years applicable to the respective tort and

breach of contract claims, those limitation periods expired years before the Berrys filed

their complaint in 2025. Accordingly, within the framework of their complaint, the

Berrys cannot show that their claims against Beltrami were filed within the applicable

limitation periods. So the trial court correctly dismissed those claims as barred by the

statutes of limitation.

We note that the Berrys argue on appeal that although their claims against

Beltrami appear to be barred by the governing statutes of limitation, the statutes of

limitation were tolled by the doctrine of equitable estoppel. But the Berrys did not

raise this issue in the trial court. While they cite to their response to Beltrami’s motion

to dismiss as purportedly showing that they made this argument below, a review of

that response belies their contention, showing that they did not raise the issue and

only argued, incorrectly, that their claims did not accrue until the they incurred

damages. See Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop, & Lee, 246 Ga. 804, 806 (1) (273 SE2d 16)

(1980) (in legal malpractice cases, a right of action arises immediately upon the

wrongful act having been committed even though there are no special damages);

5 Frates, supra (the statute of limitation commences to run immediately from the date

of the breach of duty, not from the time when the resulting injury is ascertained).

[I]t is well settled that issues presented for the first time on appeal furnish nothing for us to review, for this is a court for correction of errors of law committed by the trial court where proper exception is taken. Nor may [appellants] alter the course of [their] arguments mid-stream, raising issues on appeal that were not raised before the trial court. [The Berrys] did not raise this issue below; consequently, [they] did not preserve this claim for review on appeal.

Rodriguez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 366 Ga. App. 65, 70 (880 SE2d 606)

(2022) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also First Merit Credit Servs. v.

Fairway Aviation, 359 Ga. App. 829, 836 (2) (860 SE2d 126) (2021) (“Although under

the ‘right for any reason’ rule this court will affirm the correct ruling of a trial court

on grounds not addressed below, we do not apply a ‘wrong for any reason’ rule to

reverse incorrect rulings on issues not raised or ruled upon in the trial court.”)

(citation omitted).

6 3. Duty

Because of our holding above that the trial court correctly dismissed the claims

against Beltrami as barred by the applicable statutes of limitation, we need not address

the trial court’s additional finding regarding duty.

Judgment affirmed. Watkins and Padgett, JJ., concur.