Thomas v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedSeptember 29, 2025
Docket8:25-cv-00145
StatusUnknown

This text of Thomas v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Thomas v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, (D. Md. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

SUZETTA THOMAS, *

Plaintiff, * Case No. 8:25-cv-00145-TJS v. *

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA * TRANSIT AUTHORITY, * Defendant. * * * * * * MEMORANDUM OPINION Pending before the Court is Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s (“WMATA”) Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”).1 ECF No. 23. Having considered the submissions of the parties (ECF Nos. 23, 26 & 31), I find that a hearing is unnecessary. Loc. R. 105.6. For the following reasons, WMATA’s Motion will be granted. I. INTRODUCTION A. Factual Background Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are not in dispute. To the extent any facts are in dispute, they will be considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Suzetta Thomas (“Thomas”), as the non-moving party. Perkins v. Int’l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 196, 205 (4th Cir. 2019). This lawsuit arises from injuries Thomas alleges she suffered when she fell while riding on a WMATA bus in Hyattsville, Maryland. ECF No. 4. On July 2, 2022, Thomas boarded the bus

1 In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), all parties have voluntarily consented to have the undersigned conduct all further proceedings in this case, including trial and entry of final judgment, and conduct all post-judgment proceedings, with direct review by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, if an appeal is filed. ECF No. 16. and paid the fare. ECF No. 23-2. Thomas was not infirm or disabled when she boarded the bus. Id. As the bus driver drove away from the bus stop and into traffic, Thomas began walking down the bus aisle with a bag in each hand. ECF No. 23-4. Thomas was not holding any of the bus poles as she walked down the aisle toward a seat. Id. As Thomas walked down the aisle, the bus driver applied the brakes in response to a turning vehicle in front. Id. Thomas fell backwards and hit the

bus floor. Id. The parties disagree as to how Thomas’s fall occurred. Thomas claims the bus driver applied the brakes suddenly, jerking the bus and causing Thomas to fall to the floor. ECF No. 26- 1. WMATA contends the bus driver appropriately slowed the bus without causing any abnormal or extraordinary movements. ECF No. 23-1. WMATA argues Thomas lost her balance and fell because she failed to hold onto any of the poles as she walked in the aisle of the moving bus. Id. B. Procedural History Thomas filed this negligence action on December 10, 2024, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland, against WMATA for injuries sustained as a result of her fall. ECF

No. 4. On January 15, 2025, WMATA removed the case to this Court. ECF No. 1. Following the close of discovery, WMATA filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 23. C. Choice of Law Under the WMATA Compact, WMATA is liable for torts that its employees commit “in the conduct of any proprietary function, in accordance with the law of the applicable signatory (including rules on conflict of laws).” Md. Code, Transp. § 10-204(80). Maryland adheres to the principle of lex loci delicti to determine the applicable law in tort actions. Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 744 (2000). Under this rule, the “substantive tort law of the state where the wrong occurs governs.” Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 123 (1983). Here, because the event took place in Maryland, the law of Maryland governs Thomas’s negligence claim against WMATA. II. LEGAL STANDARD “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact. Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987). If sufficient evidence exists for a reasonable jury to render a verdict in favor of the party opposing the motion, then a genuine dispute of material fact is presented, and summary judgment should be denied. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). However, the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [opposing party’s] position” is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 252. The facts themselves, and the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007);

Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2008). A party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading but instead must cite to “particular parts of materials in the record” or “show[] that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). III. DISCUSSION To prevail on a claim of negligence in Maryland, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: “(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant’s breach of the duty.” Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 353 Md. 544, 549 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A common carrier owes its passengers the highest degree of care to provide safe means and methods of transportation for them,” while “deliver[ing] them to their destination as expeditiously as possible, consistent with safety.” Todd v. Mass Transit Admin., 373 Md. 149, 156-

57 (2003). A common carrier is not, however, “an insurer of safety to its passengers.” Id. at 156. It is well established in Maryland that once both feet of a passenger are level on the floor, and so long as the passenger has no obvious infirmity, a common carrier driver may move the vehicle even if the passenger is not yet seated. See Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Djan, 187 Md. App. 487, 492 (2009). Once on board, it becomes the duty of the passenger “to use reasonable care to protect himself against the normal motions of the vehicles incident to public transportation.” Mass Transit Admin. v. Miller, 271 Md. 256, 260 (1974) (citing Retkowsky v. Baltimore Transit Co., 222 Md. 433, 437 (1960)). Under Maryland law, a negligence action based on the alleged sudden start or stop of a

common carrier requires the plaintiff to produce evidence of a “definite, factual incident” that is so abnormal, unusual, or extraordinary “that it can be legally found to have constituted negligence in operation.” Retkowsky, 222 Md. at 438 (quoting Johnston v. Greyhound Corp., 139 F. Supp. 551, 555 (1956)). A plaintiff passenger generally cannot prove negligence by relying on mere “adjectival descriptions of the nature of the sudden start or stop.” Id. Maryland courts have found such a “definite, factual incident” in the following scenarios: (1) “rocking, swaying, or jiggling of the streetcar that threw the other passengers back and forth”; (2) “[the plaintiff fell] flat on her back from a standing position, with such force that the driver said he heard her hit the floor”; and (3) “such a violent jerk that it caused the passengers to scream.” Butts v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. GLS-17-855, 2018 U.S. Dist.

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Scott v. Harris
550 U.S. 372 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Iko v. Shreve
535 F.3d 225 (Fourth Circuit, 2008)
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Djan
979 A.2d 194 (Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 2009)
Valentine v. on Target, Inc.
727 A.2d 947 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1999)
Sunthimer v. Baltimore Transit Co.
141 A.2d 527 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1958)
Hauch v. Connor
453 A.2d 1207 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1983)
Mass Transit Administration v. Miller
315 A.2d 772 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1974)
Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti
752 A.2d 200 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 2000)
Baltimore Transit Co. & Penny v. Pue
220 A.2d 551 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1966)
Retkowsky v. Baltimore Transit Co.
160 A.2d 791 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1960)
Todd v. Mass Transit Administration
816 A.2d 930 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 2003)
Matthew Perkins v. International Paper Company
936 F.3d 196 (Fourth Circuit, 2019)
Johnston v. Greyhound Corp.
139 F. Supp. 551 (D. Maryland, 1956)

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Thomas v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-washington-metropolitan-area-transit-authority-mdd-2025.