THOMAS v. STATE
This text of 2024 OK CR 15 (THOMAS v. STATE) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
THOMAS v. STATE
2024 OK CR 15
Case Number: C-2023-725
Decided: 05/30/2024
DONALD WAYNE THOMAS, JR., Petitioner v. THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Respondent.
Cite as: 2024 OK CR 15, __ __
OPINION DENYING WRIT OF CERTIORARI
¶1 Donald Wayne Thomas, Jr., Petitioner, pled guilty to unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, in violation of 47 O.S.2021, § 4-102, in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-2022-4725. The Honorable Jason Glidewell, Special Judge, accepted the plea and assessed punishment of four years imprisonment, suspended. Petitioner filed a written request to withdraw the plea, which the trial court denied. Petitioner seeks the writ of certiorari.
FACTS
¶2 Petitioner pled guilty on July 11, 2023, and was sentenced the same day. Thirteen days later, Petitioner returned to court and indicated to plea counsel that he wanted to withdraw the plea. Plea counsel assisted Petitioner in filing a written request to withdraw the plea, which Petitioner signed himself. The request alleged that his plea was coerced and thus involuntary. The docket sheet reflects that Petitioner appeared before the court with plea counsel that same day and the request was set for hearing.
¶3 New counsel was assigned to present Petitioner's motion. The trial court heard the request in an untranscribed and unrecorded proceeding on August 22, 2023. That hearing is described by prosecution and defense counsel in affidavits attached to Petitioner's motion to supplement the record on appeal (see the discussion of this motion below). According to these affidavits, Petitioner testified that he believed his motion to withdraw the guilty plea was due within ten business days. It was filed nine business days, but thirteen days, after the pronouncement of judgment and sentence. The trial court deemed the request untimely and denied it after the hearing.
ANALYSIS
¶4 In his sole proposition of error, Petitioner argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw the plea as untimely and not allowing evidence that he entered his plea under duress, threat, and coercion. We ordinarily review such a ruling for an abuse of discretion, Carpenter v. State, 1996 OK CR 56, ¶ 40, 929 P.2d 988, 998, which is a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, one that is contrary to the logic and effect of the facts presented. Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, ¶ 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170.
¶5 Rule 4.2(A), Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22 O.S., Ch. 18, App. (2024) provides the time limitation for commencing a certiorari appeal from conviction on a guilty plea:
In all cases, to appeal from any conviction on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant must have filed in the trial court clerk's office an application to withdraw the plea within ten (10) days from the date of the pronouncement of the Judgment and Sentence, setting forth in detail the grounds for the withdrawal of the plea and requesting an evidentiary hearing in the trial court. (Emphasis added).
¶6 "No matter may be raised in the petition for a writ of certiorari unless the same has been raised in the application to withdraw the plea." Rule 4.2(B). The failure to present a timely motion to withdraw the plea results in waiver of the right to appeal. See Barnes v. District Court, 1967 OK CR 19, ¶ 5, 423 P.2d 892, 895 (pro se defendant who failed to timely seek to withdraw his plea waived the right to appeal). However, a defendant who has been denied an appeal through no fault of their own may seek an appeal out of time by applying for post-conviction relief in the trial court. See Rule 2.1.
¶7 Counsel acknowledges that Petitioner was properly informed of the ten day rule and filed his motion outside the ten day period, believing he had ten business days. Counsel points out that Petitioner signed the request to withdraw the plea himself and thus nominally pro se. His status as an honestly mistaken pro se litigant is the principal rationale offered for liberalizing the ten day rule in his case. Of course, Petitioner was not pro se in the ten day period. See Randall v. State, 1993 OK CR 47, ¶ 3, 861 P.2d 314, 315 (right to counsel includes the ten day period for filing a notice of intent to appeal). He returned to court after thirteen days and contacted plea counsel, who immediately assisted him in requesting to withdraw the plea. He does not claim that he sought to confirm his beliefs about the time limit or indicated to counsel any wish to withdraw the plea within the ten days allowed by law.
¶8 Despite counsel's argument that we should accommodate his mistaken beliefs as a pro se litigant, this Court has also enforced time limitations of this kind against those acting pro se. See Barnes, supra; Burnham v. State, 2002 OK CR 6, ¶ 9, 43 P.3d 387, 390 (pro se defendant's failure to file notice of appeal was jurisdictional and resulted in dismissal of appeal). Petitioner does not seek an appeal out of time, seeming to tacitly acknowledge that he was not without fault in the delayed filing. Because Petitioner was not free from fault, the trial court cannot have abused its discretion in denying his untimely request. Petitioner waived his right to appeal. His motion to withdraw the plea was therefore properly denied.
¶9 As noted above, pursuant to Rule 2.2(C), appellate counsel has provided affidavits from two defense attorneys and the prosecutor describing what transpired at the untranscribed and unrecorded hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea. Counsel for Petitioner has moved to supplement the record pursuant to Rule 3.11(A) with these affidavits, arguing they are necessary to the resolution of the issues raised on appeal.
¶10 Rule 2.2(C) provides the following procedure for creating an official record of an untranscribed and unrecorded hearing:
If no transcript has been previously prepared and no tape recording is available for any portion of the trial proceedings, the trial attorneys may stipulate or submit affidavits as to what transpired during the proceeding not transcribed or recorded. The trial judge shall enter an order adjudicating any matters upon which the attorneys cannot agree regarding what transpired during the unrecorded or untranscribed proceedings.
¶11 We take this opportunity to discuss the operation of Rule 2.2(C) and its relationship to Rule 3.11. We now hold that Rule 2.2(C) contemplates a proceeding in which counsel must appear before the trial court to offer their stipulations or affidavits (the rule logically would permit live testimony as well) about what transpired in an untranscribed and unrecorded proceeding.
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2024 OK CR 15, 550 P.3d 960, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-state-oklacrimapp-2024.