Thomas v. Standard Fire Insurance Company

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedOctober 8, 2021
Docket2:21-cv-00211
StatusUnknown

This text of Thomas v. Standard Fire Insurance Company (Thomas v. Standard Fire Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas v. Standard Fire Insurance Company, (N.D. Ind. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA HAMMOND DIVISION

RUSSELL THOMAS, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:21-CV-211-JEM ) THE STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE ) COMPANY, ) Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant=s Motion to Dismiss [DE 9], filed July 23, 2021. Defendant seeks dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. I. Background On June 2, 2021, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in Lake Superior Court, Lake County, Indiana. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached its insurance contract with him for failing to pay underinsurance coverage, was guilty of bad faith, was guilty of abuse of process, and that Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages. On July 2, 2021, the matter was removed to this Court by Defendant. Defendant filed this Motion to Dismiss on July 23, 2021. Plaintiff responded on July 29, 2021, and Defendant filed a reply on August 5, 2021. The parties have filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c). II. Standard of Review A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the

1 sufficiency of the complaint and not the merits of the suit. See Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In ruling on such a motion, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts alleged by the plaintiff and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007); see also Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1082 (7th Cir. 2008).

To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must first comply with Rule 8(a) by providing “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), such that the defendant is given “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). Second, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1082. The Supreme Court explained that the “plaintiff=s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that “[t]he complaint ‘must actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing allegations that raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Serv., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2008)). In order “[t]o meet this plausibility standard, the complaint must supply enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery

2 will reveal evidence supporting the plaintiff=s allegations.” Indep. Trust Corp., 665 F.3d at 934-935 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (quotation marks omitted). III. Analysis1 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract fails because it fails to plead the necessary elements of a breach of contract claim. Under Indiana law, “[t]o recover for a breach

of contract, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) a contract existed, (2) the defendant breached the contract, and (3) the plaintiff suffered damage as a result of the defendant=s breach.” Collins v. McKinney, 871 N.E.2d 363, 370 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Defendant argues that the Complaint does not satisfy the basic elements of a breach of contract claim because it does not plead that Plaintiff made a demand under the applicable insurance policy (to establish breach) and that his losses were not covered by the other driver’s insurance (to establish damages). Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s allegations are mere conclusions, rather than factual statements. Plaintiff argues that his pleadings are sufficient under Indiana pleading standards.

Although both Indiana and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana are notice pleading jurisdictions, federal courts apply federal procedural law. Ahepa Nat’l

1 Defendant included Plaintiff’s Complaint and its Exhibit as exhibits to its motion. The general rule is that, when documents are submitted with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must either convert the motion into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 or set aside the documents attached to the motion and rule on the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1998). However, the pleadings which the Court may consider include the complaint, the answer, and any written instruments attached to the complaint as exhibits. See Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 2002); Beam v. IPCO Corp., 838 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir. 1988). The Court declines to convert the motion to a motion for summary judgment since the documents attached are considered part of the pleadings. See Wright v. Assocd Ins. Cos. Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[D]ocuments attached to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to his claim. Such documents may be considered by a district court in ruling on the motion to dismiss.”).

3 Hous. Corp. v. Ahepa 53-Ii, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140549, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Aug 6, 2020). Pleadings must still be “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). It is not the Court’s responsibility to go searching through the Complaint to determine if there are statements which, when cobbled together, might rise to the level of an actionable claim

under any of various legal theories.

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Lakes v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co.
964 N.E.2d 796 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2012)
Tamayo v. Blagojevich
526 F.3d 1074 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Brooks v. Ross
578 F.3d 574 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Collins v. McKinney
871 N.E.2d 363 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2007)
Gibson v. City of Chicago
910 F.2d 1510 (Seventh Circuit, 1990)

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Thomas v. Standard Fire Insurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-standard-fire-insurance-company-innd-2021.