Thomas v. Thomas

519 So. 2d 357, 1988 WL 3556
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJanuary 20, 1988
Docket19279-CA
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 519 So. 2d 357 (Thomas v. Thomas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas v. Thomas, 519 So. 2d 357, 1988 WL 3556 (La. Ct. App. 1988).

Opinion

519 So.2d 357 (1988)

Christy Lynn Dowden THOMAS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Mark Aaron THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19279-CA.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

January 20, 1988.

*358 Wilkinson, Carmody & Gilliam by Steven E. Soileau, Shreveport, for defendant-appellant.

Claudius E. Whitmeyer, Shreveport, for plaintiff-appellee.

Timothy R. Fischer, Shreveport, for intervenors Clayton and Mable Dowden.

Before JASPER E. JONES, FRED W. JONES, Jr. and NORRIS, JJ.

JASPER E. JONES, Judge.

This appeal arises from custody litigation between the father and maternal grandparents of a two year old child. Mark Aaron Thomas, appellant, is the father of the minor child, Whitney Leigh Anne Thomas. Mable and Clayton Dowden, intervenors, are the maternal grandparents. The father appeals a judgment awarding custody of the minor child to the grandparents. We affirm.

Christy Lynn Dowden Thomas, mother of Whitney, and Mark Aaron Thomas were legally separated on March 12, 1986. The judgment of separation awarded joint custody of the child to both parents but did not specify which should be the primary residential parent. However, the child stayed with her mother and live-in boyfriend in Shreveport after the physical separation of the parties.

The father filed a rule to change custody after the mother and her boyfriend were arrested on drug charges. In October of 1986 the mother was declared unfit and the father was awarded sole custody.[1] A provision *359 of the judgment awarding sole custody to the father was an order requiring Mr. Thomas to abstain from all use of marijuana and further requiring him to undergo monthly drug testing for a period of three months subsequent to the judgment.

The father and his child resided at the home of his parents in Doyline, Louisiana for one week following the judgment and then moved to Ooletewah, Tennessee where the child and her father resided with his sister, Joy Thomas.

On January 27, 1987, the mother filed a petition to fix visitation claiming, among other allegations, that Mr. Thomas moved to Tennessee from Louisiana to prevent her from seeing the child. On the same date the mother's parents, Clayton and Mable Dowden, residents of Phoenix, Arizona, filed a petition of intervention seeking custody of their grandchild Whitney. Judge Gayle Hamilton found the grandparents proved the father's continued custody would be detrimental to the child's best interests. Custody was removed from the father and placed with the grandparents. Mr. Thomas appeals, contending:

(1) the trial judge erred in changing the previous custody judgment;
(2) the trial judge erred in denying appellant's motion to strike;
(3) the trial judge erred in relying upon the profferred testimony of counsel for the grandparents.

Change of the Previous Custody Judgment

The appellant contends the trial judge erred in revoking the prior custody decree and awarding custody to the grandparents. Mr. Thomas contends there were no occurrences subsequent to the award of custody to him in October of 1986 which warrant a change in custody. He argues he has had no female overnight guests except for relatives and has abstained from all use of marijuana after the award of custody. Appellant states he underwent drug testing as per order of the court and points to the test results filed in the record. Appellant further argues the child Whitney has been happy and well-adjusted while living with appellant and his sister in Ooletewah, Tennessee.

Although a parent enjoys a paramount right of custody, that right may be outweighed by a showing of sufficiently great detriment to the child's best interest to require that custody be awarded to a nonparent. Gras v. Gras, 489 So.2d 1283 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986), writ den., 493 So.2d 1222 (La.1986); Boyett v. Boyett, 448 So.2d 819 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984); LSA-C.C. art. 146(B).[2] Where a considered decree of custody has been rendered, there must be a showing of a change in circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the child to justify a change in custody. Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So.2d 1193 (La.1986).[3] Where no considered decree of custody has been rendered, the test to be applied in a change of custody action is the best interest of the children. Dungan v. Dungan, 499 So.2d 149 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986); Bergeron v. Bergeron, supra. The paramount consideration in child custody matters is the best interest of the child. LSA-C.C. art. 146(E); LSA-C.C. art. 157(A); Bergeron v. Bergeron, supra.[4]

*360 Appellant first contends the trial judge should not have changed the October 1986 custody judgment without the grandparents showing a change in circumstances warranting a transfer of custody. Second, appellant contends the grandparents did not prove the award of custody to the father would be detrimental to the child requiring an award of custody to the grandparents to serve the best interest of the child. For the following reasons we find both contentions without merit.

As to appellant's first contention, we conclude the judgment awarding custody to the father is not a considered decree as contemplated by Bergeron and for that reason does not invoke the standards set forth in Bergeron v. Bergeron, supra. A review of the decree awarding custody to the father reveals the judgment to be subject to limitations contained therein and is not an unconditional award of custody to the father. Although evidence was adduced concerning the parental fitness of both parties at the first custody hearing, the final decree placing custody of the child with her father was made subject to two conditions to be fulfilled by Mr. Thomas. The judgment imposed upon him the affirmative duty to (1) abstain from all use of marijuana, and (2) submit to three monthly drug tests to affirm his abstinence. The sole responsibility for obtaining the drug screening rested entirely with the father and he procured the tests in Tennessee. The results of the tests are contained in the reports in the record.

Although the father submitted to some form of drug testing, the record reveals none of the test results show the father to have been tested for the use of marijuana which was the primary concern voiced by the trial judge in requiring the father to undergo the tests. All three tests indicate the father was tested for a variety of drugs, including amphetamine, barbiturate, darvon, and demerol, and the results in each testing were negative. The reports in the record do not reflect that "marijuana," "cannabis," or "THC," the latter being another common name for the substance, were tested. When questioned why the results were lacking, Mr. Thomas professed no understanding of the terminology:

Q. Now, if the pathologist at the laboratory that conducted those tests indicated that the word that would be used to describe marijuana would either be cannabinoid or THC, and that word had not been found on your drug test result, that would indicate that you were not tested for marijuana, correct?

A. I wouldn't know anything about that.

Although the defendant ostensibly complied with the order by submitting to some form of drug testing, we conclude the defendant failed to comply with the true nature of the order as required by the trial judge and readily inferred from the trial judge's oral reasons for awarding custody to the father.

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Bluebook (online)
519 So. 2d 357, 1988 WL 3556, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-thomas-lactapp-1988.